The Afghan humpty

The fact remains that Afghanistan and Pakistan have never had cordial relations – not even during the Taliban years from 1996 to 2001 when the Taliban pretty much did as they pleased. The Durand line remained a line and was never converted into a border. There are many more instances that those in the know will tell you when the Taliban were their own people and not anyone’s lackeys, as is usually surmised.

The one instance which Afghan-philes like to quote to illustrate the warmth in Pak-Afghan relations are the two wars with India in 1965 and 1971 when the Afghans chose to adopt a neutral stance and not impose a second front on us. This is patently negative in character. When translated, it means, “look what I could have done to you; but I did not”. This hardly qualifies for brownie points in cordiality.

The Afghan bogey is a product of the extended imagination. Threats are a reflection of capacity. And Afghanistan has been unlucky in that it hasn’t been able to rise from the ashes since the British first overran it in 1838. By 1893, the capitulation was complete. Afghanistan has barely survived as a nation-state since then.

This fear of the second front is most surprising for being oft-repeated in terms such as the ‘two-front’ or the more famed ‘nutcracker’ driving our choices in policy formulation. The Afghans have never carried the military potential to force a dilemma of the kind on Pakistan. The reality, at best, has been a superficial caricature of the perception. In reality, a two-front threat of war has neither been a possibility nor did it factor into any real assessment.

Afghanistan was the only member state of the UN which refused to recognise Pakistan after our independence. Afghanistan did subsequently start diplomatic relations with Pakistan soon after 1947. But what remains as a memory is Afghanistan denying Pakistan recognition in the first place. Afghanistan also refused to accept the border between both countries until Britain assuaged the situation through a clarification that as a successor state to Britain, Pakistan inherited the territorial delineation.

The initial years were laced with unease as Afghanistan triggered a secessionist movement among the tribes along the borders. Some immediate trouble had to be put down by force. Afghanistan aligned itself with India and Russia as Pakistan joined the Western alliance in the cold war years, pitching the two in opposing camps.

The 1960s and early 1970s were relatively better as relations between both countries were largely premised on the Pakhtun ethnicity of Pakistan’s presidents during this period – Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. It was during this period that both countries managed to develop a functional relationship barely bordering on friendliness. Afghanistan’s landlocked geography also renders obligations on Pakistan which it must comply with, forcing the two countries into a relationship.

Between 1958 and 1971, the hostile sentiment was appeased considerably as more and more Pakhtun leaders found greater benefit with Pakistan. The two fell out again under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Sardar Daud – who had replaced King Zahir Shah, forcing him to abdicate. Ethnic secessionism was revived and many notable leaders of the National Awami Party of Khan Wali Khan found refuge in Afghanistan. A clemency towards the latter part of the 1970s by General Ziaul Haq brought them back to Pakistan. Most Baloch secessionists have continued to find succour in an anti-Pakistan social and political tradition that has unfortunately been sustained over time.

On top of this bilateral dynamic between the two countries was the carry-over of an international intrigue that bequeathed itself from the ‘great game’ and found expression in a cold war. If earlier it was Britain and Russia who jacked for influence in these regions, it was soon the US and the USSR that inherited the tussle for control in these regions. From 1972 – when King Zahir Shah was forced out – to 1996, a series of regime changes by the Parchamis and the Khalqis meant that Soviet influence had finally found a toehold in Kabul, replacing Western control.

The Americans reacted to this change of Afghan character by initiating a Muslim insurgency against communist control – which was suitably augmented by fighters from all over the world – and honouring them with the appellation of a mujahid (Allah’s warrior). By 1989, the Soviets had effectively been kicked out with no less help from Pakistan which became a conduit of support for the US. This was fine as long as it served US interests. Around 12 years later, the mujahideen were renamed terrorists and the US intervened this time to eliminate the Taliban - formerly the mujahideen.

This persists even today. Two attempts at globalising Afghanistan through an imposed democratic order have done little to bring back any semblance of a self-dependent state. US presence and continuous financial support keeps it afloat. Society remains badly fragmented with the territory almost evenly divided between the Taliban and the Afghan state. The government is itself broken into factions that lack central direction. Rather than developing structures to unify a badly-broken nation, the state is seeking refuge in blaming all except itself on its existing deterioration. External influences dictate their disposition to the Afghans. It makes for a harrowing neighbourhood.

Afghanistan’s precariousness roils the region but hurts Pak-Afghan relations the most. Terrorism and war have seeped in through the porous borders into Pakistan. Over the last 40 years, Pakistan has been host to over five million or more Afghans – three million of whom still reside in the country – which has impacted its social, economic and security fabric. Pakistan’s war against terror, now in its 16th year, may have to do with playing host to an international agenda. But terror has now found permanent havens in Afghanistan.

Given that Afghanistan is a badly-broken Humpty Dumpty that is unlikely to be put together again with the existing forces in play there, it is sensible for Pakistan to control movement from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Whether it can be called management or control, Pakistan will strictly need to permit what is only salubrious to the mutual gains of both countries. Pakistan must also eliminate all possible havens within its territories where those creating harm for both nations are located. If this means encouraging the gradual repatriation of the extensive refugee population in Pakistan, it should be undertaken without any sense of appeasement for fear of a hostile perception among the Afghans. The Afghans have never been cordial towards Pakistan. Any such perception is fallacious.

Pakistan may have many options, from mitigation to neutralisation of the threat that sources itself in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan’s limitations will also need to be factored in and it should instead be offered help to ease its difficulties where possible. However, the dominating sense of appeasing Afghan hostility must give way to the imperatives of a 21st century state which can control its borders and what goes through them.

Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com