Ties with Tehran

For sure, the reintegration of Iran into the multilateral political and trading systems creates substantial opportunity for the deepening of Islamabad-Tehran relations. Yet, quite a few irritants deflate such optimism.

Hasan Rouhani, after his landslide victory in the 2013 presidential election, presided over a fundamental shift in Iran’s foreign policy. Rouhani’s electoral triumph itself signalled that a clergy-dominated, aggressive Iranian establishment was prepared, albeit reluctantly, to do business with the West, at the start of which was striking a deal on the country’s nuclear programme, which had invited crippling international sanctions. Last year’s (2015) nuclear agreement between Iran and the world’s major powers (P5 + 1), and Tehran’s subsequent compliance thereto, was a watershed in contemporary Middle Eastern history.

The sanctions prevented Pakistan, as they did most other nations, from having normal relations with Iran – both economically and politically. Bilateral trade came down with a thud, from $1.3 billion in 2008-2009 to $270 million in 2014-2015. The disruption of formal trade, mainly due to the absence of banking channels, created a windfall for smugglers. The annual informal trade between Iran and Pakistan is stated to be over $2 billion, meaning a substantial revenue loss for both governments. Although Pakistan did sign a deal in 2013 for the import of up to $2.5 billion worth of gas a year from Iran, it was evident that as long as Tehran was under international sanctions, no substantial headway could be made.

Since the lifting of sanctions on his country, President Rouhani has visited quite a few countries. Last month (March 2016), he came to Pakistan – the first top-level visit from Iran in several years. The tour was aimed at reviving relations between the two countries. During the visit, several bilateral agreements were signed, including one pertaining to shoring up bilateral trade to $5 billion in five years.

This target seems fairly ambitious, because even at its peak, Pak-Iran trade was well below $1.5 billion. Even if bilateral trade reaches $2 billion in the next half decade, it will be quite an achievement. That said, numbers don’t really matter, as long as the two countries move ahead on the economic front.

The visit coincided with the capture of a self-confessed Indian spy in the restive Balochistan province, which shares a more than 900 kilometres long border with Iran. Islamabad’s concerns about RAW’s anti-Pakistan activities on Iranian soil were conveyed to President Rouhani by none other than Army Chief General Raheel Sharif, during his meeting with the visiting dignitary. As the head of ISPR, the Pakistan army’s media wing, tweeted, the army chief asked Rouhani to convey to India that “they should stop these activities and allow Pakistan to achieve stability”. Judging by diplomatic norms, the message was strongly worded.

Surprisingly, in his press conference, Rouhani outright denied that the issue had come up during his meeting with Gen Sharif: “Whenever Iran comes closer to Pakistan such rumours are spread.” That is how Rouhani summed up his response, which was also very strongly worded. The question, however, is why did the army high command choose to make the contents of the top-level meeting public?

There is no gainsaying that India has a strong presence in Chabahar, where Iran is building a port with Indian assistance. The port will provide access to India to Afghanistan as well as Central Asian Republics (CARs) through Iran. India has been pressing Pakistan to provide the same access, under its transit trade treaty with Afghanistan. This makes Gwadar and Chabahar competitors, even though they have been declared sister ports via an MoU.

In addition, India is an enormous market as well as one of the fastest growing economies. As a post-sanctions Iran seeks a substantial increase in its oil exports, it must be eyeing the rising energy demand in India. All this highlights that New Delhi and Tehran have tremendous economic stakes in their relations. But whether Iranian soil is being used against Pakistan is a different question. For its part, Iran has also alleged in the past that militants from Pakistan infiltrate into its territory.

If Pakistan has concerns about Iran’s relations with India, Tehran has its own concerns about Islamabad’s relations with Riyadh.. Not surprisingly, if Pakistan looks at stronger Indo-Iran relations with apprehension, Tehran may also be uneasy over Islamabad-Riyadh ties.

The lifting of the sanctions on Iran has been accompanied by an escalation in Tehran-Riyadh tensions. Iran and Saudi Arabia, representing Shias and Sunnis respectively, have competed to control the Middle East. In almost every conflict in the region they are on the opposite sides. No wonder Iran has been excluded from the 34-nation military alliance organised by Saudi Arabia to fight Daesh.

Pakistan is one of several countries that have been the sites of a proxy war between Riyadh and Tehran. Therefore, the recent escalation of tensions between the two Middle Eastern rivals has put Islamabad in an awkward situation. The government had earlier turned down Riyadh’s request to send troops for operations against the Houthis in Yemen, as such a move would amount to taking sides in the Iran-Saudi antagonism.

But the fact that Pakistan is a member of the Saudi-led 34-nation military alliance, and thus may be asked to take part in a likely invasion of Syria by virtue of its military strength, suggests how difficult it will be for the country to stay neutral. Many believe that by its inclusion in the alliance, Islamabad has already ceased to be neutral. At any rate, let’s admit that Pakistan is a Sunni-majority country and therefore, however hard it may endeavour to even out its relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, the tilt is likely to be towards the latter.

The writer is a graduate from a western European university.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com