The peg and the hole

In the last six weeks alone, press reports indicate that at least a dozen Pakistani soldiers have been martyred in North Waziristan. Another fifteen have been injured.

The war that Pakistan has won is not yet over. Thanks to the bravery of Pakistan’s best and brightest, its men and women in uniform, alhamdolillah, Pakistan is not at risk of losing the war. But thanks to ill-conceived notions of 21st century human relations, it does risk losing the momentum that a victory should have created.

For at least four decades, a series of international actors, as well as domestic strategic compulsions (for lack of a more appropriate word that would pass the mustard of politeness and conformity), have helped generate a strange cocktail of religiously-inspired extremism in the districts formerly known as Fata.

After 9/11, this religious extremism became less of an asset and more of a liability. As the years went by, it became almost entirely a liability. When it was first formed in late 2007, the TTP was not breaking the mould. It was not the first generation of violent religious extremist from Fata. But it was unique in that it was probably the first that directly challenged the Pakistani state. Seven years after the TTP went live, so to speak, Pakistan awoke from the stupor of having suicide bombers swarm its towns and cities, its markets and universities, its mosques, and its churches, until finally, it hit Karachi airport.

The fight-back began in the summer of 2014. When the Peshawar APS attack took place in 2014, the entire nation got to experience a small sliver of the PTSD that had been raining down upon Pakistanis unlucky enough to be born in Fata for the last four decades.

So on the one hand, we have a war and conflict ravaged enclave of the country, in which essentially every living human being was born into, or raised children through, violence. What do we have on the other hand? Several things. Let’s start with some numbers.

The average age of a Pakistani in 2019 is projected to be between 22 and 23 years. As the demographic dividend window for Pakistan begins to shrink more rapidly, the average age will cross 30 before the year 2050. By then, Pakistan will be a country of at least 300 million. Among the fastest growing parts of Pakistan then? It probably won’t be Karachi, or Lahore, or Islamabad. It will definitely include Peshawar and Quetta.

There are nearly two and a half million Afghans living in Pakistan. Only about 1.4 million of them are officially recognised as refugees. Of those 1.4 million refugees, 74 percent were born in Pakistan. Almost 70 percent of all Afghan refugees live in cities, mostly Peshawar and Quetta.

Some more numbers. In the 2013 elections, Peshawar had four National Assembly seats, NA 1 through NA 4. All four were swept by the PTI. In the 2018 elections, Peshawar had five NA seats, NA 27 through NA 31. All five were swept by the PTI.

One more vital number. 100 billion. The then-federal minister of finance, Ishaq Dar, announced Rs100 billion for the so-called Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) of then-Fata during his budget speech for 2015-2016. No such funds were ever made available. Later, the Fata Reforms Committee recommended that as part of the grand compact for Fata reforms and integration, three percent of the total NFC award be allocated for the newly merged districts – this also came to about Rs100 billion. Later, the same three percent of the NFC was adopted as the standard envelope to be recommended as the baseline monetary allocation for the former Fata districts being integrated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, by the National Implementation Committee on Fata Reforms.

Unlike Ishaq Dar, or indeed the current federal Finance Adviser Mr Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, the core purpose of Taimur Khan Jhagra’s political journey is not servitude to the powerful, but service to the people. As a first time MPA, and minister of finance for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Jhagra is quietly trying to build the momentum that will allow KP to actually help keep the promise of at least Rs100 billion per year for the districts formerly known as Fata. He is doing this, because unlike most of his ministerial colleagues in Peshawar, or Islamabad, or Lahore, he can read more than one tweet in a single go, he understands the complexity and depth of the challenge in former Fata, and he is young enough to harbour legitimate aspirations to remain alive, active, and continuing to serve for the next quarter century. He may be two decades senior to the average Pakistani, but he is seriously invested in the Pakistan of the year 2050.

If you will recall then, on the one hand, we have a war and conflict ravaged enclave of the country, in which essentially every living human being was born into, or raised children through, violence. On the other, we have an entire country that is young. A post-conflict enclave that is even younger. A neighbouring country in a state of war that has sent over millions of its own to Pakistan as refugees. A massive need for funding in this post-war, post-conflict enclave. A political party that has a serious political interest in serving the city that was, is and will increasingly be the epicentre of the hopes, aspirations and anger of the people affected by 40 years of this international conflict. And a bright young politician who needs to hit a home run for his people.

Add to all of this, a few dimensions that go beyond Pakistan’s borders. There are Afghan mercenaries that would happily hurt Pakistan without even being paid. For nearly 20 years, young men and women in Kabul and beyond have been living a discourse that is principally designed to allow both Afghans and Americans to be able to step away from the disastrous state of that country and point the finger at someone else. Close at hand to both such Americans and Afghans are Indians that are, depending on when they were born, still smarting from Kargil, Indian parliament, Mumbai, Pathankot, Uri, or Pulwama. They need little to no motivation to find ways to put the hurt on Pakistan. Why any of these actors would lionise Pakistan instead of demonising it is beyond imagination. They would not. Ergo, malign foreign intervention in Pakistan is not a matter of if. It is a matter of how and when. Cliff Notes? Every which way. Every chance they have.

Finally, to all this, add the capacity to dream in full 4K. People all around the world aspire to have a good life. Thanks to the miracles of technology and road infrastructure, the 22-year-old rural poor aren’t quite so forgiving of the 40-something urban rich. No quite so tolerant of how they drive by with their windows tinted, and up. No quite so able to ignore the heat, and the sunstroke, and the miscarriages, and the closed doors. Not quite so docile as to continue to silently endure war, whilst everyone on television, and in their smart phones, seems to be enjoying peace and tranquillity.

If by some miracle, Rs100 billion does start to be spent in former Fata, on badly-needed infrastructure and social services – will it be good enough to tackle the sense of deprivation that inequality, injustice, conflict and modern technology have imposed on my sisters and brothers who belong to the area? It will not. But it is where the story for how to deal with political and social dissent begins.

In the meanwhile, both earnest and ill-intentioned expressions of the indignity of being from former Fata will continue to be fashioned.

Soldiers (and for that matter, righteous doctors, lawyers, bankers, accountants, software engineers and all others with lifetimes that have been spent colouring within the lines) tend simply to not be very good at dealing with those that don’t know any lines, what to say of how to colour within them.

Do not try to force a square peg into a round hole: you either break the peg, or you break the hole. Both deserve to be protected. Both should be cherished.

The writer is an analyst and

commentator.