Daesh: rhetoric and reality

In the wake of the Paris carnage, major powers have renewed with greater vigour their resolve to crush the Islamic State. Yet quite a few factors militate against turning the commitment into reality.
In order to appreciate the gap that exists between rhetoric and reality on wiping out the IS or Daesh menace, one needs to look at the factors that contributed to the rise of the apocalyptic organisation.
The two major drivers of the rise of Daesh are foreign intervention in the Middle East and the sectarian schism. The Middle East, because of its strategic importance and tremendous oil wealth, has been a flashpoint of international politics. During the cold war, the US and the USSR vied with each other for supremacy in the region.
In the post cold war era, Washington and its western allies, duly supported by the Gulf States – and at times by Turkey – have intervened in different countries for regime change. In the case of Iraq and Libya, the intervention was successful. In the case of Syria, the Assad regime, with support from Iran and Russia, has so far held its own. But the efforts for regime change, whether successful or abortive, have destabilised these countries providing a fertile ground for the rise of the IS.
Probably in no other part of the world is the sectarian schism as conspicuous as in the Middle East. On the whole, it is a Sunni majority region with a substantial Shia population. In countries such as Iran, Bahrain, and Iraq, Shias have been in majority. However, until the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iran was the only Shia majority country in the region ruled by the adherents of that sect. Syria stands out as a special case, where Shias despite being in minority, have been at the helm since 1970.
Iran and Saudi Arabia, representing Shias and Sunnis respectively, have been at loggerheads in their efforts to bring the region under their sphere of influence. The scramble for power received tremendous boost in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and its proclaimed anti-monarchy ambitions in the region. Alarmed by the revolution, the Gulf States intensified propagation of their own brand of Islam. Petrodollars were spent rather lavishly for that purpose. They also joined hands with the US in encircling Iran.
The advent of the Arab Spring in 2010 brought a new challenge for the established orders in Arab countries. Starting in Tunisia and spreading rapidly to other nations in the region, the movement expressed the discontent of the people – led by the younger generations – with the despotic and repressive political systems. However, the movement – which at one point appeared to be capable of shaking the entire Arab world to its foundation – fizzled out.
Meanwhile, a civil war broke out in Syria, exacerbating Iran-Saudi or Shia-Sunni tensions with Tehran and Riyadh going all out to save or pull down the Assad regime, respectively. Not to be left behind, Hezbollah fought on the side of the Syrian government, while Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organisations became part of the anti-Assad coalition. The Syrian civil war became a hot spot for Muslim militants all over the world.
In Iraq, one of the effects of the removal of Saddam Hussein was the ascendency of the Shias, the majority sect, to power. The new government came under the influence of Iran leaving both the neighbouring Gulf States and the country’s Sunni minority without power. A weak government in Baghdad also encouraged the Kurds, an ethnic group inhabiting northern Iraq, northern Syria and southern Turkey, to cut loose.
To exploit the growing instability in the region, the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq set up the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis). Isis did what Al-Qaeda could not: it took possession of large tracts of land, comprising Sunni provinces in Iraq and eastern regions in Syria. Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, fell to the movement in June 2014. The following month it was re-named the Islamic State (IS) and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was made the khalifah (caliph), which by definition is a transnational office to which Muslims all over the world owe allegiance. The IS or Daesh adheres to a primitive interpretation of Islam and regards elimination of rival creeds as a foremost religious obligation.
Paradoxically, all stakeholders in the Middle East have reason to go all-out against Daesh, if for nothing else but because of its diabolical credentials; at the same time, many of them feel they also stand to lose in the event that the organisation is subdued.
The US and its European allies fear that the suppression of the IS would bolster the Assad regime, whom they have set upon themselves to bringing down. This is why Washington does not seem inclined to pit its ground forces against Daesh. Turkey, a Nato member and a leading Muslim power, feels threatened not by Daesh but by the Kurds, who thanks to instability in Iraq and Syria have carved out a territory of their own. Turkish forces have been bombing the Iraqi Kurds to the advantage of Daesh.
The victory of the Kurds in the show of strength against Daesh will run counter to the interests of the party at the helm in Ankara, which is as conservative as is possible for a Turkish political outfit to be.
The Kurds, for their part, are keen not to eliminate Daesh but to defend the land they hold. Besides, for Iraqi Kurds a strong central government in Baghdad will be anathema. The presence of Daesh is a guarantee that such a government can’t be set up.
Last, but not the least, are the Gulf States with Riyadh leading the way. Daesh has two overriding characteristics that make the movement at once a friend and a foe of the Arab states. It champions the cause of a puritanical sub-sect of Sunni Islam, which brings it doctrinally closer to Saudi Arabia and its Middle Eastern allies. At the same time, it wants to overthrow the reigning absolute monarchies in the Gulf and put in place an all-encompassing caliphate. With such ambitions, Daesh has the Saudis worried.
But such fears have not driven the Gulf States to make common cause with Iran against Daesh because of the stronger fears that the defeat of the organisation would give breathing space to the Assad regime, and thus strengthen Iranian or Shia influence in the region. Already in the wake of the nuclear deal reached earlier this year, Tehran-Washington ties are on the mend.
This leaves only Russia, Iran and the ruling party in Damascus with the incentive to take on Daesh without any reservation. Their combined might be enough to crush Daesh. But would the West-Turkey-Arab states combine allow them to do so?
The writer is a graduate from a western European university.
Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com