Afghanistan’s last chance for peace

Amid growing Taliban attacks in Afghanistan, efforts to revive the peace talks between the Afghan government and Taliban factions have been launched under the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG). Talks between the two sides collapsed in July last year after confirmation of Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s death. Now US and Chinese pressure has provided the impetus for the latest push for talks.

At this stage, a broad consensus exists among the QCG members to explore a political solution to end the war in Afghanistan in the absence of a viable military solution. However, there is no clarity on how to achieve it.

Wide-ranging differences exist between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding peace talks in a number of areas. To begin with, Kabul did not expect Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz to draw green and red lines for peace talks while advising a condition-free approach to negotiations himself.

The Afghan government believes that the onus is on Pakistan to help it clinch a deal with the Taliban. Pakistan’s stance is that it can only facilitate the two parties to sit across the table; it is for the Afghan government and the Taliban to sort out their differences in the larger interest of peace. Further, Pakistan thinks it is the duty of the Afghan government to build trust with the Taliban insurgent groups and give them enough political concessions that can persuade them to give up their armed struggle.

Another major disagreement is over Pakistan’s clout over the Taliban. The popular perception in Afghanistan is that Pakistan controls the militant group and has enough levers at its disposals to compel the Taliban to join the peace talks. In the meanwhile, Pakistan has consistently maintained that its influence on the Taliban is limited, and that it can convince but not compel the Taliban for negotiations.

The Afghan government advocates a timeline approach, while Pakistan wants open-ended peace talks with no pre-conditions. In his opening speech to the QCG’s first meeting in Islamabad, Sartaj Aziz cautioned against unrealistic deadlines and early breakthroughs. On the contrary, Afghanistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator for the peace talks Hekmat Khalil Karzai promised good news to the Afghans in two months, expecting an early breakthrough.

Differences also exist between Afghanistan and Pakistan on to how to deal with irreconcilable Taliban factions. The Afghan government wants immediate joint military action against irreconcilable Taliban groups – an idea that Pakistan believes can be counter-productive for peace talks at this stage. Pakistan believes that force should be used as the very last resort, once all options for peace have been exhausted. The threat of using force should not precede the offer for talks.

In the last few months, the Taliban have done remarkably well on the battlefield despite factionalisation, leadership disputes and internal struggle following Mullah Omar’s death. They have increased their territorial gains both in the north and south of Afghanistan. Currently, 40 Afghan districts are under direct Taliban control along with 39 others at the risk of falling under their control.

At this stage, it is not clear which Taliban groups are willing to join the peace process. Most likely, Mullah Akhtar Mansour’s group and the Haqqani Network might participate in the negotiations. Hizb-e-Islami Gulbandin (HiG) has shown its willingness to join the peace process but it is not clear if it will be invited for talks or not. The dissident Taliban faction under Mullah Muhammad Rasool Akhund has already rejected the offer for peace talks conditioning it with the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, some groups and commanders of the Taliban have joined IS-Khorasan, the Islamic State’s franchise in Afghanistan.

There are many gaping holes in the peace-talks framework which should be plugged before direct negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban groups. The undue haste to achieve a quick-fix solution can potentially jeopardise prospects of a long-term settlement. At the moment, a solid incentive that can persuade the Taliban to give up armed struggled and pursue a political approach is missing from the framework.

The recent wave of terrorist attacks in the region – from the Pathankot airbase in India to the assault on an anti-polio team in Quetta and the attack on the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad as well as growing IS activities in Afghanistan – increases the importance of the current peace initiative despite its flaws.

Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani has taken a huge political risk by extending a hand of cooperation towards Pakistan for the second time. In doing so, Ghani has put his career online. His spy chief Rahmatullah Nabil resigned from his post in protest to Ghani’s peace initiative towards Pakistan. Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum has deserted him as well, and has not entered Kabul since July for the same reasons.

The failure of these peace talks might cost Ghani his government. Therefore, Pakistan should use all its influence on the Taliban to take the peace talks’ offer seriously. A positive outcome will go a long way not only in changing the negative public perception of Pakistan in Afghanistan but also help Pakistan safeguard its interest.

The Taliban are strong but factionalised. The Afghan government is legitimate but weak, and Pakistan has earned the central role of chief negotiator in the Afghan peace talks without much of a wholesome clout over the Taliban factions. No party is in a position to dictate its terms. And the limitations of the three parties should make them realise that cooperation for peace is the way forward.

At minimum, a conditional ceasefire agreement in the next two or three months is extremely crucial for continuation of the peace process without a fixed timeline. The fight-talk approach by the Taliban might undermine the peace process.

This is why, along with tying up the loose ends of the negotiation-framework, it was necessary for QCG members to also focus on a possible ceasefire agreement as they met in Kabul yesterday.

The writer is an associate research fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and TerrorismResearch of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.

Email: isabasit@ntu.edu.sg