Institutional stability

Is Pakistan’s democratic experience failing? Why have the liberal democrats and the free market economics not delivered at the desired pace and quality to make a palpable difference in the lives of common people? Why does the public imagination still yearn for a man on horseback to act as the promised messiah for the many ills that plague the socioeconomic firmament of the nation?

The answer to the above questions may possibly lie in the institutionalisation versus liberalisation debate. According to scholars like Roland Paris, democratisation and free market economics creates chaos and disorder in societies that do not have stable institutions to ensure public order, social justice, and participatory governance. This debate is echoed in Edmund Burke’s ideas of peace and order, before reforms. Huntington also believed that political and economic reforms without stable institutions give rise to competition and disorder.

Fareed Zakaria, in ‘Illiberal Democracy’, cites institutions like a strong judiciary, effective police, independent parliament, enlightened civil society and a vibrant media as necessary pre-conditions for a successful democratic experience.

In his famous treatise on stability and democracy, ‘At War’s End’ Roland Paris uses “stable and lasting peace” as a dependent variable to study the efficacy of democracy and free market economy. In his research, culled out of fourteen case studies of nations coming out of conflict, peace and stability were found to be adversely impacted by the absence of regulatory institutions to moderate the intense competition generated because of rapid political and economic reforms. This phenomenon was clearly observed in the case of Mozambique, Angola and Rwanda. In Mozambique, the Western import of free market economy and democracy failed to take root in the absence of strong institutions.

Frelimo’s Marxist central planning and one-party political arrangement came in conflict with the Western model espoused by the West’s protégé, Renamo. In Rwanda, the IMF’s “Structural Adjustment Programs” imposed heavy social costs on the people, which exacerbated ethnic differences that led to a genocidal civil war. In Angola too, the UN-sponsored and Western-backed elections and free market reforms failed to usher in peace between the MPLA and UNITA factions of the country. The absence of strong institutions and democratic traditions led to an ineluctable fight over political and economic power.

In Pakistan’s context, the Paris argument can be adduced by citing conflict in society, engendered by endemic bad governance and economic inequality. Democratisation and free market economy have not acted as a panacea for Pakistan, due to the absence of sound liberal and regulatory institutions to oversee property disputes, economic activities and ensue the rule of law.

The liberal democratic institutions and traditions, such as respect for law, judicial efficacy and social justice, are pre-requisites for the desired democratic peace dividend that eludes the people of Pakistan. What we have here are extractive institutions, instead of stability-inducing structures and a tradition of respecting the law. Due to frequent democratic derailments, stable, independent and strong institutions could not be built. We see conflict in urban Sindh, Balochistan and north-west Pakistan because of an institutional vacuum.

In the absence of stability-inducing institutions, the vacuum is filled by demagogues and religious extremists, which gives rise to ethnic particularism and sectarian disharmony in the country. In Pakistan’s Fata region, there is no institution to regulate the modern economic and political activity, giving rise to a vacuum that is filled by buccaneers, criminals and extremists.

Reliance on the medieval jirga system and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) are anachronisms in this modern age of global connectivity. Terrorists and criminals exploit these institutional weaknesses to carve out a niche for their criminal enterprises. Similarly, in Balochistan, the absence of the writ of the state in 90 percent of the area, which has been declared as B area, with no police and judicial reach, is a sad commentary on self-induced institutional vacuum.

Without institutions such as an effective judiciary, depoliticised police force, strong representative institutions and a vibrant and mature media, the democratisation and marketisation of Pakistan would continue to exacerbating social and economic inequalities. Like all the fourteen case studies mentioned in the Roland Paris’ book, our democratic experience, sans the true participatory spirit of social and economic egalitarianism, runs the risk of social polarisation and conflict between the haves and the have nots.

The ongoing debate about corruption and terrorism needs to be viewed in the context of the aforementioned discourse. The elite, unmindful of public sentiment, is loath to establish strong and independent institutions for public accountability, dispensation of justice, law and order and good governance. Sans these institutions, our entire democratic voyage, in Shakespeare’s words, is bound in shallows and miseries.

The writer is a PhD scholar at Nust.

Email: rwjanj@hotmail.com