The Betrayal of East Pakistan

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BOOK NAME:  The Betrayal of East Pakistan

AUTHOR: Let Gen A. A. K. Niazi

PUBLISHER: Oxford University Press - Karachi (Pakistan)

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 1998

The following excerpt has been taken from Pages: 235 — 238

“Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi of the Eastern Command was the man whose fate it was to direct the operation which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan. Many books have been written about that unforgettable year in Pakistan's history, 1971, and the terrible events that it spawned. But finally one of the main actors of the drama has volunteered his own account of the events leading to the disaster.

“Was General Niazi a coward, a hero, or the victim of an unjust fate? In this book he has exercised a basic human right, that of voicing his own version in order to clear his name, Inter alia he has summoned up questions which through manipulation or neglect had either disappeared from the public mind or had settled down comfortably as facts of history. Was it an army of 93,000 soldiers that laid down arms in that fateful surrender? Did the surrender take place at the bidding of Niazi, because he and his soldiers did not wish to fight any more? Just what were the odds against which the Pakistan Army was fighting in the West? Who is being protected by the secrecy which continues to surround the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report, and why are the people still deprived of their right to know and to judge?

SURRENDER OF EAST PAKISTAN - 16 DECEMBER 1971

“The surrender ceremony took place on 16 December 1971. Major-General Farman and Admiral Sharif witnessed the ceremony. As I signed the document with trembling hands, sorrow rose from my heart to my eyes, brimming them with unshed tears of despair and frustration. Before the ceremony, a French reporter came to me and said, 'How are you feeling, Tiger?' I replied, 'Depressed.' Arora, who was standing nearby, remarked, 'He had an impossible task under extremely difficult conditions. Any other general in these circumstances could not have done better.'

“The destiny I could not evade was not of my choosing or making. Ordered to lay down arms by the President to save West Pakistan, my mind swung between the two options-risk West Pakistan being further overrun, or jeopardize my reputation, my career, my future, and the high tradition of the Pakistan Army by submitting to the orders. I had accepted a task beset with hazards and difficulties, when East Pakistan was in disarray and disorder. Two senior generals had refused to accept the responsibility on various pretexts, one had resigned when raging torrents of insurgency became obvious, and another had bungled the situation. I was twelfth in seniority when I was selected for the third senior post in the Army. Deciding to agree to the second option, I had swallowed my pride and made the supreme sacrifice of forfeiting reputation and honour, and the honour of my gallant troops, in the national interest.

“After the ceremony, many of the Bengalis, although jubilant and joyous at the outcome of the war, approached me and said: 'We craved maximum participation in decision-making and more funds for development, but not at this cost.' Some appeared to be genuinely sad and touched. This display of sentiment by people who had been thirsting or our blood hours earlier showed that affection still flowed under the thick layer of hatred. I told them, 'Much blood has flowed under the bridge and it is too late to be remorseful. We were pawns used by our leaders, who chose the path of violence to reach the crown. They watched from outside the arena, like Roman Emperors watched gladiators fight. Whatever the outcome of the clash, they would be the winners.' I wished the Bengalis success and expressed the hope that, if not in our time, maybe, in the time of our grandchildren, the wounds would heal and a better relationship between the two countries based on amity and brotherhood would be established.

“After deliberations, hectic efforts, and exhaustive discussions between the Indian and Pakistani teams, the move to evacuate the Pakistani personnel, both civilians and uniformed, was worked out. The move was to take place by trains, direct to Wagah border. According to the move plan, I gave directions that the first to move would be the civilians, followed by civil armed forces, the police, and then the armed forces. The senior officers of the three forces would be the last to leave after every soldier was across the border, safe and sound. The first train full of joyous civilians started off amidst high hopes. It continued without mishap until suddenly the destination was changed and the train was diverted to Allahabad. The joy turned to despair. Bhutto had released Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman unconditionally. With Mujib, thousands of Bengali soldiers in West Pakistani camps, Indian POWs, and a sensitive Indian area like Ferozpur Headworks, all in Pakistani hands, Pakistan had been in a strong position regarding an exchange for the POWs in India. With a single stroke, Bhutto had undermined Pakistan's situation. Now on a tightrope, Pakistan's position of strength was reduced to a position of extreme weakness.

“It should be kept in view that in the west all decisions were made by General Yahya as President and head of the Government, and not by COAS as head of the Army. But in the east I had been abandoned by my High Command and deserted by the Provincial Government. I was left alone to make decisions regarding both civilian and military matters. If the Governor had still been holding his office, he would have signed the instrument of surrender as the head of the administration and representative of the President, not I as commander of the troops and answerable to the Governor. In the west, Yahya signed for everything where required, not General Hamid as COAS, who was acting as C.-in-C. Army or Chief of the General Staff.

HAMOODUR REHMAN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE 1971 WAR:

WAS GEN NIAZI BOUND TO OBEY AN ORDER TO SURRENDER?

“Gen. Niazi has claimed before us that he was in law bound to obey an order to surrender and we proceed to consider the question on the assumption (with which we do not agree) that he was indeed so ordered. The Pakistan Army Act nowhere states in so many words that an order to surrender must be obeyed and reliance is, therefore, placed on Section 33 which reads thus:-

“ ‘33. Disobedience of lawful command 

(1) Any person subject to this Act who disobeys in such a manner as to show a willful defiance of authority a lawful command given personally by his superior officer, knowing or having reason to believe him to be such, shall, on conviction by court martial, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years, or with such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.

(2) Any person subject to this Act who disobeys the lawful command of his superior officer, knowing or having reason to believe him to be such, shall on conviction by court martial, if he commits such offence on active service, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years, or with such less punishment as in this act mentioned; and if he commits such offence not on active service, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with such less punishment as in this Act mentioned.’

2. Section 24 of the Act, moreover, enumerates a number of offences which are punishable and which seem to us to include surrender in certain circumstances, although, again, the word is not actually used.

3. The question for decision is whether in the circumstances the order was a lawful command. The question is a difficult one to answer, but in the Manual of Pakistan Military Law appears a comment on the section which has some value: 

“‘The command must be a specific command to an individual i.e., it must be capable of individual execution by the person to whom it is addressed, and justified by military, as well as by civil law and usage, e.g., a command addressed by a superior officer to four men to "dismiss" is for the purpose of this clause a lawful military command to each of the four men so addressed. The command must relate to military duty that is to say disobedience to it must tend to impede, delay, or prevent a military proceeding.’

It does not seem to us that this was such an order. 

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