JuD justice

A parallel state has been operating inside Pakistan, not in the far-flung region of Fata, but in Lahore. The Jamaatud Dawa (JuD), an organisation placed on the terrorism watch-list by a number of international organisations and supposedly by our own authorities, has been running a Shariat court in Punjab’s capital. The court, named the Darul Qaza Shariat, which should be both illegal and unconstitutional, has been operating from the main JuD mosque in the Chowburji area. New reports indicate that these courts have been operational in seven cities across Punjab, including Islamabad – maybe even from as far back as 1990. The JuD court has been adjudicating on issues ranging from domestic issues to financial disputes and even murder cases, with as many as 5,500 cases ‘resolved’ by the court. Some of those issued illegal notices by these courts have reported receiving threats from those affiliated with the parallel court to appear before it. If these courts have indeed been operational since 1990, this is criminal negligence by various governments and agencies.

The Punjab government has taken the welcome decision to issue notices to those operating these courts, but what is worrying is that it is still unclear who exactly was issued notices and what kind of action was being contemplated. Only a day earlier, Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah trivialised the issue by almost comparing the Shariat court to a panchayat. With a case on the legality of panchayats ongoing in the Supreme Court, it should be important to highlight here that the two are not comparable. Panchayats are a system that existed locally prior to the colonial state coming in, whereas Shariat courts are an externally imposed system. Both have their own problems, but comparing them serves no function but to obscure matters. The state has continued to cede fundamental spaces to religious extremists in central Pakistan while continuing to focus on a war in the north. The JuD itself has admitted to the existence of the court but has publicly taken the position that it is only a space which ‘arbitrates disputes.’ It would be wrong to blame the failures of the state legal system for the JuD’s decision to form its own court. Instead, it shows both that the religious right wing in Pakistan is gaining more confidence despite the apparent implementation of NAP, and that the state is continuing to abdicate itself responsibilities. The notices may be a start, but they are certainly not enough. It is impossible that no one in the security or government apparatus knew of the operation of the Shariat court by the JuD (reportedly for over two decades now). There needs to be a longer and more fundamental investigation of what kind of social contract the Pakistani state is offering its citizens.