The long shadows of July 5

On the night of July 5, 1977 we were discussing the implications of the coup at Lakshmi Mansion, Lahore. The optimists, mostly jiyalas, were hopeful that it was a smart Bhutto tactic to outmanoeuvre his opponents, and that the agency of martial law would be of a short spell.

Pessimists, like me, predicted it was going to be much worse and much longer a spell. We dispersed and had to suffer for long years either underground or in prison as the unending shadows of the most ruthless and right-wing coup of General Ziaul Haq continued for so long. It was much worse than what even the worst critics had expected.

The parties of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) – after having badly lost the elections (albeit with charges of rigging in a few constituencies) against the still very popular Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – were prompted by aspiring Bonapartists to launch an anti-Bhutto agitation. (We have witnessed a similar attempt during a sponsored dharna against yet another elected government). All those forces, from the bazaar to the clergy and the provincial nationalists, which were badly affected by Bhutto’s state-socialism and populist narrative, got together under the Islamist banner of ‘Nizam-e-Mustaffa’.

This was a most reactionary backlash of the urban petty bourgeoisie, and created the necessary conditions for a right-wing military coup. The talks were just a smokescreen to allow a most deceitful Gen Ziaul Haq to prepare the stage for the coup. Although Bhutto conceded all demands of the PNA, though belatedly, before the political settlement that had been reached could be implemented Brutus struck the back of his master.

The PPP jiyalas’ illusion was shattered only when they saw the picture of an annoyed Bhutto with his army chief in ‘protective custody’ in Murree. Interestingly, still fearful of Bhutto, Gen Zia assured him of his loyalty – and to hold elections       in 90 days. Bhutto saw through his treacherous designs and warned him about the consequences of treason, which the usurper had committed against the 1973 constitution. To Gen Zia’s utter disappointment, Bhutto was given an even more enthusiastic reception on his release. In desperation, the dictator framed Bhutto in a conspiracy-to-murder case, after having failed to find any case of corruption against him. The general further panicked when Bhutto was given yet another massive reception in Lahore after Justice Samdani had bailed him out.

This forced Zia to form a coalition government with most parties of the PNA, release Baloch and Pakhtun nationalist leaders from the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case and issue his Provisional Constitutional Order as the constitution had already been placed in abeyance. A pliant judiciary, with the exception of Justice Samdani and Justice Dorab Patel, upheld the treason against the constitution and allowed the murder of the unanimous 1973 constitution under the ‘doctrine of necessity’. Chief Justice Maulvi Mushtaq convicted Bhutto by awarding the death penalty. This was upheld by a majority-decision, which is now known as a ‘judicial murder’. After hanging the most popular and legitimate leader in Pakistan’s history and getting the dirty work done both by the parties of the PNA and the top judiciary, Gen Zia prolonged his totalitarian rule for over a decade right up to his accidental death.     

It was a most dreadful decade for democratic forces, the media and the people of this country. Thousands of political activists were imprisoned, hundreds were killed, lashed and hanged. Thanks to Begum Nusrat Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan’s efforts, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was launched. It       gave a befitting democratic fight to the dictator for a long time. Like Ayub Khan, Gen Zia created his own local-bodies constituency from among the most corrupt and notorious people and consolidated his rule by holding a non-party election. More than any military dictator in Pakistan’s history of martial rule, Gen Zia’s dictatorship was instrumental in transforming the political, ideological, cultural and social landscape on extremely reactionary lines.

If Gen Yahya Khan was responsible for the brutal murder of the people of East Pakistan and the dismemberment of the country, Gen Zia was the harbinger of violent Islamic extremism and terrorism which divided the social landscape on militant sectarian lines. Like Ayub Khan, he became a pawn in the hands of American imperialists and turned Pakistan into a large terrorist-producing country. When his hand-picked prime minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo, signed the Geneva Accord for peaceful settlement of the Afghan war, he did not spare him either and dissolved the non-political assemblies that his fraudulent elections had produced. What we are reaping in terms of terrorism and sectarianism is a product of Zia’s poisonous legacy. What is quite unfortunate is that Gen Zia’s legacy is still continuing and democratic and enlightened forces are on the retreat.

The lessons from successive military rules are almost similar, but unfortunately and conveniently forgotten or distorted, despite their most disastrous consequences.    Military takeovers invariably destroy all the institutions, rule of law, human and civil rights, constitutional edifice, peoples’ representation, transparency and accountability. By extending its domain, the army also nullifies its professional standing while also hurting overall national development.

Neither Mujibur Rehman nor Bhutto was corrupt or unpopular. Yet both were imprisoned and killed. It doesn’t matter if a leader was first groomed under the patronage of a military rule – such as Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif – and then becomes a leader in his own right. In all military takeovers, the pretext has remained the same: either the corruption/incompetence of politicians – as if the dictators were less corrupt or more competent – or a ‘threat to national security’. The fact is that military rulers harmed the country for their self-perpetuation, in contrast to politicians who were answerable to the people. Yet, dictators always found lackeys from among defeated politicians or ambitious political start-ups. And it is always prime ministers, from Nazimuddin to Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, who were made to suffer rather than the military usurpers who escaped justice (from Ayub Khan to Musharraf) under the watchful eyes of our judiciary.

As we dangerously and unpredictably move towards the completion of the second term in our democratic transition after a decade of Gen Musharraf’s dictatorship, we see again a blatant power struggle among various institutions. Indeed, due process of law should take its judicious course to make the prime minister accountable, but that must not allow any institution or political player to act beyond the constitutional framework.

In between martial laws, we have witnessed the Baig-Gul or Kayani-Pasha model of running a state above the state and beyond the law of the land and over the head of elected governments. The target has invariably been the elected prime minister, whoever he or she may be or may have been. The fifth of July reminds us to learn from the disasters of direct or indirect military rules. The shadows of martial rule must be shed now. Is it still not enough?

The writer is a senior journalist.

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