The post-Panama fallout

The Sharifs were caught like a deer in the headlights. Not used to such blatant exposures in a still slightly deferential media when it comes to shaming, they took their time responding. They sat paralysed as leader after leader around the world, named in the Panama Papers, either resigned or explained to their people the mischief that had been attached to their name.

Most accepted and decided to fade away under enormous moral and ethical pleasure. The Sharifs dithered, once again, and found themselves in the middle of a major controversy. Trust them to lose the moment.

Holding off-shore accounts or businesses is not a crime in itself, but to have one to evade tax or shelter ill-gotten money, and to not declare such holdings when the law so ordains when running for public office, becomes a crime. When such a crime became public those responsible knew there was no escape. Even when a misstep was only immoral and not illegal, they chose the noble way at the altar.

Sanaa Ahmed, a PhD student in Canada, in her piece, ‘Tax havens aren’t new’ (April 17, The News on Sunday) attempted to create a context enabling some rationale on why baying for Nawaz’s blood in Pakistan for such alleged crime may be preposterous. She makes some plausible arguments for why the rich and mighty need these accounts and why not every such account is mala fide. I think her frustration reflects her unease at some of us trying to sound the nobility bugle without completely understanding the dynamics.

I, for one, respect her point of view and will expand the rationale further to find some space for the beleaguered Sharifs. As the PM himself stated, they were stung by Bhutto’s nationalisation. And though they quickly recovered – not without some influence of the new-to-politics Nawaz Sharif as Punjab’s finance minister – the pain stayed as indeed their distrust of the Bhutto clan. When Nawaz lost power before his time to BB in 1993, he was stung again by another Bhutto and by the fickleness of power politics. Fearing the worst he, in all probability, chose to move what he had to safer climes. How the money moved, then or later, is the defining question.

Let us cut the Sharifs more rope. Nobody pays taxes in Pakistan, at least fully. If someone is paying corporate or business tax it is almost a given that most of his personal income usually stays out of the net. The tax record of the Sharifs points to this anomaly too. Again, they are as bad, or as good, as the rest.

They however did buy property abroad in 1993. Was this ever disclosed in their tax or assets returns? Their 1996 declarations to the Election Commission of Pakistan would have so recorded. If not, they lied. And this is a serious charge for anyone who aspires to lead a nation. Did the BB and Zardari example of riches abroad goad them into such omission? If so, the Zardaris carried it off with some retribution; the Sharifs got ensnared.

The point that Sanaa Ahmed makes in all this is: what is new? Wasn’t this already known? Yes, and left to the Pakistanis they would have moved on with the information in the spirit that boys will be boys and end up doing the mischief that politicos do. Except that this time the world has taken note, the Sharifs are not the only ones, and there is attrition all around. The Sharifs’ response was also qualitatively different from those in countries with ethically greater sensitivity.

When the Sharifs were deposed in 1999 by a military general, the matter of their wealth was cast in stone for the future. An unreliable Pakistan wasn’t the place either for their children or their wealth. The Jeddah Steel Mill was an off-shoot of this thinking as was the off-shoring of moneys in the Fonsecka accounts. Despite such causal context where the seed money for the mills came from, and where such money was parked, needs to be explained by the Sharifs.

Should a context absolve Sharifs from any blame? I am afraid not. They may have been simply toeing what others were doing, justified by their innate fears of the unknowns in Pakistan’s political climate, but when once exposed with plausible wrongdoing, the process will have to run its course. That is the rub, and no amount of historical contextualisation can justify the inherent crime in there.

The Chinese way of business is considered a bit shady all over the world. To clean the system there has been a purge on for the last couple of decades. It was loudly whispered under Hu Jintao that the regime will not stand any ‘reports’ of corruption by the powerful. The guideline was simple: ‘don’t get caught, or I will have to kill you’. And he did kill some. That helped convey a message domestically and internationally. President Xi Jinping has actively pursued the known corrupt without waiting for exposures. That will wring the Chinese economy clean generating greater credibility and trust.

So with political leadership. To begin with, Nawaz Sharif must provide all answers. Even if the Sharifs were to be permitted an escape from this juggernaut, the question of fidelity of Pakistani politics will remain. An investigative commission under a couple of Supreme Court worthies must investigate all those named and award retribution where applicable, while a parallel parliamentary committee should initiate action pronto to close all existing loopholes in the Foreign Exchange Act, money laundering and non-disclosure of income and assets. Reforming the tax system to make it easier and less hurtful is another essential.

What the opposition, led by Imran Khan, needs to focus on is not how to bring Nawaz down – that may become a collateral consequence regardless, either for reasons of health or simple unresolved pressure – but to focus on cleansing the Pakistani political scene of its affiliated grime with concrete policy measures.

Only a cleaner leadership will deliver a cleaner Pakistan. It will also save them some blues.

The writer is a retired air-vice marshal, former ambassador and a security and political analyst.

Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com