The Nawaz of today

Those who consider Nawaz Sharif a simple person are simpletons themselves. Many view him as only a businessman with little skill in politics, but they cannot be more wrong; he is a shrewd politician. We keep saying foolishly that he has learnt nothing from the past. But Nawaz has learnt a lot from the past – but the lessons learnt are for his own person.

The Nawaz Sharif of the present is the negation of the Nawaz Sharif of the past. In the past he would; now he prefers to have others fight each other to his benefit. It is now that he practises in its true spirit the philosophy of Gen Ziaul Haq. Nawaz’s posture towards the establishment may be most humble, but he has not missed a single opportunity to hit it. He bows before the media, only to pull its legs through government advertisement distribution and through his management skills. He may claim deep respect for judiciary but has worked in fact to keep it subservient.

In his present term as prime minister, Nawaz Sharif is a hybrid of all Pakistani politicians. He seems to copy the ‘principled politics’ of Maulana Fazalur Rahman, coupled with Zardari’s wise moves and Imran’s U-turns. He is vengeful like Mehmood Khan Achakzai, but a thorough gentleman like Dr Abdul Malik. He acts like kings but follow the rules of European politics. He spent long years in Saudi Arabia, but it seems that he learnt very well, during his short stays in London, the colonial tactic of divide and rule.

Nawaz knew that only three institutions could check his powers: the media, the judiciary and the establishment. Thus he dealt with each of them in the precise manner that was required. He divided the judiciary and the establishment over the issues of Pervez Musharraf and the ‘missing persons’. A few ministers were seen to be talking against Musharraf while at same time a few others would talk in his favour. The interior minister registered a case against Musharraf, while the police working under the same minister helped Musharraf end up in hospital instead of the police station.

Similarly, the government registered a case, but once it was registered the government made it seem as though it was complying with judicial orders. Now the judiciary has ordered Musharraf be produced – but nothing is being done to facilitate that. The dignity of the judiciary is at stake. With this case the government seems to have achieved its aim to take away the authority and dignity the judiciary had gained in the last decade.

The media too faced a similar strategy. It was claimed that this time the government is serious to end the superiority of the establishment once and forever. It was also claimed that the government wished to establish relations with India and prosecute Musharraf to set an example. With this as context, the media became bolder.

And when the media was consequently punished, the government preferred to act as a mere spectator. The government constantly changed its stance to ensure a sustained conflict between the media and the establishment. The minister for information proclaimed that they were with those who possessed logic, and the minister for defence registered a case against those who possessed logic. Imran’s dharna vacuumed the left-over energies of the media, which now seems to be bereft of all vitality, power and credibility.

A media busy ensuring its survival cannot act as an objective monitor of governmental policies. In the beginning it seemed that in the conflict between the media and the establishment, the latter came out as the successful party. But in the long run, it has become clear that both parties lost. The real winner turned out to be the government. The two institutions that could press the government for fair and transparent policies, and ensure good governance, were kept busy fighting each other.

The same policy is applied with great success by Nawaz in involving the establishment in a tussle with politicians belonging to the opposition parties. Instead of ensuring military withdrawal from Balochistan, he engaged the military in Karachi too. No serious political move was made to negotiate with politicians in Balochistan, who were informed that the real decision-making power lay in the hands of the military.

In Sindh, the central government did not side with anyone – the MQM or the Rangers. If the government had formed the supervisory committee from day one, the MQM’s reservations would never have arisen. But Nawaz Sharif preferred to talk soft with the MQM and assigned his interior minister to side with the Rangers. The same interior minister tried to prove Altaf Hussain was a traitor, while the speaker of the National Assembly was negotiating with Altaf Hussain.

In the same way, the PPP was made to fight with the establishment. Ishaq Dar and Fawad Hassan were to stay in touch with Zardari while the interior minister had to give a tough time to Qaim Ali Shah and the Sindh government. When Zardari gave an open ultimatum to the establishment, Nawaz cancelled his meeting with Zardari. But the very next morning, Zardari found Fawad Hassan with a message by Nawaz. If the PM had wanted to intervene in the Karachi operation, the military would never have extended its mandate to include financial corruption. It is not difficult to understand who is behind this accountability drive. If it is the agenda of the establishment, why is the same drive not seen in Punjab?

The government pretended that it wished to save the PPP from accountability, and that the establishment was against the party. The same line is followed in dealing with the ANP leadership and other parties. Everyone knows that the chairman of NAB takes direct instructions from the PM House. The result is very interesting. The first time in the history of Pakistan, the establishment and opposition parties are in conflict, and the central government shows its solidarity with every party involved.

The same tact has been followed in foreign policy. Before Operation Zarb-e Azb, there was a facade of negotiations with the Taliban, initiated to give the impression to the Taliban that the government wished to negotiate but the establishment wanted to launch an operation. It also conveyed to the US that the government wished to initiate negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban but that it was not allowed to intervene. The same message is whispered in Indian ears: that we wish better relations but we are punished by way of dharnas. Even Ashraf Ghani repeats the same mantra to Washington – that Nawaz Sharif is sincere about peace but it’s the other institutions that are the real hurdle.

The net result of this policy is a very positive opinion about Nawaz Sharif among all internal and external actors – and a very negative image of other Pakistani institutions. Indeed this is a masterpiece of a policy. But history also shows that he who is too wise eventually gets entangled in his own wisdom.

The writer works for Geo TV.

Email: saleem.safi@janggroup.com.pk