Balochistan: a turning point

On June 27, in an interview with the BBC’s Urdu service, the Baloch separatist leader Brahamdagh Bugti showed his inclination to open peace negotiations with the Pakistani government to find a political solution to the ethno-nationalist insurgency in Balochistan.
This development signifies a paradigm shift in the mind-set of Brahamdagh Bugti. This is for the first time in the decade-long insurgency that he has moderated his demand from total secession to a political settlement within Pakistan’s constitutional framework.
This is unprecedented because his statement has come on the heels of the Nawab of Kalat, Mir Suleman’s, willingness to engage in peace negotiation with the government as well. The timing of this announcement is also critically important as it coincides with the ninth death anniversary of Brahamdagh’s grandfather Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, considered the godfather of Baloch insurgency. In the past, his death anniversaries have been used by the Baloch insurgent leaders to further cement the resolve of their fighters to continue their armed struggle against the Pakistani state till the creation of a separate homeland.
At this juncture, it is important to ask what has contributed to this radical shift in the approach of the Baloch separatist leadership in its dealings with Pakistan.
First, the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the subsequent rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan under President Ashraf Ghani have reduced the Indian clout and footprint in Afghanistan. This minimised Indian support to Baloch insurgents via Afghanistan.
Second, despite ten years of armed struggle, the Baloch insurgency has remained a low-intensity guerrilla conflict. Right from the start, the separatist movement and its leadership remained divided along political and tribal lines. Moreover, the movement lacked organisational coherence, coordination and unity of effort.
For instance, in 2007 the Marri and Bugti tribes which formed the core of the insurgency in its initial years separated their ways. So the insurgent movement fractured between the Baloch Republican Party (BRP), led by the Bugti tribe, and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), led by the Marri tribe. The killing of the scion of the Marri tribe, Mir Balaach Marri, in a missile attack further fuelled suspicions in the Marri tribe that somehow Brahamdagh was involved. The latter reportedly had to leave Pakistan after this development.
Third, the death of Nawab Kahir Bux Marri, who was considered the spiritual head of the Baloch insurgency, was also a major blow to the insurgency. His death not only weakened the insurgency but further fractured the Marri tribe’s resistance against the government between the Hairbyar Marri-led BLA and the United Baloch Army led by Mehran Marri, another scion of the Marri tribe.
Fourth, due to division between the Bugti and Marri tribes, the centre of gravity of the Baloch insurgency shifted from tribal stronghold areas like Dera Bugti and Kohlu to central Balochistan in the Khuzdar, Quetta and Mastung districts. Later, it shifted further south towards Balochistan’s coastal belt where the middle class is stronger and traditional Baloch tribal structures are weak. So, the main resistance in 2010-12 came from the Awaran, Turbat, Panjgur and Gwadar districts.
A medical doctor and a leader of the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Dr Allah Nazar Baloch, emerged as the new face of the Baloch insurgency. However, after the 2013 earthquake the insurgency suffered a major setback because during the relief operations the security forces mapped out the whole area. Following the relief operations, a series of intelligence-based operations were launched which pushed Allah Nazar’s group out of its stronghold areas. The group had to relocate to Afghanistan. Recently, there have been unconfirmed reports that the security forces killed Allah Nazar during an operation.
Fourth, on June 15, under the National Action Plan (NAP), the Balochistan Apex Committee offered general amnesty to the Baloch youth who laid down their arms and renounced violence. It was decided to provide financial assistance to those who surrendered to the government: fighters were offered Rs500,000 while mid-level commanders were offered Rs1 million to Rs1.5 million. In the last four months around 650 Baloch militants have surrendered to the government.
The two most prominent separatist leaders, Brahamdagh and the Khan of Kalat, are willing to talk; the external support to Baloch insurgency has weakened; and the proposed China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) equips Pakistan with the ability to turn around the socio-economic conditions of the impoverished and neglected Baloch masses. This then is an ideal opportunity for Pakistan to pacify the Baloch insurgency.
More importantly, the current Chief Minister of Balochistan, Dr Abdul Malik Baloch, is a nationalist himself and is fully aware of the psyche of the aggrieved Baloch sections as well as what approach is required to address those grievances. The announcement about the formation of a Grand Jirga by the CM to hold talks with the exiled Baloch separatist leadership is a welcome step in the right direction.
For all practical intents and purposes now the ball is in the court of the Pakistani government. A decision creates a moment; a moment creates an opportunity and history rides on the wheels of opportunity. Pakistan must turn this window of opportunity into a historic moment.
Pakistan will not get such a conducive environment with so many favourable factors to resolve the conflict. The country can ill afford to waste this God-sent opportunity; this may be our last chance to solve the crisis without shedding more blood, and pull Balochistan back from the precipice.
The writer is an associate research fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.
Email: isabasit@ntu.edu.sg