March 2009

Capital suggestion

Main actors: Asif Ali Zardari, Mian Nawaz Sharif, General Ashafaq Parvez Kayani and Ambassador Patterson. March 10: Ambassador Patterson’s fourth meeting in a week with General Kayani. During the meeting General Kayani hints “that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation sharply deteriorates.”

General Kayani mentions Asfandyar’s name “as a possible replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP government led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring Nawaz Sharif to power.” General Kayani “made it clear that regardless of how much he disliked Zardari, he distrusted Nawaz even more.”

General Kayani also hints at “disquiet among his corps commanders who believe Zardari is corrupt and has not been paying enough attention to Pakistan’s … security challenges.” General Kayani tells the ambassador that “he has talked directly to Zardari, but he does not appear to have conveyed the seriousness of Army concerns about Zardari or the security situation vis a vis the march (Note: Kayani may be seeking to avoid a confrontation that would prompt Zardari to make a disastrous decision to try and oust the COAS).”

Ambassador Patterson’s scenarios: “There are three political scenarios in play as tensions between President Zardari and the Sharif brothers rise ahead of the start of the lawyers’ march on March 12: mediation/accommodation, which resolves the Sharifs’ disqualification from holding public office, ends governor’s rule in Punjab and addresses the judicial issue; confrontation, which leads to violence and possible Army intervention; and a fizzled march that sets the stage for continued conflict.”

Ambassador Patterson’s recommendation to Washington: “We should encourage Zardari to continue efforts to ease tensions and ask the Saudis and the UAE to weigh in with their respective allies.”

Asfandyar’s advice to Nawaz Sharif: Asfandyar “told Nawaz that he would win the next election and should just be patient; by pressing now, he threatened a political vacuum that would be filled by the Army. This time, warned Asfandyar, Nawaz might not be sent into a comfortable exile. Nawaz refused to budge.” Asfandyar “welcomed the idea of UK mediation but said it was the US view that counted most.”

March 11: Nawaz Sharif confirms “press reports that the PPP had reversed course and now had offered Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of leader of the Senate.”

Ambassador Patterson’s warning to Zardari: The ambassador “warned that efforts to arrest the Sharifs or high-profile activists like Aitzaz Ahsan would not be well received in Washington or elsewhere.”

Ambassador Patterson’s conclusion: “At this point, everything appears to rest on the outcome of the lawyers’ march. By applying the road closure/detention tactics that worked for Musharraf in 2007 to stop pro-Nawaz demonstrations, the government might be able to avoid a serious clash this time. But if a policeman fires into the crowd or a terrorist attacks protesters, all bets are off. Even if the march fizzles, Nawaz retains the high moral ground in the public’s eyes and will use it to continue attacking a weakened Zardari. Zardari needs to win back the military’s confidence.”

History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives – Abba Eban

The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad.

Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com  Twitter: @saleemfarrukh