The NSS process

In April 2009, President Obama in his Prague speech called nuclear terrorism “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”. Even though the possibility of a terrorist organisation carrying out a nuclear attack is slight, the consequences of such an attack would obviously be of gigantic proportions. Against this backdrop, President Obama mounted an initiative to prevent nuclear terrorism by strengthening the global nuclear security regime.
Over the past decade, the amount of fissile material in the world has grown rapidly, particularly in countries like Pakistan and India. Since 1993, there have been 16 confirmed cases of theft of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium documented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database, most of them occurring in the former Soviet Union. The major factor responsible is that safeguards to control the diversion of nuclear materials have been weak.
The US hosted first the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington DC in 2010, in order to draw attention, at the highest possible level, to the need to prevent unauthorised use of nuclear materials across the globe. In 2012, a second summit was held in Seoul. The first summit focused almost exclusively on fissile materials, while the follow-up in Seoul was concerned with the interface between nuclear safety and security at nuclear facilities and the protection of high-activity radioactive sources.
The Hague hosted the third NSS last year in March to review progress made over the past four years and determine the future direction of the global nuclear security regime. The NSS process has raised the profile of nuclear security issues and many countries have demonstrated tangible and concrete progress in reducing nuclear materials. In this way, the NSS process has made some headway in generating new avenues for global action to thwart the transnational threat of nuclear terrorism.
However, sceptics say sufficient infrastructure to tackle the global threat is still not in place. Despite the progress made since the 2010 Washington summit, the participants of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague could not announce ‘mission accomplished’. Many specific tasks and objectives in the NSS work plan remain unfulfilled. A roadmap to develop an effective ‘global nuclear materials security system’ involving tracking, accounting, managing and securing all fissile nuclear materials in storage is yet to be framed.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), signed in 1980, is the only legally binding international treaty in the area of physical protection of fissile materials. It establishes measures related to theft or loss of nuclear or other radiological materials but is only applicable to nuclear materials in transport. In July 2005, an amendment was passed to make it legally binding to protect materials in international transport as well as in domestic use and storage. But the amendment could not take effect as it has not yet been ratified by two-thirds of the state parties to the convention.
Furthermore, the CPPNM and other nuclear security-related multilateral instruments including the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the UN Security Council’s Resolutions (UNSCR) 1373 and 1540, do not offer concrete mechanisms to advance international cooperation for eliminating weak links in the global nuclear security regime.
Building a more efficient and flexible nuclear security architecture will require some structural changes in global nuclear governance arrangements. The regime has to be more cohesive and universalised in its scope to effectively address nuclear security challenges. There is a general failure on the part of many countries to establish a system for cross-border communication of essential information in order to build international confidence in the system. Lack of political will seems to be a major impediment to the global implementation of common nuclear security standards.
Another key hurdle is the view held by many countries that strengthening the nuclear security regime is primarily a problem for nuclear weapon states at a national level. The current global nuclear materials security infrastructure relies almost entirely on protection measures designed by individual countries that possess fissile and radiological materials and nuclear facilities to prevent uncontrolled releases of radiation.
However, after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, there should be growing recognition that a global, and more comprehensive, response is needed. In other words, the current nuclear security system is nationally focused with weak international requirements. The Nuclear Security Summits could not move far enough to improve nuclear security governance and overcome a ‘government-governance’ gap. Many states also fear that the nuclear security agenda will be used to block their access to nuclear technology and that the US is dictating its own priorities to developing countries.
The NSS process must start a dialogue to harmonise these divergent threat perceptions because they will only complicate efforts to make nuclear terrorism a priority. The problem is further compounded by the largely voluntary and sovereign nature of the nuclear security regime. Although ensuring nuclear security is a sovereign responsibility, a nuclear terrorism incident will have widespread consequences for the whole world. The current nuclear security system does not include the monitoring structures needed for ensuring accountability.
The main priorities of the global non-proliferation regimes should be to strengthen the international legal regime by pressurising countries to ratify the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM and bring it into force. The 2016 nuclear security summit in Washington offers an opportunity to specify international standards regarding the level of security nuclear materials must have.
Unlike the earlier three summits, the participants at this summit will have to avoid NPT politics in order to give a clear vision for the future of the nuclear security regime.
Nuclear security is a global challenge, which demands global and strong solutions. President Obama can turn his NSS initiative into true success only if he succeeds in creating a global alliance against nuclear terrorism by the end of 2016 when the summit process finally ends.
Email: rizwanasghar5@unm.edu