Perils of appeasement

Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Bajwa’s recent speech at a seminar on extremism must be appreciated. It reflects the dogged determination of the general to stamp out the scourge of religious militancy that has been sapping the foundations of our society.

The gist of the general’s speech was that: the army can fight terrorists, but when it comes to eliminating extremist ideologies, it is society that has a larger role to play. Bajwa pointed out the lethal weapons of modern technology – including social media – which, he believes, are being employed by extremists to contaminate the minds of youths.

No one with a modicum of common sense would deny the role of social media in spreading retrogressive ideas that have prompted thousands of young people to join outfits like Isis across the world. But in the case of Pakistan, putting all the blame on social media would amount to exonerating the state, which has followed a disastrous policy of appeasing extremist elements and has turned a blind eye to the activities of militant outfits for so-called ‘strategic interests’.

There is a need to admit to the catastrophic consequences of this policy and develop a strong determination to reverse this decades-old strategy that has torn apart our social fabric.

While excellent speeches have always been made against extremism, few practical steps have been taken to tide over this lethal phenomenon. The mandarins of the state have not translated their promises into action. For instance, former president Pervez Musharraf made solemn pledges to wipe out this ideology of hate. However, he ended up consolidating the same elements by pampering the religious right for political reasons. The state has turned a blind eye to the activities of hate-mongers, who were openly contaminating the young minds in Swat and Fata. Even the provocative speeches and poisonous sermons made by clerics could not awaken the state from its slumber.

This was one of the factors that led to the rise of Taliban insurgency. But instead of challenging it, the state chose to first garland Naik Mohammad and, subsequently, other notorious militants. Encouraged by this, the extremists first turned Fata into a no-go area and later threatened even the settled parts of the Islamic republic. Despite these disastrous consequences, we chose to turn a blind eye to the defiant acts of the militants. The strategy of appeasement remained unabated. People like General Hamid Gul continued describing these fanatics not as disgruntled and misguided youths, but as patriotic Pakistanis.

The horrors of the Taliban’s atrocities prompted the state to spring into action, making it take drastic steps to flush out militants. Interestingly, we continued fighting militants in one area and striking a deal with them in another. This strange policy allowed militants to sneak from one area into another. Even our success in Swat did not help us annihilate militancy as no concerted effort was made to arrest the fleeing terrorists, who disguised themselves and settled in the urban areas of the country. This failure on our part allowed extremists to form sleeping cells in urban centres. Some of the worst terrorist attacks occurred after the Swat operation that ended the rule of Fazlullah.

The success of Operation Zarb-e-Azb greatly reduced the level of violence. But instead of capitalising on the gains, the cause of ending corruption started being championed. The phrase ‘economic terrorism’ too came to be heavily used. While it would be a blatant lie to deny the rampant corruption that has permeated all layers of society, linking mainstream politicians with Taliban militancy flies in the face of common sense. This allowed critics to politicise the anti-terror efforts of the state.

The attempt by some elements to create a ‘larger-than-life image’ of certain individuals also led to doubts about the state’s policy on extremism, and created the impression that only certain individuals, and not the state, were capable of countering terrorists. The mysterious display of banners and posters urging Raheel Sharif to stay in office in various parts of the country stoked further speculations. There was an impression that some wanted to make political gains out of the fight against militancy.

What is done cannot be undone. But now, we will have to prove that Operation Raddul Fasaad is meant to stamp out extremism in all its forms. The appeasement of jihadi and sectarian outfits and the state’s alignment with regional forces that have a history of supporting extremist ideology cannot be blamed on social media and its use. It is, of course, the weakness of state policy that allows retrogressive forces to assert their authority.

We can continue hunting down those who mysteriously upload ‘anti-state propaganda’, but are tangible actions being taken against those elements sitting in the heart of the federal capital who openly announced their allegiance to Isis? Is there any state policy to stop TV anchors from openly accusing people of blasphemy? These may sound like tough questions. But we, as a nation, need to find their answers to them.

The writer is a Karachi-based freelance journalist.

Email: egalitarianism444@gmail.com