The IAF in crisis

On February 26, at 0330 hours, 12 Mirage 2000 – French multi-role, single-engine fourth-generation jet fighters – of the Indian Air Force (IAF) crossed the Line of Control (LoC) and bombed a mountaintop by the name of Jaba Top in Balakot. The IAF’s jets were carrying Spice-2000, the Israeli-manufactured electro-optics GPS-guided guidance kits, and Israel’s precision-guided, air-to-surface missiles, Popeye.

The IAF hit neither a strategic nor a tactical target. Its mission turned out to be a publicity stunt for Narendra Modi’s election campaign. Imagine that in the world’s largest democracy an extremist politician managed to manipulate the entire Indian Air Force (140,000 active personnel and a fleet of 1,724 aircraft) for a personal publicity stunt.

Pakistani strategists completely outmanoeuvred their Indian counterparts whereby India came out as a clear-cut aggressor and Pakistan had two victories – a moral victory and a military victory (by shooting down two Indian jet fighters in Pakistani airspace).

War is an awfully expensive business. A strike fighter of the IAF taking off from an Indian Air Force station and returning after dropping bombs on a nondescript mountain-top in Balakot costs the IAF around $1.1 million per sortie. My estimate is that the IAF burnt a hefty sum of Rs2 billion in about a half hour-long operation. Remember, the 68 percent of India’s population survives at or under $2 a day. Yes, India’s defence budget has ballooned to $60 billion a year as the annual trade deficit approaches a colossal $200 billion.

The IAF has five operational and two functional commands, 140,000 active personnel, 66 stations and an estimated 1,724 aircraft (including around 900 combat capable). A 2016 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that “The IAF’s fighter force, as of early 2016, is weaker than the numbers suggest. At nominally 36.5 squadrons, it is well short of its sanctioned strength, and many of its frontline aircraft are obsolete”. The same report adds that “The Indian Air Force’s falling end strength and problematic force structure, combined with its troubled acquisition and development programs, threaten India’s air superiority over its rapidly modernizing rivals”.

According to the Carnegie, “all three tiers – light, medium and heavy weight – of the IAF are currently in trouble”. In 2018, The National Interest, an American bimonthly international affairs magazine, ran a report titled ‘Why India’s Air Force is dying’. The report concludes that India’s “procurement process is a deeply bureaucratized labyrinth of incompetence and ineffectiveness”.

The IAFs Russian-made MiGs are now known as ‘flying coffins’ or ‘widow makers’. The BBC ran a story titled ‘Why are India’s air force planes falling out of the sky’. Yes, the IAF has “lost more than half the 872 MiGs it had purchased from Russia in accidents”. Indian-designed warplanes are proving to be a major disappointment.

According to India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), Indian-made Akash air defense missile system is “deficient in quality” and has a 30 percent failure rate. In 2018, the CAG pointed out “gaping holes in the airfields….inadequate equipment and deficient infrastructure…”

Here’s A S Dulat’s, former chief of RAW, advice: The best way forward is dialogue with Pakistan; avoid coercive action at all cost. The best template for dealing with Pakistan and Kashmir is Vajpayee’s template. Musharraf’s four-point formula was a very realistic one and had it been accepted we would have had 15 years of peace in Kashmir.

On March 4, The New York Times concluded: “After India loses dogfight to Pakistan questions arise about its ‘vintage’ military. The aerial clash, the first by the South Asian rivals in nearly five decades, was a rare test for the Indian military – and it left observers a bit dumbfounded. While the challenges faced by India’s armed forces are no secret, its loss of a plane last week to a country whose military is about half the size and receives a quarter of the funding was still telling”.

Rajiv Tyagi’s, a retired IAF pilot, message to Modi: “Stop baying for the blood of our soldiers”. According to Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, “barely a fortnight ago, Modi was on a weak electoral wicket. IAF air strikes in Pakistan – has Modi won half the election battle?”

In my opinion, Modi’s IAF gamble is backfiring. Two questions: Will Modi’s politics of blood bear fruit? Will Modi fold or double up?

The writer is a columnist based inIslamabad.

Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com

Twitter: @saleemfarrukh