Challenges to non-proliferation

Permanent Envoy of Pakistan at the UN Maleeha Lodhi spoke at the UNSC debate on ‘Global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors’ on June 29.

In an implied reference to the efforts by the US to have India admitted into the NSG as a full member, and grant of a waiver, rightly pointed out that making exceptions out of power or profit considerations remained a key challenge to non-proliferation norms and rules.

It is pertinent to point out that for any nuclear state to become member of the NSG, signing of the NPT is a basic condition. The decisions of admittance of a new member and change in the guidelines of the NSG are taken by consensus. However, since signing an agreement with India on the transfer of civil-nuclear technology in 2008, the US has been desperately trying to have India admitted to the NSG and even managed a waiver for the country. Emulating the US, France and the UK also signed civil-nuclear deals with India. Japan has also concluded a similar arrangement with it.

At the time of giving waiver to India some members of the NSG did express concern about India expanding its nuclear arsenal by diverting the fissile materials for production of nuclear weapons. These concerns still persist. Some international agencies have come up with reports recently that India has indeed expanded its nuclear arsenal – after the NSG waiver. US Senator Markey in a Senate hearing said: “since 2008 when we also gave them exemption, India has continued to produce fissile materials for its nuclear programme virtually un-checked. At that time, Pakistan warned us that the deal would increase the chances of the nuclear arms race in South Asia”.

Pakistan rightly felt concerned about these developments and ever since the signing of the civil-nuclear technology deal between the US and India, and the NSG waiver for India, it has been striving hard to convince the US and the international community about its credentials to deserve membership of the group and the adoption of a non-discriminatory approach in regards to giving membership of NSG to the non-NPT states. While US has all along stood for Indian membership of the NSG, it has not adopted a similar approach towards Pakistan. Notwithstanding the efforts of the US and its Western allies to have India admitted to the prestigious nuclear club, the latter failed to get a nod from the plenary session of NSG held in Vienna in November 2016; a number of countries including China insisted on a criteria-based approach in view of the fact that besides India, Pakistan had also applied for the membership of the group. The rejection of the Indian bid in a way was a vindication of Pakistan’s stance on the issue.

The NSG seeks to further the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, through regulatory guidelines on the export of nuclear materials, nuclear reactors, non-nuclear material for reactors, plant and equipment for reprocessing, enrichment and technologies covering these items. The NSG guidelines also govern export of nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies which could make a substantial contribution to an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.

The need for these regulatory guidelines stems from the recognition of the need for international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the NPT and NSG guidelines on the subject. The overall aim of these guidelines is to ensure that nuclear exports are carried out with appropriate safeguards, physical protection, and non-proliferation conditions, and other appropriate restraints.

Though Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT, it has all along supported nuclear non-proliferation and abided by the parameters spelt out by it and different international treaties. Therefore, joining the NSG would be tantamount to global recognition of those efforts. But the question is: has Pakistan done enough to deserve membership of the NSG? For this, one has to look at the measures taken by Pakistan to deserve membership of the group and the criteria laid down by NSG in this regard.

At the third Nuclear Security Summit at Hague in March 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made a forceful case for Pakistan’s inclusion in the NSG. He staked his claim for membership of the group and other international control regimes by declaring that Pakistan had been running a safe and secure civil-nuclear programme for the last 40 years and attached highest importance to nuclear security. Pakistan has the expertise, manpower and infrastructure to produce civil-nuclear energy and has pursued a policy of restraint and credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan’s nuclear security regime is supported by five pillars – a strong command and control system, an integrated intelligence system, rigorous regulatory regime and active international cooperation.

The security regime covers physical protection, material control and accounting, border controls and radiological emergencies. The prime minister said that Pakistan has also has been regularly submitting reports to the UNSC 1540 committee on the measures that the country has put in place to exercise control over transfer of sensitive materials and technologies. That is exactly in line with the criteria for admitting new members to the NSG, which stipulate that an aspiring country should have the ability to supply nuclear items covered in the NSG guidelines; should have a proven record of adherence to those guidelines taking necessary actions in that regard; must have enforced legally based domestic export control system; should have complied with obligations under the NPT and other treaties; and should have supported international efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. Pakistan, as is evident, surely qualifies for membership of the NSG.

Any discriminatory treatment towards Pakistan in regard to membership of the NSG is likely to push Pakistan for ‘full-nuclear deterrence’, which will deal a big blow to the efforts of the international community to promote the cause of non-proliferation. As against this, simultaneous inclusion of Pakistan and India in the NSG will not only establish the principle of non-discrimination but would also add to the strength of the NSG in furthering the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and well-controlled export of nuclear materials for promoting international nuclear trade cooperation.

As member of the NSG, Pakistan would be in a better position to contribute to firming up and refining the regulatory guidelines and safeguarding its interests. It would also allow Pakistan to export nuclear materials to other countries under the gaze of the global community, in a legitimate manner with all the accompanying economic benefits. It will also reinforce its credentials as a useful member of the global community.

Policies subservient to expediencies and vested interests would scuttle efforts to check proliferation of nuclear weapons and other related causes. It is hoped that the members of the NSG, the US and its allies will keep all the foregoing variables into consideration and give adequate and well-deserved attention to the security concerns of Pakistan while deciding the fate of the request of both the countries.

The writer is a freelance contributor. Email: ashpak10@gmail.com