The right approach

Gulf kingdoms, particularly Saudi Arabia, are on the horns of a dilemma. They have to choose between making a common cause with Iran in crushing the self-styled Islamic State (IS) and taking on Tehran with the support of the IS. The dilemma brings out two things in the main: one, the sectarian schism – the perennial Shia-Sunni antagonism – that runs through Islamic history; two, the changing contours of Middle Eastern politics.
The IS has two overriding characteristics, which makes the movement at once a friend and a foe of the Arab states in the Gulf. It champions the cause of a puritanical sub-sect of Sunni Islam, which brings it doctrinally closer to Saudi Arabia and its Middle Eastern allies. At the same time, the IS wants to overthrow the reigning absolute monarchies in the Gulf and put in place an all-encompassing caliphate through what it calls jihad.
The sectarian divide has been a principal driver of conflicts in the Middle East. On the whole, it is a Sunni majority region where a substantial Shia population also resides. In countries such as Iran, Bahrain, and Iraq, Shias have been in majority. However, until the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iran was the only Shia majority country in the region where the government was in the control of the adherents of that sect. Syria stands out as a special case where Shias, despite being in minority, have been at the helm since 1970.
Iran and Saudi Arabia, representing Shias and Sunnis respectively, have competed to control the region. The scramble for power received a tremendous boost in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The revolution alarmed the Arab states for at least two reasons: that the ouster of absolute monarchy in Iran through a popular movement might embolden republican elements in Arab kingdoms to press for a similar change there; and that Shia movements in those countries might ally themselves with the clerics-ruled Iran thus endangering their internal security and stability.
Those suspicions were not unfounded as Tehran backed resistance movements in Lebanon (Hezbollah in particular) and Palestine (Hamas) and sought to shore up its influence on Shia populations residing not only in the Arab states but also in countries like Pakistan.
The response of the Arab states led by Saudi Arabia was two-fold. One, they intensified propagation of their own brand of Islam and cashed in on their petro-dollars rather lavishly for that purpose. Two, they joined hands with the US in encircling Iran. The pre-revolution Iran had been both a pillar of the US-sponsored regional security system and a strategic ally of Washington. The US as well as Arabs fully supported Iraq in its eight-year war (1980-88) with Iran.
The 1979 USSR invasion of Afghanistan also served to shore up Saudi-Iranian competition for beefing up their sphere of influence in this part of the world. Saudi money came in handy for the US-backed Afghan militants as they fought a ‘holy’ war against Russians. The Afghan war turned out to be a bonanza for sectarian outfits in Pakistan, which had easy access to arms, heaps and heaps of money at their disposal, and a jihadi ideology at their beck and call to legitimise and sanctify the killing of fellow Muslims. Pakistan became a spectacle for a bloody Tehran-Riyadh proxy war.
The advent of the Arab Spring in 2010 set up a new challenge for the established orders in Arab countries. Starting in Tunisia, the popular discontent with autocratic regimes spilled over to Egypt and other Arab countries. In Egypt, elections brought the popular Muslim Brotherhood to power, which rang alarm bells in many Gulf capitals. But soon the new government was shown the door by the army with the blessings of both Washington and Riyadh.
Meanwhile, a civil war broke out in Syria, which exacerbated Iran-Saudi or Shia-Sunni tensions with Tehran and Riyadh going all out to support and bring down respectively the Assad regime. Not to be left behind, the militant-cum-political movement Hezbollah fought on the side of the Syrian government, while Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organisations became part of the anti-Assad coalition. The Syrian civil war became a hot spot for Muslim militants all over the world. This is precisely the reason the US has felt shy of launching a military strike on Syria to topple the regime.
To exploit the growing instability in the region, the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq set up the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis). Isis did what Al-Qaeda could not do: it took possession of large tracts of land, comprising Sunni provinces in Iraq and eastern regions in Syria. Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, fell to the movement in June 2014. Next month, it was re-named the Islamic State (IS) and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was proclaimed as khalifah (caliph), which by definition is a transnational office to which Muslims all over the world owe allegiance. With such credentials, the IS is bound to arouse deepest Saudi concerns, notwithstanding sectarian affinity between the two.
While these developments were taking place, Iran and the US set out on mending their relations. With the Iranian economy reeling under the stringent multilateral and unilateral sanctions and considering such factors as the presence of a common enemy in Al-Qaeda and now the IS, Iran’s clout on the Shia population in the region, and the country’s credential of being arguably the only stable democracy in that part of the world, both countries decided they could, and should, do business with each other.
An interim agreement was struck in November 2013 between Iran on the one hand and the five declared nuclear powers and Germany on the other (P5 +1), whereby Tehran agreed to contain its nuclear ambitions to peaceful purposes in return for easing of sanctions. Now a framework agreement is in sight, which would pave the way for full reintegration of Iran into the international community.
With Iran and the US inching closer to detente, and the Assad regime successful in holding its own meaning that both Iraq and Syria continue to be in Tehran’s sphere of influence, the Saudis find themselves in a rather difficult situation. They feel threatened from both a rejuvenated Iran and an extremist, expansionist, blood-thirsty IS.
This also places Pakistan in an awkward situation. The ruling Sharif family is on excellent terms with the House of Saud. Islamabad can count on Riyadh’s tremendous capital resources for economic turnaround. Recently Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was among dignitaries from the Muslim world invited to the holy kingdom as part of the regime’s efforts to draw up a strategy to deal with Iran and the IS.
Islamabad’s stated position is that it will not take sides in the Tehran-Riyadh conflict. For a country like Pakistan, which itself is in the throes of a sectarian bloodbath and has already been the site of a proxy war between the two Muslim counties, this is the right approach as taking sides in the conflict will only sharpen the sectarian cleavage and make it even bloodier.
The author is a graduate from a western European university.
Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com