Maximum pressure

On May 8, 2018 President Trump announced that the US would exit the so-called Iran nuclear deal, painstakingly negotiated and signed in 2015 between Iran on one side, and the US, Russia, China, European Union and United Nations on the other.

The objective of the deal was to put a stop to or at least slow down Iran's nuclear arms development programme in exchange for sanctions relief. It put severe restrictions on Iran with highly intrusive inspections by international agencies to ensure compliance.

Inspectors had continued to confirm Iran was in full compliance, however, President Trump considered the deal to be insufficient as restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme would expire in 10–15 years. Additionally the agreement focused solely on nuclear arms development, leaving out other matters such as missile development and Iran’s role in regional conflicts.

The Trump administration's exiting the deal, and subsequent implementation of severe sanctions against Iran essentially negated all the economic benefits Iran expected to reap from having agreed to curb its nuclear programme. The Trump administration declared its goal was to bring Iranian oil exports to zero, essentially strangling the Iranian economy. The calculation by President Trump was that the pain endured by Iran would force them back to the negotiating table leading to a new deal more acceptable to the US and its key allies Israel and Saudi Arabia.

There was a small problem with this calculus. What if sanctions did not force Iran back to negotiations? How likely was Iran to renegotiate with a country that had just reneged on a deal signed multilaterally with all world powers, in full glare of the global media? Could Iran wait out the campaign of maximum pressure? What retaliatory actions could Iran actually take? If Iran did retaliate in some fashion, what would the US do? And ultimately, was the US ready to go to war with Iran to force a more desirable deal?

Answers to these questions are gradually becoming clearer. It appears the Trump administration had not thought through all possible outcomes and what the US would do if they materialized. In April 2018, shortly before he exited the nuclear deal, President Trump appointed John Bolton as his national security adviser. Bolton had made a career out of calling for military action against Iran. The thought perhaps was that Bolton's presence as a key adviser to the president would scare Iran into submission. At the same time, it was clear to everyone that the president himself was extremely averse to any further military entanglement in the Middle East. In fact, pulling out of all overseas war theaters was a key campaign promise candidate Trump had made in 2016.

Not surprisingly, John Bolton was unceremoniously dumped from his national security post by the president on September 10, 2019. In the meantime Iran, with its back to the wall, and its economy in severe recession, has gradually ratcheted up its response to the severe sanctions. There have been small-scale attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf; these attacks some have alleged have been the work of Iran or groups close to Iran. Iran shot down a sophisticated and expensive US drone it claimed had violated its airspace. And, on September 14, 2019, Saudi Arabian oil facilities were attacked by drones, temporarily taking out half of Saudi oil capacity, about five percent of world supply. Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for this attack.

It appears the desired results from the campaign of maximum pressure are not panning out as hoped. In some ways, this outcome was not too hard to predict. When you threaten someone be prepared that your bluff may be called out.

The writer is a freelance contributor based in Washington DC.

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