By Shafqat Mahmood
This has consequence; for Pakistan-US relations because the Americans must feel that the teeth of their gift horse are being counted: for the economy, because any serious reduction in aid inflows will have an adverse impact, and for President Zardari, because he is seen as behind-the-scenes operator for the language in the bill targeting the military.
First, some words about the bill. It may be standard practice in the US Congress to include conditions and certifications before disbursement of aid, but it appears humiliating to the recipient.
And in this era of instant communication, nothing can be hidden. We have received aid in the past with tough conditions, but few noticed. This is not possible any more. Anyone with an internet connection can read the small print and react.
Then there is the question of language. While feeling upset about an outside party telling us how to behave, there can be little quarrel with the broad objectives of the stipulated conditions. Fighting terrorism, subscribing to non-proliferation and building a better democracy, are something the people of Pakistan want anyway. The problem is in the way they are being told to go about it.
There is a presumption of guilt in many of the clauses and specific targeting of the military. For example, on terrorism: "the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress in ceasing support, including any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups." This presumes that the Pakistan's government, and specifically its military, is giving such support.
Other clauses also have a similar message, whether it is regarding support and safe havens for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups or the issue of cross-border terrorism. Even on proliferation, the language is accusatory regarding supplier networks and the admonishment that the Pakistani government will continue to dismantle them.
On the unexceptionable broad objective of building democracy and civilian supremacy, the Kerry-Lugar Bill gets into details that are way beyond the acceptable. It first presumes guilt and then says that the military would not "subvert" the political and judicial process. It then gets into the military's internal functioning and seeks civilian control over military budgets, chain of command, promotions to senior ranks, strategic guidance in plans and related issues.
While these are steps towards a better democracy, it is something that the Pakistani people and its institutions have to work out for themselves. For an outside party, to go into such detail, is obviously a blatant interference in our internal affairs and more than embarrassing for the military.
It is also disturbing that the US is treating Pakistani institutions in the bill, such as the civil government and the military, as separate entities. Whatever our internal issues, and we have some way to go in bettering civil-military relations, it is not for an outside party to come and lecture us about it.
And this is where the problem lies. It is the visage adopted by the US of a stern schoolmaster, admonishing an unruly brood, which disturbs Pakistan's armed forces and people.
A debate has started in the National Assembly and it is far from clear whether the government will be able to persuade the legislators to endorse the Kerry Lugar Bill as is. It is more likely that after some give and take, a resolution will be adopted that is critical of it and the government will endorse it. It will then make a claim that national consensus has been achieved.
But the matter does not end here. Will such a resolution mean that we are saying no to US aid or merely that we will receive it with reservations?
The second is more likely because the government sees this brouhaha as a political issue and wants somehow to get beyond it. Whatever the Parliament says will be accepted, but in practical terms it will have no substance. This will seem the only practical solution to the government because it has very little capacity to seek changes in a US legislation that has taken so long to work out.
The US Congress has a tortuous process of creating bills. Both the houses first create their own versions and then reconcile through negotiations. All sorts of elements come into play in the process, including lobbies. To revisit this again, while not impossible, is difficult.
It is more likely that the current version, with all its faults, will be signed by President Obama and it will become US law. Then the ball will be in our court. It will take some courage to say no because it will sour relations with the US. It will also have a negative impact on the economy.
Some economists have argued that we don't really need these 1.5 billion dollars. Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin thinks otherwise, because he has pitched his resource availability for the next financial year on aid inflows.
More importantly, any serious souring of relations with the US can also affect multilateral flows from the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Bank besides drying up the potential pipeline of the so-called Friends of Democratic Pakistan.
A confrontation with the US does not suit Pakistan. The challenge is to use whatever leverage we a have to ensure better and more honourable terms for the aid we get. The supply line to US-NATO forces is one such lever. It has not been used effectively in the past. Maybe the time has come to bring it into play.
In whatever manner this issue plays out the position of President Zardari has become very difficult. There are accusations in the media that his cohorts deliberately got the insulting language, particularly against the military, inserted in the bill. Whether true or not, this perception is rife and must be felt in the military too. How will this affect his future?
I said last week that there is little likelihood of any direct military intervention. But the public anger against Mr Zardari is growing. Besides issues of corruption, he is now becoming the object of widespread anti-Americanism in the country. This makes his position exceedingly shaky.
This does not automatically translate into his removal because no obvious mechanism is visible. Yet it creates the enabling circumstances, the necessary condition for it to happen. The halo of democratic legitimacy that his elected position held has begun to wear thin. This constructs the sufficient condition for his fall.
It is ironic that President Zardari predicated his survival in office on robust support from the United States. He bent over backwards to ensure that it does not waver. This very fact may now become a millstone around his neck. Simplistic notions do not always work.
Email: shafqatmd@gmail.com