The canal controversy: Origins and fallout

In the scorched plains of Pakistan’s southern province of Sindh, where every drop of water determines life and death for its people and crops, a new political storm has emerged — one that encapsulates the broader struggle between provincial autonomy and centralized decision-making. The controversy surrounding the proposed Chashma Right Bank Canal (CRBC) lift project is not merely a matter of infrastructure; it is a sharp lens through which the long-standing tensions between Sindh and the federal establishment are being refracted. At its heart lies a question that has tormented the Pakistani federation for decades: who owns Pakistan’s rivers?

The CRBC project, previously cleared by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), faced instant backlash from Sindh, a province historically deprived of its rightful water share. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, and Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah took an unambiguous and uncompromising stance against what they labelled a “blatant violation” of the Indus Waters Treaty and an affront to Sindh’s constitutional rights. Their protest culminated in a historic reversal: the Council of Common Interests (CCI) rescinded ECNEC’s decision in an extraordinary move, asserting that any major water-related infrastructure project must first undergo CCI scrutiny, particularly if it alters inter-provincial water flows. This reversal was not merely procedural—it was political, constitutional, and symbolic. It was a vindication of Sindh’s long-held position that major decisions affecting shared natural resources cannot be made unilaterally or by stealth through executive maneuvers. It was also a reaffirmation of the CCI’s role as a federal dispute-resolution body, enshrined in the 1973 Constitution, to safeguard the delicate equilibrium between provinces. Yet, to truly understand the emotional gravity and political sensitivity surrounding this issue, one must journey back into the history of water politics in Pakistan. Sindh, the lower riparian province, has consistently accused upstream regions—especially Punjab—of disproportionately exploiting the Indus River system through a network of dams, barrages, and canals that redirect precious flows. These tensions are not new. Since the early days of Pakistan, Sindh’s leaders have voiced concern over what they perceive as systematic denial of their water rights, especially during critical sowing seasons. The construction of the Kalabagh Dam, which remains suspended due to Sindh’s staunch opposition, is just one prominent example in a long line of contested hydrological projects. What makes the CRBC controversy even more combustible is its timing. Pakistan is grappling with severe climate change impacts, dwindling water tables, and increased demand for irrigation in all provinces. In such a climate of scarcity, every project that aims to divert water becomes a zero-sum game. For Sindh, whose tail-end farmers are already receiving far less than their share as per the Water Accord of 1991, the idea of yet another canal benefiting upstream users is nothing short of existential threat. This is not mere politics; it is a fight for survival.

Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s framing of the issue was unequivocal. Speaking at the Sindh Festival in Sukkur, he thundered that no canal can be constructed without Sindh’s consent and that the PPP would go to any length to resist such encroachments. His statement echoed through the historic city built along the banks of the mighty Indus—a river that defines Sindh’s identity, economy, and culture. By linking the canal issue to the broader politics of federation, Bhutto effectively transformed what some might have dismissed as a technical dispute into a rallying cry for provincial dignity and constitutional federalism. Murad Ali Shah, an engineer by training and one of the most informed provincial leaders on water issues, has been equally consistent in articulating Sindh’s position. He has repeatedly stated that any bypassing of the CCI in water-related decisions is unconstitutional. His government’s technical experts raised concerns about the feasibility and ecological impact of lifting water from the right bank of the Chashma Barrage, warning that it could drastically reduce downstream flows, particularly during the lean season. What also emerged during the CCI proceedings was the broader concern about transparency and procedural fairness. Sindh’s representatives argued that they were never consulted before ECNEC approved the project. This points to a larger malaise—of federal institutions operating without adequately engaging provinces, particularly those governed by political opponents. Such actions not only fuel inter-provincial discord but also erode trust in the state’s ability to act as a neutral arbiter. By successfully forcing a reconsideration of the CRBC project, the PPP has sent a powerful message: that Sindh will no longer tolerate being treated as a subordinate unit in Pakistan’s federal architecture. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, by lending his voice to the cause, has reiterated the party’s historical position as a defender of provincial autonomy—a position championed by his grandfather Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his mother Benazir Bhutto, both of whom fought battles against centralized hegemony in their time. The broader political implications of this controversy cannot be overstated. First, it has re-established the CCI as the proper constitutional forum for resolving disputes of national significance. For far too long, the federal government has sidelined this institution, often relying on technocratic bodies to rubber-stamp controversial projects. The canal episode has served as a wake-up call—a reminder that provinces are not passive spectators in national planning but stakeholders with voice, history, and rights. Second, it has re-energized the PPP’s narrative of being the guardian of Sindh’s resources and interests. In a political climate often dominated by power struggles in Punjab and Islamabad, this issue has allowed the PPP to reassert its federal relevance. Bilawal Bhutto’s unequivocal tone, backed by technical and legal arguments from the Sindh government, has resonated not only within Sindh but also among other provinces wary of majoritarian overreach. Finally, this controversy has also brought to light the urgent need for a national dialogue on water. Climate change, population pressures, and poor infrastructure management are exacerbating water insecurity in Pakistan. The country can ill-afford inter-provincial mistrust over something as vital as water.

It is imperative that future projects be based on consensus, backed by transparent data, and aligned with constitutional processes. In retrospect, the canal controversy is more than a policy debate—it is a reflection of deeper structural tensions within the federation of Pakistan. It is a contest between two visions: one that seeks to govern from the center with a heavy hand, and another that demands respect for the provinces, for the Constitution, and for the people whose lives are directly affected by decisions made in distant boardrooms. Sindh’s resistance, led by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and the PPP government, has not only safeguarded the province’s water rights but has also revitalized the principle of cooperative federalism. If Pakistan is to navigate its many crises—from water shortages to political instability—it must listen more closely to its provinces. The Indus does not belong to one province; it flows through the veins of the entire federation. To dam its flow without consent is not only reckless—it is unconstitutional.