The man on horseback

The need for balance in civil-military relations has been variably defined by different scholars like Laswell, Finer, Janowitz, Huntington and Peter Feaver. As per Laswell and Finer the military has a proclivity for intervention in domestic politics to shape a political system leading towards a garrison state. Scholars like Janowitz and Peter Feaver opine that a strong civilian political oversight over military policy formulation is necessary since civilian institutions are better equipped to provide policy direction.
The optimal balance between civilian and military functions and the concomitant efficacy of the military instrument as an element of national power is predicated upon a number of factors that include internal as well as external threats, the strength of political institutions and the ideological orientation of the armed forces in the national policy.
Samuel Finer’s treatise, ‘The Man on Horseback’ propounded the concept of military intervention as a consequence of weak civilian administrative and legislative institutions. This capacity deficit has been the red rag to the bulls of military intervention in developing countries in Africa, Asia and South America. Antidotes to this military propensity have been proposed in the shape of strengthening of civilian institutions and capacity to govern exemplified by scholarly advice tendered by the likes of Rebecca Schiff whose ‘Concordance Theory’ recommends a cooperative interaction between the three societal institutions – the political elite, the military and the citizenry.
The best civil-military relations are based upon an ideal balance between the civil and military institutions. The strength and maturity of political and legislative institutions directly impacts the efficacy of the civilian leadership to provide leadership in national security policy formulation. In Pakistan, despite establishment of institutions like the Defence Cabinet Committee (Now renamed Cabinet Committee on National Security) and Defence Council, the ability of the civilian leadership to take effective lead in national security and military policy formulation has remained a weak link. The putative efficacy of the existing institutions to ensure smooth and efficacious interaction between the civil and military components of national security policy formulation has been hamstrung in the past due to a palpable lack of expertise in the civilian component to provide the desired leadership role.
The lack of political will and intellectual depth amongst the political leadership has stunted the growth of structures and institutions required for a comprehensive understanding of the nuances and complications of military and national security affairs ceding space by default to the military leadership. There is a dire need for strong and well-resourced advisory and decision support institutions to provide sound policy options and input to political leadership.
The current national political terrain is in the throes of the distant hoof sounds of the man on horseback. The salience of military decision-making in the current national security environment is reflective of a vacuum that echoes Finer’s prognostications about weak civilian governance and administrative ability. At this moment the military leadership is confronted with a ‘de jure-de facto’ dilemma while the civilian leadership is impaled on the horns of a governance dilemma begotten out of weak political will and institutional capacity to confront the existential threats to the country’s security.
In the absence of palpably bold policy initiatives to tackle the genies of terrorism and bad governance the harried populace starts rooting for a messiah and when the Rubicon is finally crossed in the shape of a major catastrophe like APS Peshawer public sentiment attains a Wagnerian stridency calling for extraconstitutional measures to ameliorate their lot. Democratic transitions from autocracies always lead towards ‘anocracies’ which are defined as a system of governance retaining both the democratic as well as autocratic practices. Pakistan appears at present to be one such anocracy prone to political inability and concomitant inefficacy that calls for a strong leadership intervention.
A status quo leadership model based on real politik and expediency geared more towards keeping political allies happy is out of sync with the people’s expectations. The political leadership needs to realise that poor governance and a carte blanche to political allies to go for lucre and pelf at the cost of the common people are fast eroding its moral capital. The legal capital on which the democratic edifice of the de jure political power of the men in the stagecoach rests is being palpably challenged by the moral capital of the de facto ground performance of the men on horseback reinforcing yet again the well-argued postulate of Samuel Finer about the dominant role of the military in fragile democracies.
The question arises here as to why political leaders do not realise the dangers their indecision and poor governance poses to the democratic experience of the country. The answer may lie in the nature of the problems confronting the country. Our current problems have become wicked problems which by definition are multilayered, contradictory and interconnected.
The ability and will of our political leadership to cut through the Gordian knot of our wicked problems is seriously constrained by some structural and institutional incapacities that include lack of civilian expertise in national security affairs and absence of policy input institutions like the national security advisor secretariat comprising experts in national security matters. The problem is further compounded due to political compulsions of accommodating allies short on moral and national vision.
The institutional incapacities engendered out of a leadership deficit make governance a farce that is not responsive to the needs of a population that starts looking for non-democratic options to come to their rescue. When in the public perception index the stock of institutions like the judiciary also plummets, the situation becomes very dangerous for democracy in a country. What happens when the public sentiment and the patriotic sensibilities of the men on horseback are in accord while the gulf between the civilian institutions and the population widens? The concordance theory of Rebecca Schiff gets upended into national discordance with dangerous portents for the democratic dispensation.
The threats to the democratic order emanate not from an ascendant military whose stock has risen because of its performance in an institutional vacuum but a lack of performance by the political, administrative and judicial institutions. The political leadership’s inability to tackle our wicked problems with full vigour and clear vision is the real issue that haunts governance in the country.
Since the civilian leadership and institutions have failed to come up to the public’s expectations in an environment where the military has started viewing their inaction as the main driver of the conflict and disorder in the country, military intervention appears ominously on the horizon. With the spectre of terrorism stalking our land, the economic crisis squeezing the lifeblood of the citizenry, and the civilian leadership unwilling to separate crime from politics the public is rapidly losing its appetite for constitutional propriety.
Suddenly the sheen appears a lot more lustrous on the armour of the man on horseback while the hunkered down countenance of the man in the stagecoach only leads to contempt. In this dialectical battle of public perception and concomitant legitimacy the last laugh will be that of someone with the maximum moral capital.
The writer is a retired brigadier, and a PhD scholar in Peace and ConflictStudies at the National University of Science and Technology, Islamabad.