The first three weeks of the New Year have seen two significant developments, both involving Iran, in the Middle East. One is the severance of Riyadh-Tehran diplomatic relations and the other is the lifting of international sanctions on Iran.
The Middle East has two capital credentials: it is endowed with enormous oil wealth; and for centuries it has been a hotbed of sectarian schism. This combination of oil wealth and internal strife has made the region a flashpoint of international politics. Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two principal regional powers as well as patres familias of the two sects – Shia and Sunni – have locked horns in their bid to be the leading nation in the region. In the course of their strategic rivalry, each has supported and opposed governments and movements in the neighbouring countries much to the detriment of those states.
Although relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have seldom been easy, the tensions between the two shot up when the Saudis executed an eminent Shia cleric. In Tehran, an enraged mob reacted by attacking the Saudi embassy leading Riyadh to shun Iran diplomatically. Some of the allies in the Gulf expressed solidarity with Riyadh by cutting off or downgrading diplomatic ties with Tehran.
While the execution of the Shia cleric and its consequences may be the proximate cause of the severance of diplomatic relations, several other factors are also responsible. These include acrimony over the Yemen and Syrian crises, Saudi reservations over a thaw in Tehran’s relations with the West in the wake of a successful nuclear deal last year, and, to top it all, Iran’s exclusion from the 34-member alliance of Muslim states announced by Saudi Arabia to fight the twin forces of religious extremism and terrorism also contributed to pushing the bilateral relations to a low ebb.
The deterioration of Saudi-Iran ties will have repercussions on Muslims all over the world including Pakistan. As a rule, the antagonism between the two nations is seen as an expression of the sectarian schism, with people by and large taking sides on the basis of the sects they adhere to. This makes both countries put more money and effort into the proxy war that they have been fighting for decades in various Muslim countries including Pakistan. The proxy war sharpens the sectarian divide and so on.
The Tehran-Riyadh acrimony also presents a difficult policy option for the governments in these countries. An outright support to either country is bound to annoy the adherents of the other sect. Neutrality may be the best option but at times maintaining a neutral posture becomes difficult, especially if the crisis lingers on. Countries like Pakistan are walking a tight rope as they seek to even out their relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Islamabad went a step further by sending its two most powerful persons on a peace mission to both countries.
Evidently, one of the chief beneficiaries of the Saudi-Iran rivalry will be the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh. Such apocalyptic organisations feed on political uncertainty and sectarian divide. The fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia have failed to stand united against Daesh in not surprising. Nor was Iran’s exclusion from the multiparty Saudi-sponsored alliance aiming at putting down such extremist outfits. The tussle will also undermine the efforts to thrash out the Syrian problem in which both nations have high stakes.
In a welcome statement, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei has decried the storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran, describing is as act that will harm his country as well as Islam. Whether the remarks have anything to do with Pakistan’s mediation efforts is anybody’s guess – though Islamabad can take credit for it. At any rate, one needs to be careful in reading too much into the statement. Sanctity of diplomatic premises is a basic norm in inter-state relations and Iran’s image was tarnished by the attack on the embassy. The supreme leader’s word of condemnation does not imply a softening of Tehran’s position.
In the power game against Tehran, Riyadh has had the benefit of having the US and its European allies on its side. Whether it’s the crisis in Yemen or the situation in Syria, the West and the Saudis have been on the same side. The crippling economic sanctions also squeezed the space for Iran to manoeuvre.
The regional scenario will, however, change in the wake of lifting of the sanctions on Iran. The development will create enormous commercial opportunities for Iran as well as Western nations. The country will be able to significantly drive up its oil exports, the mainstay of the economy, and attract foreign investment. For the Western economies, Iran, a consumption-oriented society, will be an attractive market for capital intensive exports including those of commercial aircraft.
The thaw in Washington-Tehran relations may also be instrumental in withdrawing American opposition to Iran’s admission into the WTO. Once in that club, Iran’s access to the international market will improve. It will also have to open up its economy to foreign competition. Economic liberalisation is always a catalyst for social change. So we are likely to see significant changes in Iranian society in the years to come.
More important than the likely economic benefits are the message that the withdrawal of the sanctions convey. Iran’s nuclear programme, which invited multilateral and bilateral sanctions, was only one of the issues that strained its relations with the West. During Iran’s negotiations with the P-5, a lot more was on the table than whether the country’s nuclear programme was peaceful or not.
The pre-1979 Islamic revolution Iran was a strategic ally of the US as well as a linchpin of the Washington-sponsored regional security system. In the post-sanctions scenario, what the Saudis fear above all is not Iran’s ability to double its oil exports but that its erstwhile credentials may be revived. Iran already has a lot of clout in the Middle East, where substantial Shia populations reside. It is arguably the only stable democracy in the region. And of course, the US and Iran also have a common enemy in Al-Qaeda and now the IS. As the House of Saud sees it, any strategic gains that Tehran makes will be at the expense of Riyadh.
Iran’s strategic importance in the changing Middle East scenario played a crucial role in making the US strike a deal with the country, notwithstanding Tehran’s support to the Assad regime in Syria, and the apprehension of its Gulf neighbours and Israel that a rejuvenated Iran may be a more serious threat to their stability and interests.
The writer is a graduate from a western European university.
Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com
