Karachi’s Samson Option

Karachi has been at the mercy of an oligopoly that has deliberately let loose a reign of crime and misgovernance. Once a shining city throbbing with promise and hope, it represented all that was best in the young country – cultural effervescence, economic enterprise, and political perspicacity.
What has brought such a ‘Camelot’ to its present sorry state? The best answer lies in the writings of social scientist Christopher Cramer whose tragic view of history is rooted in a conflict and development binary. According to this view, conflict and development are so intertwined in a violent symbiosis of development and destruction that one cannot survive without another. The political and social stakeholders of the city have apparently taken this tragic view to its macabre end by fostering an entente cordiale of crime partnership to partake of the bounties offered by the infinite economic potential of the city.
A city that should have rivalled the likes of Shanghai, Tokyo and Singapore is gasping for life. If it was only at the cost of national security one could have taken issue with the present prescription by the minders of national security. It in fact quite tragically has come at the cost of human security. The public adulation behind the law-enforcement agencies and state security apparatus’ current involvement in the Karachi conflict is an indication of the human security dimension of the conflict.
Karachi’s current malaise is summed up in a de facto-de jure dilemma. The political and civilian administrative structure, having abdicated its responsibility to the Rangers, had created a huge governance vacuum which was filled by a Rangers-army combine under intense public pressure. This did not go down well with the de-jure rule of the provincial government that has always treated the city indifferently. The largest stakeholder in Karachi’s socio-political scene, the MQM, unfortunately has been the worst offender. The party’s abject capitulation to forces of greed and crime allowed others to carve out their niches of crime and extortion in different parts of the mega polis while an enervated provincial law-enforcement apparatus became a partner-in-loot.
The astounding amount of money involved in land-grabbing, extortion, and criminal cartelisation of public goods like drinking water encouraged non-state actors and terrorists to claim their pound of flesh. The most hideous part of the problem was the complete harmony and interconnectivity between these different criminal enterprises. There was, therefore, an unwritten understanding to let the writ of the state atrophy as it served everyone’s interests as a win win formulation.
The combination of these national security and human security dimensions gave rise to a perfect storm of community unrest that forced the military to swing into action. It was the MQM that was loudest in asking for a military intervention in Karachi’s affairs when apparently the Taliban had created enclaves in the city.
Terror funding through corruption, and the links between political parties and criminal enterprises left the Rangers and intelligence agencies with no choice but to hunt for the sources of corruption. When the law became an obstacle to the Rangers’ anti-corruption operation, federal civilian agencies like the National Accountability Bureau were also pressed into service.
As per independent analysts, the drop in the crime rate due to the operation has been palpably evident in concrete figures. The drop in extortion, target killings, terrorism and kidnappings for ransom has been 83 percent, 75 percent, 75 percent, and 91 percent respectively. Now having gone the whole hog as per public demand and on the government’s direction, the Karachi Operation has attained irrevocable momentum.
Having paid dearly in terms of 75 deaths and 86 serious injuries, the Rangers and intelligence agencies would be loath to tuck tail and return after a job well done. Very strong public pressure and support undergirds this operational resolve. The million dollar question here is about the civilian resolve and capacity. The present public mood in Karachi and the rest of the country is not ready to countenance any regression into crime and violence.
While we have seen the reasons behind the lack of civilian political resolve to establish the writ of the state in Karachi, a word about capacity is necessary. The state ensures its writ through retributive justice and enforcement of laws. Both these functions demand effective police and efficient courts. Do we have a police and courts apparatus that would keep pace with the military prong of the state?
In Karachi we have a police force of around 30,000 policemen out of which 16,000 remain deployed on protection of static installations. Out of the remaining 14,000 the real deployable strength for crime combat remains only around 8,000-10,000. Now if we apply the citizen-to-police ratio of Lahore/Punjab to Karachi the total requirement for policemen would come at around 100,000. Going by a realistic induction and training target of around 15,000 policemen per year that capacity would be attainable in not less than five years.
The above is just a quantitative requirement and if we include qualitative aspects like depoliticisation and proper training it becomes a rather tall order. The purpose of highlighting the above is to be mindful of the challenges that lie in the path of capacity building, an aspect that was criminally neglected in the past.
There are certain problems that would tax a smooth civil-military working equation in the future handling of the Karachi Operation. What if, due to weaknesses in our prosecution and justice dispensation, hard-core criminals and terrorists get off scot-free? That would surely be a most dangerous scenario, one in which civil and military relations could be strained beyond repair.
The military might then be tempted to cross the Rubicon of constitutional constraints. Supported by public clamour for accountability of malgovernance and corruption, there would be little criticism of the military’s messianic quest. Would the civilian component of the state let things come to such a pass? It is again essentially a question of capacity and resolve. The civilian political stakeholders have to abandon crime to practise clean politics. In addition, civilian law-enforcement and justice dispensation capacity is de rigueur – especially considering the possibility of any last-gasp attempt of the so-far-hidden potential militancy of political militant cadres organised at the sector and unit levels.
If courts, politicians, and the civilian administration fail to live up to people’s expectations, de facto military administrative control would ultimately attain de jure permanence, deriving legitimacy by performance-based public adulation. The million-dollar question is: will the civilian component of the state rise above petty politics and greed to fill the yawning governance void? Will the constitutionally-elected Samson lend his shoulders to the crumbling temple of state governance or bring the roof down on the entire system? This is a tragedy we can do without.
The writer is a retired brigadier and is currently a PhD scholar in Peace Conflict Studies at NUST.