Carrots and caveats

The writer is a retired air-vice marshal, former ambassador and a security and political analyst.
When Susan Rice, US national security adviser and an Obama confidante, visited Pakistan, President Ashraf Ghani had already blasted his most intense volley to date against Pakistan – another came later in a BBC interview. By then both India and Pakistan had cancelled their NSA talks and dampened hopes for a dialogue that could have led to normalcy in their relations. This had followed a week of acrimony in public debate burying peace under senseless sabre-rattling.
It has been usual for the US to intervene as a patronising parent when the two squabbling children – India and Pakistan – trump common sense leading to ugly confrontations with a potential to spirally escalate. It was, thus, that many felt that Ms Rice’s calming hand at such a critical juncture came to soothe raised hackles.
Also, Afghanistan was still an interest with the Americans because they wished to see their surviving order succeed giving them cause to withdraw the remaining 10,000 men back to America. What takes precedence, however, is America’s fresh indulgence in the fast evolving geopolitics in Syria, and Russia’s growing assertiveness.
Surely she discussed Afghanistan, not in terms of ‘doing more’ but to ‘do as much as is possible’. For there remains that all-important matter for Pakistan of the $300 million in Coalition Support Fund that is linked to Pentagon’s certification of Pakistan’s efforts to neutralise the Haqqani Network. Nato/Isaf General Campbell has done precisely that while deposing before a Senate Committee within the last week. With that the frivolous was done and over with.
Immediately after, she went right into real business. She was in Beijing before Islamabad to prepare for President Xi Jinping’s forthcoming visit to Washington. This included presenting President Obama’s vision for global security and order to President Xi. Two elements of the plan stood out – Syria and Isis, and of course Russia which somehow had to be roped in as a partner to the plan.
The purpose was simple: ‘this is what the US is going to do about the future order beginning with Syria; it was up to those now receiving the briefing to position themselves in the plan’. This was ‘with us’ or ‘against us’ in a different packing. Or ‘if you wish to stay by the side of America, come prepared with what you can bring to the table in this American mission’.
The same briefing, tailored for relevance, was repeated in Islamabad, since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif too was to make his official visit to Washington beginning October 22. In China, the briefing may well have asked China to ameliorate Russia’s intransigence, as indeed seek Chinese support for the effort in money and material. In Pakistan the thought left behind was pretty simple: ‘Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan were all in it to fight Assad and Isis; will Pakistan too commit troops in this all-important fight against a rogue regime and a growing monster in Isis?’ Period.
Since then President Obama has spoken directly to President Putin, who seemingly has his own vision and his own plan to end the strife in Syria; worryingly for the US, it does not coincide with Obama’s. In fact he is now fighting on the opposing end as his naval, land and air assets in Syria bolster the Assad regime against those fighting to bring him down. This includes the Al Nusra Front supported and armed by the US, and Isis which is a common enemy to both Assad and the US.
Of late, Pakistan has successfully resisted involving itself in foreign ventures. Requests by the Saudis for Pakistani forces to help them (the Saudis) in Yemen were politely turned down with as much embellished diplomacy as could be invoked when dealing with a historically benevolent friend.
But this is another kind of challenge; Pakistan has mostly, and practically, always accommodated American requests, even at the cost of its own long-term interest and health. How will the prime minister deal with this one is as much befuddling as it is a test of Pakistan’s newfound resolve of keeping its own interests uppermost.
As a way of summation, the US is on a sabbatical from the conflictual intricacies in West Asia and needs time to focus on its prime interest in Syria. In pursuit, therefore, it seeks yet another coalition that will do its work for her. If it thinks Pakistan should be one such partner, there is little to contest that impression given Pakistan’s past. There are two carrots – at least – being readied in Washington to dangle before the Pakistani prime minister to take the bait. David Ignatius, in his Washington Post piece, leaked one recently – mentioning the possibility of the US offering Pakistan a civil-nuclear deal similar to the one that was offered to India; for long a bane in US-Pakistan relations. This one will be hard to crack.
At times it is easier to hide behind popular positions without exposing one’s self to the vulnerability of finally making the call. When the Indo-US nuclear deal was announced, Pakistan took a public position which was in consonance with the international nuclear framework and subsumed Pakistan’s concerns on India’s de jure accession to the nuclear mantle without having signed the NPT. But, it was still not sure whether to accede to one if offered. Over the years, our claim to parity with India in the matter has become our default position, without yet having tested the fidelity of determining whether we will take such an option. A typical case of rhetoric leading policy.
The reason for avoiding making the call on this is as clear as it was when the Indian deal was first mentioned. Under the deal, India is required to open some of its facilities to international inspection and monitoring, with a significant capacity still left out for military use – read weapon development. India has a large enough base to open most of its facilities – yet keeping fourteen of them out, and in wraps. Pakistan’s base isn’t large enough. Also, such a deal, governing trade of nuclear materials, will impact the delivery of future Chinese reactors to Pakistan, due under a grandfather-agreement. That will hit Pakistan’s civil nuclear programme hard.
It still is too big a carrot to be avoided. The de jure accession to the nuclear mantle is rising to the highest table where recognition comes easy. Pakistan, having served its time in the pits, deserves to be raised to that level. See how nation after nation in the Middle East has failed against the challenge of simple political transformation reeling under shallow societal and governance structures; and how Pakistan has stood the challenge, far deeper and more dangerous to its existence, on the basis of a strong nationhood.
While others have fragmented and shrivelled, Pakistan has stood the test with resilience, institutional competence and deep social strength. This has been no mean achievement. Perhaps accepting the responsibility to submit to the global regimes after formal accession will be the right move to make. But it all depends on what the cost is, and where Pakistan finds itself on the spectrum of credible minimum deterrence.
Considering Pakistan cannot dilute its own focus on fighting terror – a growing part of which is closing the space to evolving threats as Isis – and the fact that relations with India continue to be dangerously tenuous, the scope to participate in expeditions far away from home can only be foolhardy. Pakistan did well to refuse Saudi Arabia for assisting with military forces, and it will continue to do well by keeping out of other proposed engagements. The nuclear carrot could thus wait.
Pakistan must, however, do all it can to stem the rot in Afghanistan and secure itself from the malfeasance of a dissembling neighbourhood. This carrot Pakistan should happily accept. Beyond it, no carrot is big enough to supersede Pakistan’s interests.
Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com