Futile tug of war

A crucial meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on June 23, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tashkent, holds the key to India and Pakistan’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This meeting coincides with the plenary meeting of the NSG. It is unlikely that an exception will be granted to India at the expense of Pakistan. So what is the possible way forward?

The fact is that under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the criteria that it has set for the NSG, both India and Pakistan are not eligible to become members of the NSG. They are neither signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor have they adhered to the moratorium on fissile material production as required by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) while avoiding to express any intention to consider signing the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Interestingly, the NSG came into existence as an informal group of states to regulate and control nuclear-related trade after India exploded its device in 1974.

A major stumbling block in the way of India and Pakistan’s entry into the NSG is the also the two categories of states as defined in the NPT – Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), excluding four non-NPT nuclear states – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea (the latter first joined and then left to explode its nuclear device).

However, the non-NPT nuclear states continued to exploit the lacuna in articles III and IV of the NPT that allowed the NSG to concede to a waiver to a state to transfer nuclear technology, even though in its 2001 Aspen Plenary (item 4 of 5), the NSG had insisted that new aspirant states should be a party to the NPT and follow full-scope safeguards with the IAEA.

India and Pakistan refuse to sign the NPT as there is no third category for nuclear states that emerged after the treaty was signed in 1970. Though they subscribe to the safeguards required by the IAEA in their nuclear energy projects, they have not so far accepted legally binding commitments to pursue disarmament negotiations, stop the production of nuclear weapons and halt further testing of nuclear weapons.

The signing of the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership; between the US and India in 2008 paved the way for the NSG to grant a waiver to India that allowed the latter to trade in nuclear-related materials with the US, France and Russia. What is still not clear is why Pakistan, then under Gen Musharraf, not hinder it and why China did not veto it.

In 2010, President Obama had assured in a joint statement with PM Modi that “the US intends to support India’s full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes”, which include the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR and the NSG. India has already been inducted into the MTCR and has subscribed to the other two export control regimes. The US is trying hard to get India included in the NSG – while asking Pakistan to try its luck on its own.

While opposing India-specific exceptions to include it (India) in the NSG, Pakistan continues to stress a criteria/merit-based approach since both the countries fall in the same category of de-facto nuclear powers. Pakistan has separated its military and civil nuclear programmes, and subscribes to the IAEA’s safeguards. It has also showed its readiness to sign the CTBT, if India does too. But both nuclear neighbours have avoided adherence to additional safeguards since, like other nuclear weapon states, they intend to continue with their nuclear weapon programmes with no end in sight.

Given China’s insistence on keeping a similar criteria-based approach, designed among others by the US, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying warned: “if India and Pakistan are allowed to join the NPT and atop the CTBT, it will tarnish the authority of both. How can nuclear weapon development in other countries, such as North Korea, Iran and Israel, be dealt with”?

After failing to sell China’s entry into the MTCR in exchange for India’s entry into the NSG, Indian Foreign Secretary Jaishankar in his trip to Beijing tried to persuade China not to oppose his country’s entry into the NSG. But, in an article in the official press, titled ‘China no barrier to India joining NSG’, it is stated: “if India joins hands with Pakistan to seek NSG membership, it seems more pragmatic than joining alone”.

Much earlier, mindful of China’s opposition and Pakistan’s reaction, US Secretary of State John Kerry in his letter to the NSG members to support India’s membership had hoped that “India would take a merit-based approach and would not be influenced by extraneous regional issues” regarding Pakistan’s application. He also visited Beijing to persuade the Chinese who came up with their own options to either strictly follow the same rule for both aspirants and not bend the whole no-proliferation regime or include both using the same yardstick.

Even the New York Times in its editorial of June 4 warned against the exception and wrote: “India refused, which means it has not accepted legally binding commitments to pursue disarmament negotiations, halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and not test nuclear weapons”. It further said that if India enters alone into NSG, “that could give Pakistan, which at one time provided nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran, new incentives to misbehave”.

The Chinese official press even dubbed India as the US’s military ally to contain China. Fu Xiaoqing from China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) warned that “once New Delhi gets the membership first, the nuclear balance between India and Pakistan will be broken....which will in turn shape the strategic balance in South Asia and even cast cloud over peace and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region”.

Getting a categorical signal from Beijing and also soft messaging from the US and four other opposing countries, we witness a sudden change in New Delhi’s position as reflected by the charm-offensive of India’s External Affairs Minister Shrimati Sushma Swaraj. She has said that “we are not opposed to any country’s entrance into NSG based on merit, including Pakistan”, while eulogising the personal rapport between the two prime ministers.

This is an exceptional gesture which should have been seen positively. Instead of misconstruing it, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar should have advised the prime minister, Foreign Office and the GHQ to reciprocate the gesture.

Pakistan must immediately convey to the Chinese president, before his meeting with the Indian premier on June 23, its readiness not to oppose India’s entry into the NSG if New Delhi also reciprocates. Both India and Pakistan must be brought into some kind of no-proliferation regulation to save South Asia from becoming a victim of nuclear adventurism or accidental nuclear exchange.

There should be an end point to this mad race for mutually assured destruction and inherently escalatory doctrine of deterrence. Unfortunately, it seems that this vicious cycle of Pakistan competing with India and the latter competing with China which is competing with the US will come to an end without universal nuclear disarmament. However, can India, Pakistan and China agree on some kind of a nuclear restraint regime?

The writer is a senior journalist.

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