Blunders from across the Durand Line

The writer works for Geo TV.
A rare opportunity for both Afghanistan and Pakistan to remove all hurdles in mutual relations is lost. The first year of the Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan, and the policies it adopted, was a golden opportunity. In my previous column I had tried to outline the mistakes committed by Pakistan – which resulted in a horrible diplomatic failure. Today, as promised, I attempt to enumerate failures from the Afghan side.
For one, Hamid Karzai’s gifts to Afghanistan, and the biggest achievement on the internal front in Afghanistan, were the constitution and parliament. However, he too failed to develop a political system based on political parties. He neither formed his own party, nor allowed anyone else to do so. The same is true for Ghani, as he does not belong to any political party. Afghanistan is still waiting for a political system based on political parties.
The net result is that politics in Afghanistan revolves around personalities. So the Ghani government is an amalgamation of different personalities, with spheres of influence in different areas. All factions are part of this government due to pressure exerted from the US and its allies.
What is even worse is that each prominent personality in politics has some connection or the other with one or more foreign country or their agencies. A few even prefer to keep in contact with three or more foreign governments at the same time. This particular factor is responsible for Ghani’s failure to form a strong and cohesive government. The Taliban, keeping in view the real political position of Ghani and his government, preferred to initiate talks with other real and foreign players like the US and other neighbouring countries.
Another failure on the Afghan side is that even after completion of one calendar year, Ghani is still grappling with the issue of finalisation of his cabinet. The Afghan parliament has already completed its term, but instead of fresh elections, the Ghani government preferred to extend its tenure. Ghani’s attempt to form a government that has credible, young and talented youth has proven to be quite a challenge. Warlords that Ghani wished to oust from Afghan politics are in power; perhaps Ghani forgot that these very warlords brought him to the President House.
Now feeling uncomfortable with the Ghani government, some of these warlords are in active contact with the Taliban. It was a very noble, albeit idealistic, plan to form a government with young, fresh technocrats. This was not possible as Ghani has the task of distributing power seats among Rasheed Dostem, Abdullah Abdullah and other colleagues, who further have to distribute that bounty to placate their constituents.
It is a rather known fact in Afghan politics that Ghani is a far weaker president at the internal front than Karzai was. If Ghani is able to deliver, the resulting cohesion in government would deter Taliban. In the present conditions, due to aa weak government in Kabul, power players in Afghanistan are seeking active links with the Taliban for safer future.
Third, Ghani has taken great risk and stopped working on a strategic partnership with India. He initiated strategic cooperation with Pakistan at the institutional level. This naturally enraged the Indian lobby. Ghani, unfortunately, failed to control that lobby from working against him and his plans. The lobby focused its efforts against Pak-Afghan partnership and the Ghani government. This led to Ghani’s failure in honouring his pledges with Pakistan.
Though the Afghan government significantly helped Pakistan after the APS Peshawar attack, Pakistan continued its scepticism and kept up its complaints regarding TTP and RAW activities in Afghanistan. Afghan media, in the habit of running anti-Pakistan slogans and shows, continued to work on its usual course. All this created an impression in the minds of the Pakistani leadership that Afghanistan still could not be trusted.
As a fourth blunder, we have the issue of the refugees. The Afghan Taliban is part of the Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. If Pakistan asks for their repatriation or at least a strict monitoring arrangement, it is strongly condemned and opposed by Afghanistan. Even the Afghanistan government and leadership do not support the idea of standard border management. During a meeting in the UK, when the then Pakistani PM Yousaf Raza Gilani stressed the need for border management, the then Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, harshly turned down the proposal. He asked how it was possible that Afghans should be asked for a passport and visa to enter even Pakistan.
So one one side there we have 30,000-50,000 persons crossing the border without any identification and on other side the Afghan government demands that the Taliban should not be seen in Pakistan. Indeed the Taliban greatly benefit from such a loose identification process at the world’s most risky and important border.
Fifth, at the internal front, the Afghan government failed to demonstrate any capacity in controlling the Taliban. The Nato and allied forces reduced their operations to drones and airstrikes, and left the ground to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan police. These forces proved to be very ineffective. Afghanistan again blamed Pakistan for this failure, but the Taliban’s success in provinces that have no border or contact with Pakistan shows the capacity deficit of Afghanistan’s security paraphernalia.
The province of Kunduz is situated at the border of Tajikistan. If one accepts the accusation that the terrorists originate from Pakistan, the question is what Afghan security does when the Taliban leave Pakistan, cross the Pak-Afghan border and travel to Afghanistan to conduct, for example, a full-fledge successful military operation in Kunduz.
Another mistake on the Afghan side was declaring the death of Mullah Omar. Afghanistan declared the death at a time when high-level delegations from the Taliban, and representatives of China and the US were in Islamabad for a second round of talks. Afghanistan refused to talk and this resulted in the collapse of all efforts.
A few things are very clear. If the death of Mullah Omar was something of a surprise for the Afghan government, then indeed this is a terrible failure of Afghan intelligence. However, that is not the case as in the past the Afghan government on many occasions claimed that Mullah Omar was dead. I am confident that in comparison to Nawaz Sharif, Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani were far more informed about the death of Mullah Omar.
This was essentially an internal issue of the Taliban. If Mullah Akhtar Mansour was commanding the Taliban as Mullah Omar, and was issuing speeches in his name, that had nothing to do with the peace talks. What matters most to Afghanistan at that time was the fact that Pakistan brought the top leadership of Taliban along with international delegations to settle the issue. Mullah Mansour also issued a statement in the name of Mullah Omar to support those negotiations. So from the Afghan perspective, it was in the best interest of Afghanistan to protect that secret to ensure a peaceful Afghanistan. This news embarrassed the Taliban, and to reunite power, Mullah Mansour had no other option but to prove his power through guns and bombs.
There are certain other minor issues that resulted in failure. To achieve a peaceful Afghanistan and a prosperous Pakistan, it is time the Afghan government corrected its mistakes; and Pakistan concentrated on working on its failures. It is very clear that if Afghanistan remains trapped in anarchy, it will result in the collapse of the economy and social systems of Pakistan, Afghanistan – even the whole region.
Negotiations are the only option left with Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban. Without talks, everyone stands to lose, and all stakeholders will be doomed to sitting with guns in their hands for the next several decades.
Email: saleem.safi@janggroup.com.pk