In the corridors of uncertainty

Once again, the political system of Pakistan – fragile as it is – is under severe stress. Rumours about the exit of the government and installment of an interim setup comprising technocrats are doing the rounds. The country seems to be heading towards another era of heightened political uncertainty – if it isn’t already in it – where the casualty may not only be the government but the democratic dispensation itself.

Like it or lump it, the political system is not strong enough to deal with the challenges facing the country. As the country’s history bears out, the political system’s capacity to absorb shocks is seriously limited. If the political system breaks down, no popular political party will gain anything. Instead, the beneficiaries will be political pigmies who have no constituency in the public and who can sneak into the power corridors only through the back doors.

The very idea of an interim regime is unconstitutional. The constitution only provides for caretaker governments – both at the centre and in the provinces – after the dissolution of the assemblies and before fresh elections, with a limited mandate and for a short period. Besides, the Supreme Court has categorically declared in its July 31, 2009 verdict that the constitution cannot be held in abeyance regardless of the circumstances.

Be that as it may, Pakistan has a history of experimenting with extra-constitutional setups, which have lived longer than any constitutional government. In addition, constitutional provisions or judicial decisions, with all their importance, can hardly constitute in themselves a strong bulwark against extra-constitutional steps.

A political system may be seen as consisting of two components: structure and culture. It is on these components and how they interact that the effectiveness of a political system hinges. The political structure is the set of roles created by the constitution and laws made thereunder that are formalised into offices and institutions. A political culture is the psychological dimension of the political system and consists of attitudes, beliefs and values that are prevalent in a polity and society. To use a figure of speech, while the structure is the form or body of the political system, the culture is its substance or soul.

A political system may have all the ingredients of a democratic dispensation. These include: i) a written constitution, which distributes powers among various state organs and defines the relationship between the governors and the governed through fundamental rights and duties; ii) political parties, which offer alternative solutions to public problems; iii) an election commission, which conducts polls in a free, fair and transparent manner; iv) parliament, which expresses the popular will; v) the executive, which carries out that will; and vi) the judiciary, which ensures rule of law, justice and the expeditious settlement of disputes.

But the real test of a political system is to have a corresponding culture. It is easier to put in place a democratic political structure than to have a democratic political culture. It is easier to set up political institutions than to strengthen them. It is easier to draw up a democratic constitution than to ensure that it works in a democratic fashion. It is easier to hold elections than to conduct them fairly and squarely. It is easier to form a political party and keep it intact than to run it democratically.   

For a political system to be effective, the elaborate political structure must be supported by the political culture and institutions must be backed by the right attitudes. The fate of a political system is all but sealed when the political structure is not supported by the political culture, the written provisions of the constitution are not backed by healthy constitutional conventions and parliament passes laws but lacks the will to enforce them. The system is affected when the institutions fail to draw respect from those who are supposed to uphold them, politics becomes no more than a corporate affair, political parties are reduced to a platform to prop up sons and daughters and governance becomes the instrument of rewarding cronies and penalising opponents.

Matters tend to worsen when candidates get votes not because of their credentials but because they can use the carrot or the stick to their advantage. The fate of the political system is also impacted when courts feel shy of bringing the high and mighty to the book or when they set about doing so and their decisions are disregarded or ridiculed. The effects are also visible when leaders are revered as saints beyond criticism and error, demagogues and rabble-rousers are regarded as saviours and there is law but not rule of law.  

The political system of Pakistan is a victim of the same structure-culture and form-substance dichotomies. There are popularly-elected legislatures and governments – which are accountable to the people for their acts of omission and commission; political parties – which, in theory at least, are wedded to the cause of democracy and good governance; and the constitution – which limits the powers of the executive, grants fundamental rights to the people and provides a detailed mechanism to enforce them. This looks nice but only on paper.

In reality, the political culture, which makes the political system tick, seldom matches the political structure. Politicians seldom make their personal and party interests subservient to those of democratic institutions and work for the success of democracy rather than their personal glory or success. The political culture is markedly deficient in healthy political conventions, such as fostering respect for institutions and rule of law, which lie at the heart of democracy.

Those in power have the tendency to staff institutions with their own loyalists to get the policies or decisions that they want. When they are out of power, the same people champion the cause of independence of these institutions.

A strong political system embodies a consensus among political forces against political authoritarianism; this consensus is the hallmark of a truly democratic polity. In India, for instance, there are parties of the right, centre and the left, which may differ on various points. Notwithstanding such differences, they all agree that the country should be a multi-party democracy. It is probably this agreement that, more than any other factor, has prevented any military adventurer from stepping in. Conversely, military takeovers have always found a lot of political support and sympathy in Pakistan.

While giving the rationale for the army takeover on July 5, 1977, the then army chief Gen Ziaul Haq had stated: “When the political leaders fail to steer the country out of a crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the armed forces to sit as silent spectators. It is primarily for this reason that the army perforce had to intervene to save the country”.

Indisputably and unambiguously, intervention in politics is never justified, even if it is meant to steer the country out of a crisis. In addition, the incompetence or corruption of a civilian government does not constitute a valid ground for the suspension or abrogation of the constitution and installment of an unelected set-up. Such a dispensation demolishes the democratic structure and crushes any hope of building a democratic polity that is based on rule of law and public accountability.

But extra-political intervention – whether direct or indirect – cannot be averted merely because it is unconstitutional. The point is that in Pakistan the failure of the democratic dispensation to deliver the goods to the people coupled with the lack of consensus among political forces against extra-constitutional acts has provided a fertile ground for undemocratic interventions.

The writer is a freelancecountributor.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com