Under prevailing security scenarios at the global and regional levels, Pakistan’s friendship with China undoubtedly constitutes its most important strategic partnership with a foreign country.
Over the past seven decades, Pakistan’s friendly relations and cooperation with China have grown steadily based on the convergence of the strategic interests of the two countries, mutual benefit and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. There is every reason to believe that the coming decades will witness the continued strengthening of this link, which is vital for Pakistan’s security and economic well-being.
It is, therefore, essential for Pakistan to study China's history, culture, economy and politics more thoroughly to understand the roots of its internal and external policies. Pakistan can learn a great deal, especially from China’s remarkable rise over the past four decades, which has propelled its economy to the top globally in terms of GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. China’s GDP in 2025, in PPP terms, is expected to be $40.7 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the US. However, in nominal dollar terms, China, with an expected GDP of $19.2 trillion in 2025, would be far behind the US, which is expected to have a GDP of $30.5 trillion in the same year.
China’s dramatic rise is even more remarkable if one recalls that in 1978 its GDP in nominal dollar terms was estimated to be only $218 billion. Over the next three decades, China maintained an average GDP growth rate of approximately 10 per cent per annum, a feat unparalleled in human history. Consequently, its GDP in nominal dollar terms increased to $6.1 trillion in 2010 and $11.3 trillion in 2015.
Deng Xiaoping, China’s great leader, launched it on the road to rapid economic progress through the programme of reforms and opening to the outside world in December 1978. Henceforth, rapid economic development was to be the supreme national goal of China, and all its policies were to be geared towards its realisation. Deng’s programme of reforms, called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, embodied the move to a market economy internally and the policy of opening to the outside world.
Internally, the Mao-era emphasis on egalitarianism was jettisoned in favour of reward for private initiative, thus providing an incentive for hard work and innovation. In pursuance of this policy, the economy was gradually liberalised by allowing competition and market forces to play an increasingly important role in different sectors.
The process of reforms was initially introduced in the rural sector and, after its success, was extended to the urban sector. During my posting as minister/deputy head of mission in the Pakistan Embassy, Beijing, from 1985 to 1988, I saw with great admiration the pragmatic and skilful manner in which the Chinese authorities expanded the market reforms from the rural to the urban sector, learning from practical experience as they went along.
The policy of opening to the outside world was intended to attract foreign investment and expose China to the modernising influences prevalent in developed countries, particularly advances in science, technology and management techniques, to benefit from them in the race for economic growth on which China was embarking.
In support of its single-minded pursuit of the objective of rapid economic growth, China also decided to pursue ‘a low-risk foreign policy’ for a long time to come to minimise the danger of its involvement in a major armed conflict and to limit the diversion of its resources from economic development to the military.
Accordingly, soon after launching the programme of reforms, China under Deng Xiaoping entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union and India on border disputes to defuse tensions in relations with those countries. China’s overall foreign policy, while remaining steadfast on safeguarding its vital interests, continues to be informed by the core objective of avoiding a major armed conflict in the foreseeable future.
China’s experience in accelerating its economic progress since 1979 offers many valuable lessons for Pakistan’s policymakers. The first and foremost is the decision to assign the highest priority to the goal of rapid economic growth and subordinate everything else to the attainment of this supreme national aim. We are justifiably happy at having given a bloody nose to India in the skirmishes with it in May this year. Our success underscores the importance of always maintaining a credible security deterrent to ward off any immediate threat to our national security.
But we must also bear in mind that the security threat posed by a hegemonic, expansionist and Hindutva-driven India is strategic and long-term in nature. History is a witness that in any long-term contest between nations, the decisive role is played by the balance of economic and technological power. Therefore, the ultimate outcome of the long-term contest between Pakistan and India will be decided by our performance vis-a-vis India in the race for economic, technological and scientific advancement.
Unfortunately, our performance in these areas leaves much to be desired. According to current projections, India’s GDP is expected to be $4.1 trillion as against $400 billion only for Pakistan in 2025. Further, while India’s GDP growth rate is expected to exceed 6.0 per cent in 2025, Pakistan’s GDP growth rate is projected to be only 3.0 per cent in the same year. To raise our GDP growth rate to 6-7 per cent per annum, we must increase our national saving and investment rates to over 25 per cent of GDP, as opposed to the current low levels of 14 per cent and 13.8 per cent, respectively.
To raise our national saving rate to 25 per cent or above, we must adopt austerity as our national motto. For raising our national investment rate, we need to create a business-friendly environment in Pakistan. Both of these objectives require far-reaching reforms, which are not yet forthcoming in Pakistan. As for education, our national expenditure on it (0.8 per cent of GDP in 2024-25 as against the Unesco-recommended target of 4.0 per cent of GDP) is woefully low considering the demands of the modern knowledge-based world.
In support of the goal of rapid economic growth, Pakistan should adopt a low-risk and non-adventurist foreign policy to avoid strategic blunders, such as the Kargil operation of 1999 or its Kashmir policy of the 1990s. Instead, we should try to engage India in a dialogue to defuse tensions, adopt CBMs, try to resolve outstanding disputes and resume bilateral trade on a mutually beneficial basis and a level playing field. Over-ambitious foreign policy goals should be avoided to prevent falling into the trap of strategic overstretch and exhaustion, which we are currently experiencing.
Essentially, Pakistan needs to reorder its priorities, assigning the top priority to the goal of rapid economic development while maintaining a credible security deterrent. The government must strike a balance between the need for a credible security deterrent to ward off short-term threats to the country’s security posed by India and the imperative of accelerating economic and technological development, as well as scientific advancement, to meet the requirements of long-term security and economic prosperity.
The writer is a retired ambassador and author of ‘Pakistan and a World in Disorder – A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century’. He can be reached at: javid.husain@gmail.com
