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Tuesday April 23, 2024

Terror redux or an innovative mutation?

The Safoora killings were different. They targeted the rather pacifist and devoted Ismailis who have a significant presence in the two geographical extremities of Pakistan – Karachi and the Gilgit-Baltistan. The Aga Khan, himself a French citizen with a more defined international presence, is followed as a religious head by

By Shahzad Chaudhry
May 21, 2015
The Safoora killings were different. They targeted the rather pacifist and devoted Ismailis who have a significant presence in the two geographical extremities of Pakistan – Karachi and the Gilgit-Baltistan. The Aga Khan, himself a French citizen with a more defined international presence, is followed as a religious head by thousands belonging to the Ismaili variation of the Shia stream of Islam. The Aga Khan also contributes significantly in the development of the northern areas where many of his followers live, and has helped change the face of GB over the years.
Were the Ismaili influence in Gilgit-Baltistan to be dislocated under the threat of terror, and the presence of international forces such as the Aga Khan severely curtailed, space could be gained by the competing presence of extremist interests and groups that use religion to expand the circle of terror. Whether these groups, albeit religious in colour, have any foreign masters remains moot. The country’s northern areas act as a choke-point to and from China and if embroiled in a strife would simply squeeze out infrastructural development that could pave the way for a more abiding conjunct between China and Pakistan. The $46 billion influx would then be affected. Keep in mind that the Bhasha Dam has been kept on hold for reasons of Indian sensitivity.
This may not be the only reason why some foreign masters – such as the Indians – would be pleased to notice how terror continues to manifest in Pakistan and how it continues to embroil the Pakistani fabric in an existential threat to its future. The effort at disabling a more harmoniously developed northern region with improved economic possibility for its people, has chronologically targeted the Shias, attempted to scare the Chinese out of these territories, and through the Safoora killings terrorised the Ismailis hoping to force them to curtail their activities. Space thus vacated can only mean expanded influence for the other; more importantly denying space for activities that such foreign masters deem inimical to their interests.
This is what the Safoora killings delivered. They aimed at internationalising the concern for a reign of terror in Pakistan invoking the person of Aga Khan and the fringe minority that his people represent within the fold of Islam, while reinforcing the paradigm of vulnerability for the minorities that has irked international concerns. The Safoora killings also meant to convey to the world that the recent gains against terror, especially in the backdrop of major success in the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb or the cleanup operations in Karachi against the terror-crime syndicate, remains a tenuous gain only; lest the world assumes Pakistan’s reverting to normalcy.
The international players that may be unhappy with improvements in Pakistan for a host of reasons, especially on the back of a much greater Chinese influence, can include India, the US, and Iran. Iran is, however, least likely to target a Shia community. Could it be a disgruntled patron country or their supported groups in Pakistan, including the more regularised ASWJ, to up the ante in a sectarian undertaking as a payback for the insult? This is another option to look at.
Of all the external agents seeking to keep Pakistan suffer longer, only one stands out for the consequential benefits that fall out of such disarray: India. The theory of ultimate benefit, and most magnificently at that, makes India the most probable agent for enthusing such reign of destruction in Pakistan. Keep in mind the frequent mention of RAW by the Pakistani state as the most likely perpetrator of the recent terror acts in Pakistan, and its dangerous infatuation with Pakistan under the Modi regime and its rather foolhardy NSA Ajit Doval, who hardly sheathes his intention to destabilise Pakistan as a strategy.
Internally too there are players that can infuse sufficient cause for introspection. The TTP stands out and was the first one to be mentioned by the octogenarian CM of Sindh as soon as the Safoora killings happened. The difficulty with this proposition is that the TTP as an umbrella organisation has been rather displaced of late and has seen many elements bolting from under its influence to more promising enterprises – such as Al-Qaeda or Isis. What remains a standing truth, however, is that the hands that wrought the tragedy were surely of a group working under some religious denomination: ASWJ is mentioned, though its controllers were other than the TTP.
The CM’s instant referral to the TTP though has other important and interesting implications. This mention of religious terrorism as an early suspect is deep and has roots in a fast decaying relationship between the political setup in Sindh and the overtly military ownership of the ongoing Karachi operation. Reports of dissonance on both sides have been more than palpable – and on occasions loudly proclaimed. The other partner to this domestic entanglement in the operation against the crime-terror nexus is the MQM that has obvious complaints with the Rangers targeting it as the prime suspect behind the decaying state of security in Karachi. By pointing to the TTP the CM was guiding the military to the more probable source of trouble in Karachi, in his opinion.
There have been loud whispers of the PPP being the next ‘target’ of the Karachi operation. This has been a rather unfortunate characterisation by some thoughtless commentary giving strength and reason to an evolving narrative that has let politics conveniently replace crime syndicates as the prime target of an allegedly voracious military with whom ‘democracy’ has never found favour.
There is no doubt that the Sindh administration has been weak in delivery and capacity and no amount of ‘democracy’ can be a shielding facade for its incompetence, but for the military to repeatedly mention such incompetence can only cause politics to square off against the military’s pursuit of the real criminals and distract it from its real mission. The corps commander’s focus is to eliminate the criminals regardless of their antecedence; it doesn’t help if he repeatedly mentions they have political roots. Supporting measures to preclude recourse to crime and violence can be privately handled.
The Safoora killings happened the day after Saulat Mirza of the MQM was hanged. Before then a couple of the police officials engaged in proceedings against the MQM too were eliminated, leaving a question over why a Karachi that had in relative terms gone peaceful since the operation began there resurged in violence to target-kill some poignantly important individuals.
The MQM as a party was already in the spotlight and would have been closely monitored for a possible riposte. Who then chose to act in their name and post a situation of yet another face-off between the military and the MQM? Could it have been someone seeking to stoke flames of both military-politics dissonance and sectarian strife? Balochistan still is an open field. If that too erupts, there are chances that the most probable culprit would have been ascertained. What happens next will decide how the region fares.
The writer is a retired air-vice marshal, former ambassador and a security and political analyst.
Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com