Pursuing peace

The joint statement issued by the prime ministers of India and Pakistan in Sharm el-Shiekh is a welcome development for peace in the subcontinent. Two aspects of the joint-statement are particularly noteworthy. One, it recognises that the whole gamut of actions demanded by India to confront militant groups based in Pakistan harbouring terrorist designs against India cannot be a prerequisite to the recommencement of the composite dialogue. And, two, the mention of Balochistan acknowledges, without including any formal accusation against India by Pakistan, the concern and perception widely shared by the state and the society in Pakistan that Baloch separatists are being supported (if not sponsored) by Indian intelligence agencies.

Post-Mumbai, India made two demands in relation to a curb on terror groups operating out of Pakistan. One was the immediate-term request to prosecute the operators and sponsors of the Mumbai attacks. And the other was the generic demand to dismantle what India calls the "infrastructure of terror" within Pakistan--i.e., India-focused militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, and their suspected extensions such as Jamaat-ud-Dawaa. The agreement to de-link recommencement of the composite dialogue from actions on terrorism thus signified the understanding that the immediate-term demand for the prosecution of the perpetrators of Mumbai would be de-linked from the medium-term demand for the infrastructure of terror within Pakistan to be dismantled. The former would be accomplished immediately, while the latter would be dealt with as part of the composite dialogue, the scope of which already covers terrorism.

Once you concede that peace and normalcy would serve the national interest of both India and Pakistan better, the decision to move ahead with the composite dialogue and de-link the immediate-term and medium-term actions imperative to the curtailment of terrorism makes abundant sense. India's continued insistence on implicating the Pakistani Army and intelligence agencies for their role in nurturing and supporting loosely-controlled non-state militant groups would be tantamount to beating a dead horse. True, the Pakistani state has had a role in rearing the Frankenstein that is now lighting up fires of intolerance, bigotry and terror across Pakistan, apart from planning and executing attacks across Pakistan's borders. But that original sin was the product of a grand geostrategic design conceived by the West, led by the US and the UK, and implemented by Pakistan.

Hillary Clinton has acknowledged the US role in propping up militants in this neighbourhood, and President Zardari, for his part, has recently accepted Pakistan's involvement as well. The unofficial argument of Pakistan after Mumbai was not that the Pakistani state has no historic responsibility for the misconceived jihadi project, but that it had no continuing involvement with the acts of terror being carried out by militant groups that were out of its control, especially given that the citizens and law-enforcement officials of Pakistan were the primary victims of terror. Once the responsibility of past conduct is separated from the liability for contemporary policies, acts and omissions and the gauge for determining culpability in today's world is adjusted accordingly, the Pakistani state and its agencies seem to pass muster.

Over the last half-a-decade Army has taken many more casualties in the war against insurgency presently raging on in the North-west than all other wars put together. Pakistan has lost more civilians to terror over the last few years than any other country of the world. And the cost of this war for Pakistan's economy has been colossal. It has also been acknowledged by the US that in the first phase of the war against militancy in the post-Musharaf era, still underway in Swat, the Pakistani Army has fought valiantly, resolutely and without distinguishing "good" militants from the "bad." In its second phase, now in the offing, the war effort will be expanded to cleanse Waziristan and other tribal agencies of militants.

The second phase of the war is expected to be fiercer than the first one and could preoccupy the Army for a much longer period. What India fears is that even if the Pakistani Army succeeds in the first two phases of its war against insurgents and terrorists in the North-west, there might not be a third phase of this war where the Army would take on the India-focused militant groups based in Punjab – who have no record of attacking citizens or security agencies within Pakistan.

This is the part of Pakistan's "infrastructure of terror" that India is predominantly concerned about, and hence the erstwhile insistence that dismantling of such infrastructure be a precondition for peace talks. But abiding by India's request at this time is not possible for Pakistan for reasons of capacity and, not necessarily, will. For the same reason that Pakistan would never wish to be engaged in an external war on the eastern and western fronts simultaneously, initiating the third phase of war against militancy in Punjab, while the second phase in the tribal belt drudges on, is neither feasible nor desirable: it would overstretch the Army and its fighting capacity.

It is undoubtedly in Pakistan's interest to eradicate all militant groups without regard to their professed goals and targets. There can be no exception to the growing acknowledgment that Pakistan's jihadi project was misconceived since its inception, and that the political, economic, social and diplomatic costs for the country of breeding or tolerating militant groups, inspired by an obscurantist and intolerant version of religion and trained in the art of violence, are prohibitive. But the process of purging militants and the ideology supporting them will be arduous and time-consuming, for it will entail debating and redefining the role of religion within the country, initiating effective madrasa reforms, plugging international conduits that finance militant groups, and revisiting and revising Pakistan's strategic doctrine.

It is in Pakistan's interest to plan for the third phase of the war against militancy as well as in the interest of improved relations with India. But such recognition will need to come from within Pakistan to bolster its political and military will to initiate a disruptive war within its heartland in Punjab. India doesn't possess any levers of powers capable of coercing Pakistan into making such a decision, and thus holding out on the composite dialogue cannot help. However, a peace process aimed at fairly resolving all pending disputes between India and Pakistan could empower India with more persuasive ability in its dealing with Pakistan.

The success of the peace process is contingent on understanding the sensitivities of Pakistan and India and questioning previously unquestioned assumptions. The reference to Balochistan in the Sharm el-Shiekh statement, for example, underscores two fundamental concerns of Pakistan. One, that the future of Afghanistan has direct consequences for Pakistan's security and strategic interests, and proposals for an enhanced Indian role and presence on Pakistan's western border within Afghanistan – even under the garb of continuing developmental activities – will continue to cultivate suspicion within Pakistan. And, two, the move to permanently shelve the jihadi project must be accompanied by a principled decision to end the proxy wars being waged by the intelligence agencies of both countries.

And in this regard, India's insistence that RAW is under effective civilian control is a non-starter, because makes any accusations of Indian intelligence activities and interference within Pakistan outlandish. Civilian control alone doesn't make the incendiary nature of intelligence work kosher. There is thus the need for India to investigate the information being provided by Pakistan and decommission any intelligence projects presently operational.

Finally, the success of the peace process will depend on the ability of leaders in both countries to convince their people to buy into the compromises that the two countries will need to make in order to establish permanent peace. Here Pakistan has a head start. By proposing his "soft border" solution, Gen Musharaf took a giant step away from Pakistan's traditional view that Kashmir can only be solved in consonance with the half-century-old UN resolutions and readjusted public expectations regarding a final settlement of the dispute. Similarly, President Zardari also extended the olive branch to India: he has stated that he views militants in Kashmir (the non-indigenous Kashmiris) as terrorists; he has emphasised that he entertains no threat from India and wishes to build strong trade relations; and he recently acknowledged the role of the Pakistani state in fostering militant groups.

If peace is to be given a chance in the subcontinent, the challenge for the Pakistani and Indian leaderships is not to allow themselves to be held hostage by public opinion rooted in past hostilities and failed ideas. The perseverance needed to painstakingly sort out substantive disputes between the two nations will need to be accompanied by dexterous management of the expectations of domestic constituencies in both countries.



The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu