The specious coalition

The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. He is a Rhodes scholar and has an LL.M from Harvard Law School

There are two schools of thought within the PML-N: those who believe in asserting the party's principled position on the issue of restoration of the judges and the impeachment of General Musharraf, even at the cost of unravelling the coalition; and those who argue that democracy would be better served if the coalition remains intact, even if that requires a compromise on the twin issues of restoration and impeachment. This transformation-versus-transition debate now rages on within the PML-N, and the arguments of transitionists are still as misconceived as they were prior to Nov 3, 2007. It is hard to fathom what is holding this coalition together, for the two mainstream parties neither have a shared conviction on vital principles nor any agreement on elementary policies.

In view of the policies being pursued by the government, the process of devising the policies and the people contriving and executing them, the coalition government appears to be an extension of the Musharraf regime. By staying in such a coalition government, the PML-N is not saving and strengthening democracy but adding to the growing disillusionment with democracy and the democratic process. With the rudderless PPP-led government continuing its flip-flops at the centre, and the PML-N enjoying power in Punjab while continuing its feeble protests over the PPP's policy towards restoration, impeachment and the military operation in the NWFP, cynics argue that what we are witnessing is one big deal with everyone on board except the people of Pakistan. It is the proliferation of such cynicism and loss of the nation's hope and faith in the ability and intent of a popularly elected government to usher change that threatens democracy much more than a breakup of the coalition.

In a country where elections have traditionally been fought and won on the basis of parochial identities, loyalties and interests, the PML-N ran an issues-based campaign in the 2008 elections and its message resonated with the people. However, the change people voted for on Feb 18 was not to alter the façade and replace a few faces, but to modify the character and functioning of the state, so that the interests of citizens across Pakistan no longer seem to be in conflict with the interests of the state. The true value of a bipartisan government comprising the country's two mainstream parties lay in its potential and strength to bring about such a fundamental change in the aftermath of extended military rule. Thus, when the coalition government turns out to be an extension of the Musharraf regime and not its nemesis, it does more harm to democracy than good.

Let us start with the policies of the PPP-led government. The policy towards the judiciary – as evident from the PPP's constitutional package and the party's approach to the judges' restoration – is that the court's ability to function as an effective check on abuse of executive power must be clipped by amending the Constitution, the general's illegal actions of Nov 3 trouncing the judiciary should be indemnified, the PCO judges should be protected and the deposed judges restored through a constitutional amendment. The rationale of the general's mini-coup of Nov 3 was that the judiciary was preventing the executive from performing its functions without restraint. Endorsing such logic, the PPP has proposed to take away the suo motu powers of the court and dilute the security of tenure of the judges to keep them under the executive's control. Further, the general and his cronies in the Q League also agree that the judges can be brought back, but through a constitutional amendment. And that is now the PPP's position as well.

In the security realm too the PPP-led government is acting on the script written by the general and his foreign patrons. One, the US and NATO forces are still allowed to attack suspected militant hideouts within Pakistan, with the understanding that every time such attack results in a carnage of innocent citizens (collateral damage!), the government will make loud noises. Two, the official policy still draws no distinction between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. And, three, while on paper Pakistan is pursuing a three-pronged policy wherein military action is aimed at creating leverage for political negotiations that are to be supplemented by socio-economic development of the tribal areas, in practice no development work is taking place and there seems to be no considered plan and strategy to either win the war or the peace.

What is more disturbing than abiding by a failed policy is the perpetuation of a non-consultative policymaking process that makes a mockery of the sovereignty and presence of our Parliament. What is the difference between the present Parliament and its predecessor if neither is vested with the authority to discuss and determine the manner in which national security challenges are to be addressed? How does one distinguish democracy from dictatorship if all matters of war and peace confronting a nation continue to be decided by a coterie of faceless men without any parliamentary instruction or supervision? Part of the reason for the unpopularity of security operations in Pakistan's tribal belt is that they are viewed as an extension of the US war on terror and suffer from lack of ownership, as this nation has no shared resolve to make them a success.

The scourge of terror afflicts the entire nation and jeopardises our rights to life, liberty and property. Yet, there is widespread public opposition to the operations carried out by the army against those who pose imminent threat to lives, property and lifestyles of citizens. It is not the merit of our existing security policy that is its paramount weakness or even its flawed execution. The process through which this policy is formulated generates an abhorrent perception that our security forces are fighting an alien war against our own citizens on the dictation of foreign masters. People had pinned hopes on the ability of a democratic government to address the simmering security crisis in Pakistan more effectively. This is not because it could devise a superior military strategy or wave a magic wand to wish away the problems; but because it was expected to (i) initiate an inclusive wide-ranging debate on the issue that would produce a policy backed by national consensus and (ii) undertake socio-economic development of the tribal areas on war-footing to win the hearts and minds of those most affected. None of that has been forthcoming, and thus we continue with the general's failed security policy.

The Murree Declaration that hinged the PPP/PML-N coalition on the restoration of the judges within thirty days of the formation of the federal government went unimplemented. The other understandings between the two parties as documented by the Charter of Democracy have not being meaningfully reflected in the PPP's proposed constitutional package or the executive actions of its government. For example, the NRO has replaced the proposed "Truth and Reconciliation Commission," there has been no talk of appointing a commission to investigate the Kargil episode, and the principled position denouncing military intervention in politics and the resolve to hold dictators accountable has been all but overturned by Asif Zardari. What, then, are the shared principles, policies and goals of the PPP/PML-N coalition? And to what end is this coalition being kept alive?

Let us remember that the real threat to democracy emanates not from the person of the general, but from the deep-seated civil-military imbalance in Pakistan that allows the military to control elected governments from behind the curtain or throw up people like General Musharraf when its institutional interests are directly threatened. How, then, will this coalition strengthen democracy while it continues to behave like the King's League of yesterday? So long as the unrepresentative policies of the Musharraf regime, its autocratic policymaking processes and the people sustaining such policies and processes remain intact, the nation will find it hard to distinguish between democracy and dictatorship. And by remaining a part of such a dispensation, the PML-N will lend credence to the view that the politics of expediency still reigns supreme in Pakistan.

This coalition is also providing Asif Zardari with vital wriggle-room to avoid acknowledging the unpopular policies he is pursuing. Retention of the Musharraf regime's relics is deliberate, for Mr Zardari is keeping open the option of working with the general and his cronies should the PML-N walk out. The PML-N needs to call his bluff and let him openly ally himself with the discredited court jesters of yesterday in full public view, so that, with the smokescreen gone, this nation can take full measure of the reality. Further, the PML-N's support is also strengthening the hands of Mr Zardari and his unelected buddies to sideline saner representative voices within the PPP who are in touch with reality and worried about the future of the party and its electoral prospects.

Instead of getting maligned by remaining part of a remote-control coalition, the PML-N should step aside to preserve its credibility and continue its struggle for democracy as a mature opposition.



Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu