Beyond the BLA: How the Jaffar Express hijacking defies insurgent logic

TRAIN hijackings are exceedingly rare in modern history. The only successful example globally is the 1977 Dutch train hijacking by Moluccan separatists.

The Balochistan Liberation Army’s (BLA) tactical playbook is steeped in the chaos of guerrilla warfare: improvised explosive devices (IEDs), hit-and-run ambushes, and sporadic sabotage. Seizing a moving train hinges on a triad of critical factors: razor-sharp timing, detailed intelligence on rail networks down to the last switch and signal, and flawless logistical synchronization -- hallmarks of a special operations mission.

In its 25-year campaign of insurgency, the BLA has not exhibited such sophisticated command-and-control capabilities or the technical acumen required for a kinetic operation of this magnitude. A train hijacking is an anomaly that defies the operational norms of asymmetric warfare. This anomaly points to external support, likely from a state actor with access to advanced mission planning, reconnaissance, and execution.

Identifying a train’s exact location, speed, and vulnerability -- particularly 25 miles from the nearest road and within a tunnel -- demands real-time intelligence far beyond the BLA’s known reach. Did the Jaffar Express fall without the aid of satellite imagery? Did the Jaffar Express succumb without intercepted railway chatter?

Insurgent groups like the BLA rely on local, ground-level reconnaissance. State actors possess a sophisticated arsenal of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) networks. The precision of the attack’s location suggests a level of surveillance indicative of state sponsorship.

Imagine executing a train hijacking in a remote tunnel. Imagine capturing a moving train far from the roads. Yes, this involves transporting personnel. Yes, this involves transporting weapons. Yes, this involves transporting explosives over rugged terrain without detection. Yes, this demands significant pre-positioning, supply chains, and military-level vehicular support -- capabilities beyond the BLA’s resources. Imagine military-grade logistics. Imagine off-road vehicles. And yes, masking the entire operation.

The Jaffar Express could not have been captured the way it was without specialised training and tunnel-specific tactics. Imagine operating inside a tunnel-neutralising security, confined spaces, limited visibility, and managing escape routes all require specialised training -- think military or paramilitary drills, not the improvised tactics the BLA has been employing for the past 25 years.

For the past 25 years, the BLA has been targeting local security forces and attacking infrastructure to protest Pakistani control. The choice of a train in a tunnel, 25 miles from civilisation, maximises disruption and symbolic impact while minimising immediate counterattacks. This aligns less with the BLA’s usual goals and more with a state’s strategic playbook. The BLA might be a convenient front, but the orchestration hints at a larger agenda requiring state-level intent and foresight.

Yes, the BLA has claimed responsibility. To be certain, the operation has all the hallmarks of proxy warfare. States often provide resources and use insurgent groups to maintain plausible deniability. The BLA’s capacity to pull this off alone is doubtful; a state sponsor must have supplied the intelligence, training and materiel, then step back as the BLA takes credit.