Why counter terror strategy fails in Karachi?

Sindh will now have a Counter Terrorism Force. This time, 1,000 recruits would be trained by the army, but it is not yet clear how they will be recruited and where they will be posted after training. In the past, 80 percent of the Anti Terrorism Squad was deployed for the protection of VVIPs. Last year, some 1,200 retired military personnel were recruited, but nobody knows where they have been detailed.
If we’re really serious about eliminating terrorism and crime root and branch, then our civil-military leadership needs to break the deep-rooted nexus between politics and crime and between police, politicians, big tycoons and criminals/terrorists without which this mega city of 20 million would see no peace and stability.
Karachi needs a big and highly-trained police force and a police commissioner free of political interference. The key to success of police is an effective “Thana culture.” Since the police recruitment process is not transparent, it has become a political force rather than a police force. In this regard, the police are not to be blamed but the policymakers. So, without depoliticising the police, I’m afraid the Counter Terrorism Force may not be able to deliver.
To evolve a counter terrorism strategy, there is a need to understand where and how terrorists can strike and what possible surprises they can give, etc. In the last few months in Karachi, they came out with surprises like the airport attack and a foiled attempt of jailbreak.
Last year, some 1200 retired army personnel were recruited in the police force. Where are they? Have they been posted at the police stations? What happened to the campaign against cars with tinted glasses, fake number plates, VIPs carrying security guards in plainclothes? All this was part of the Karachi Operation plan.
Understanding the dynamics of Karachi, there is a need to break this myth. The Apex Committee must ensure that the personnel of Counter Terrorism Force are not deployed to guard VVIPs. Sensitive installations, jails, important institutions and sensitive areas need this force. There is no alternative to a strong “Thana culture”, which has been completely ignored.
Massive corruption has united all terror networks and made job easier for them. Thus, the stereotype measures to counter the mighty terror networks, some of which have links with international networks, would not work.
The high-powered meeting chaired by Sindh Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah has taken some effective measures for the implementation of the National Action Plan. For the first time, the interior Sindh has come into focus in the aftermath of the Shikarpur blast. But one has to wait to see how effective will be these measures.
It would have been better if the top commanders, officers and decision makers had also reviewed the outcome of previous such counter terror forces. Around one dozen such units are already in the field.
For instance, what has been the performance of Rapid Response Force (RRP), Special Police Unit (SPU), Anti Violence Cell (AVC), Special Security Unit (SSU), Anti-Car Lifting Cell, Anti-Encroachment Cell (AEC) and Sindh Reserved Force (SRF)? Besides, we also have the Crime Investigation Department (CID) and Prosecution Branch.
Is the Apex Committee satisfied with their performance, as their effective role can bring a change in Karachi? If not, then no Counter Terrorism Force can make a major difference. The Rangers performance and their internal units of investigation and counter terrorism also need a serious review.
Our airports and Karachi Port are also not safe. The Karachi airport and Mehran Base terror attacks have already shaken us. So, a review of the performance of our security agencies like the ASF, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and Anti Drug Force protecting sensitive installations is also needed. But the key to bring a change in Karachi is “Thana” without which counter terrorism strategy may not be able to give the desired results.
A quick look at how terrorism and crime spread in this economic hub and how it was countered will help us judge the possible outcome of the “New Action Plan”.Some 30 years back, international terror groups hit Karachi in the post-1979 Iranian revolution. They were from the Iranian Mujahideen-e-Khalq and Iraq groups. The city witnessed incidents like PAN AM hijacking and twin bombing in Saddar, killing over 200 people.
The first counter terror force formed in the 80s was “Eagle Squad” which I correctly remember was headed by Col (retd) Saeed. The present Expo Center at Hasan Square was its head office. They too had trained cops especially recruited to counter the rising terror attacks. What happened to that force and where are those trained cops? The Eagle Squad was followed by a Rapid Force but it met the same fate.
Terror dynamics and narratives were completely changed after 9/11, but Karachi became a safe haven for groups like al-Qaeda. Some of the top fugitives of this group came to Karachi and allegedly planned 9/11, but group No4, Ramzi bin Sheiba, was caught after a four-hour encounter in Defence Phase-II. A night earlier, al-Qaeda No3 Khalid Sheikh Mohammad escaped from a flat near the Noorani Kebab House, while his wife and a family member were reportedly held.
Sources said earlier Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was accused of involvement in the killing of US reporter Daniel Pearl in February, 2002. The year also saw major suicide bombings, including attacks on the US Consulate, outside the US Consul General’s residence and killing of 11 French engineers in Sheraton blast.
By that time intelligence agencies had marked Karachi as a possible hideout of terrorists. A US diplomat was killed in another suicide attack at the US Consulate, the then corps commander convoy came under a massive attack and a conspiracy to attack General Pervez Musharraf was also unearthed.
Despite Karachi being marked as “safe haven” for terror networks, after an alleged international terrorist involved in Bali bombing was arrested, no serious efforts were made to improve the system except the Police Order, 2002.
Had the Police Order, 2002 been fully implemented, some improvement could have come in the system. The idea of National and Provincial Public Safety Commissions could have brought some transparency in the system.
Today’s situation is far more challenging compared to the early years of 2002. We cannot meet these challenges by just having another “Counter Terrorism Force” unless the police are depoliticized and nexus between police, politicians and terror groups is broken.
Handling terror through counter terrorism methods can be more effective if we also have a proper local bodies system in place to resolve people’s day to day problems. It seems as if both the civil and military leaderships have almost dumped the initial plan to deweaponize Karachi.
Instead of giving arms in the hands of doctors or teachers or issuing arms license to them, a counter strategy is needed to free Karachi of arms.Can they do it? Counter terrorism needs a strategy, which so far is either missing or faulty.
The writer is a senior analyst, columnist of Geo, The News and Jang