Surveillance wall

Since even before he took office, President Trump has called for a physical wall along the southern border of the United States. Many different organizations have argued this isn’t a great idea. In response, some Congressional Democrats have suggested turning to surveillance technology to monitor the border instead of a physical barrier.

Without specific legislative proposals, it’s hard to know what these suggestions actually mean. However, any bill Congress considers related to border security should avoid -- at minimum -- invasive surveillance technologies like biometric screening and collection, DNA collection, social media snooping, unregulated drones along the border, and automatic license plate readers aimed at interior traffic.

We have already seen several proposals authorizing the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its sub-agencies to collect biometric information from all people who exit the US, including US citizens. We oppose legislation that would entrench and expand DHS’s existing program of facial recognition of all international travelers who take certain outgoing flights from US airports. EFF is also opposed to TSA’s proposals to collect and share biometric data of domestic travelers with the FBI, the State Department, and local governments. Given the sensitivity of biometric information, we’re concerned about the threat that any collected data will be stolen or misused, as well as the potential for such programs to be expanded far beyond their original scope.

EFF has long opposed dragnet biometric surveillance of immigrants. Among other things, we oppose any proposal that would require DHS to collect DNA and other biometric information from “any individual filing an application, petition, or other request for immigration benefit or status”. DNA surveillance raises special concerns, because DNA can expose sensitive information about familial history and personal health issues.

EFF opposes existing DHS and State Department programs of screening the social media of foreign visitors. We would also oppose any legislation that would expand and entrench DHS reviewing the social media accounts of visa applicants from so-called ‘high risk countries’. These programs threaten the digital privacy and free speech of innocent foreign travelers, and the many US citizens who communicate with them. Also, it is all-too-likely that such programs will invite ‘extreme vetting’ of visitors from Muslim nations.

Any proposal that would allow DHS and the Defense Department to deploy drones at the US border raises significant privacy concerns. These drones will invariably capture the faces and license plates of the vast number of US citizens and lawful permanent residents who live close to the border. Drones can take pictures and videos from all of the people on the ground within their range and sightlines -- secretly, thoroughly, inexpensively, and at great distances. Millions of US citizens and lawful permanent residents live close to the US border, and these drones should not be allowed to take photos and videos of people on their own property.

ALPRs can collect massive amounts of sensitive location information about identifiable law-abiding people. Any new ALPR authority or funding should be limited, at most, to cars that actually cross the US border. It should not also apply more broadly to cars at CBP’s many interior checkpoints.

This article has been excerpted from ‘A Surveillance Wall Is Not a Good Alternative to a Concrete Wall’.

Courtesy: Commondreams.org