The Obama-Sharif working summit

The stage is set for the second Obama-Sharif summit in Washington today. The meeting is expected to grapple with some of the most tedious questions regarding the Pak-US-Afghan partnership in the closing years of the war on terror in Afghanistan.
It is also expected to discuss the mutually exclusive demands of Washington and Islamabad over the latter’s nuclear programme with no possibility of any deal in sight as well as the ongoing Indo-Pak acrimony the US could do little about, besides exploring the potential of the Pak-US relationship beyond being an otherwise transactional relationship. Instead of raising the antes and living in our delusionary world, what should we realistically expect from a working US visit?
The speculations are high; and demands are being made by some incorrigible hawks for the prime minister to not budge an inch on every strategic item on the agenda so crucial to what is an otherwise unequal partnership with the US. Suspecting the capacity of an elected PM, who had once dared to defy US opposition and authorised the country’s nuclear tests, to stand up to US pressure, one of our leading hawks Ambassador Munir Akram had asked the PM to be wise enough to “postpone” his visit since “he cannot afford another Ufa” (sic!) – a sort of warning indeed.
Our nuclear hawks should be pleased (or disappointed?) to know that White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest ruled out any kind of a ‘breakthrough’ or ‘nuclear deal’, before the summit had even started.
The US is in no hurry, though determined to restrain our reach beyond the ‘India-centric’ limited scope of the Pak programme, while our nuclear National Command Authority is determined to continue with its strategic plans at any cost – as reflected by the statement it issued after its last meeting on September 9.
The dialogue over the nuclear programme will, however, continue as both sides are keen to develop some kind of difficult, but not impossible, middle ground – barring over-stretch by either side. Pakistan’s security establishment is rightly keen to get into the nuclear mainstream while over-ambitiously wishing to be treated at par with India which is being rewarded with preferential treatment by the US to match China.
At the heart of the nuclear deliberation at the moment is the desirability of the pace of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, being widely perceived as the fastest growing undertaking, ostensibly beyond the scope of India-specific deterrence, battle-ready short-range missiles, such as the 60-kilometre range Nasr, to counter India’s ‘Cold Start’ offensive military design, and 2,750 kilometre long-range Shaheen-III to pre-empt second nuclear-strike capability stationed somewhere at the other end of India – Nicobar, Andaman and other islands in the Indian Ocean.
Graduating from a ‘limited nuclear deterrence’ to ‘full-spectrum (nuclear) deterrence capability’, either we agree to a limit that doesn’t potentially hurt anyone other than India, and recognise restraints that do not turn a conventional threat into a nuclear war, or we remain outside the realm of legitimate mainstream. The deterrence theory is inherently self-escalatory: Pakistan struggles to compete with India, is breathlessly following China, is determined to overtake Russia, and wishes to match the US. Perhaps this was the best time to negotiate a palpable deal – when we have had the strategic advantage of being a US partner in the fading war of terror in Afghanistan.
The focus is going to be on Afghanistan, now that President Obama has reversed his earlier decision of a complete drawdown of US forces, and has decided to allow 9,800 troops to stay – beyond his earlier deadline as well as tenure as president. This gives us a sense of relief – realised a bit little – especially after the Pakistan Army and air force launched the massive Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan and other northern regions and we face an increased blowback emanating from the Afghan territory.
During Secretary of National Security Susan Rice’s preparatory visit to Islamabad, she had unambiguously set the US’ terms for continuing partnership in Afghanistan, including eradicating terrorists’ “safe havens”, the Haqqani Network, the LeT, etc.
The Americans’ major demands – to go after the Afghan Taliban and bring them to the negotiation table at the same time – are somewhat problematic. The riddle can, however, be solved by calibrating restraints strictly placed on their presence on our soil without compromising our capacity to persuade Mullah Mansour and his guys to resume negotiations.
The US wants to leave, not as soon as Obama had wanted and not as early as the Taliban had sought – a point of convergence that may not be as good for the future of Afghanistan and its stability if the Americans leave a warring and war-torn country behind for the Afghans, and with Pakistan still suffering from the remnants of the earlier conflict. Peace in, and the future of, Afghanistan depend on the sustenance of the state and economic structures built in the last decade and a half, and the high cost to maintain them that can’t be afforded by the countries of the region.
Pakistan denies continuing its objectives of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan – for which from Gen Musharraf to Gen Kayani we have paid such an exorbitant price – and vows not to let its territory used for terrorism against other countries.
Islamabad’s stated position is: 1) supporting reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban on terms left to them; 2) a friendly Afghanistan not in cohorts with India – not letting the latter use Afghan territory to destabilise Pakistan; and 3) above all what should be the priority, effective management of security across a porous border that should be permanently settled – something our preferred Pakhtun friends in Afghanistan are not ready to accept.
On the other hand, Afghanistan blames Pakistan for the insurgency and recent rise in attacks, including the Taliban’s temporary takeover of Kunduz, while ignoring Islamabad’s complaints regarding the refuge that absconding terrorists have got in the provinces bordering Pakistan. Thanks to US mediation, both countries could agree to a detente and enter into a long-term partnership in all spheres allowing a regulation and, if at all, a permanent settlement of the Pak-Afghan border broadly around the Durand Line.
On the ongoing Indo-Pak tension, we must have no illusions. Washington agrees with most of New Delhi’s allegations against Pakistan about cross-border terrorism that we are trying to counter-balance by some of our well-founded allegations of India fomenting destabilisation in Pakistan. The Ufa understanding was a way forward that was squandered by both sides.
We should not expect much from the US except another reminder to us to do our part by nabbing all those suspected of cross-border terrorism as a quid to persuade India to respond by its pro quo by stopping its counter-terror through terror policy of PM Modi’s national security advisor.
We want normalcy on our eastern border and should be happy over the resumption of composite dialogue with India that helps create a congenial atmosphere for talks that take care of the core, and outstanding, issues. And, finally, we need to explore with the US what lies beyond the Afghan theatre and what awaits us in a de-hyphenated relationship without a hangover of the ‘most allied ally’ days of a gone era.
The writer is a political analyst.
Email: imtiaz.safma@gmail.com
Twitter: @ImtiazAlamSAFMA