A human disaster was averted as thousands of stranded Afghans and Pakistanis were allowed to cross the Torkham and Chaman border posts. These posts had remained closed for almost three weeks to stop the movement of terrorists who continue to attack Pakistan’s security forces from sanctuaries in the troubled provinces across the border. Why has our north-western border become so troubling and how can we manage this troubled relationship for peace in the region?
Pak-Afghan relations have remained problematic ever since Pakistan was created. Pakistan inherited its present territory from the British and upheld the territorial demarcation undertaken first by Sir Durand and Afghan ruler Abdul Rehman in 1893 and subsequently ratified by successive Afghan rulers. Amir Habibullah Khan recognised it in 1905 and the Afghan interior minister in 1919, Ali Ahmed Khan, recognised the same border in August that year (1919) at Rawalpindi. This was further ratified under an agreement signed on November 22, 1921 in Kabul.
But the controversy continued unabated after the exit of the British from the Subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan. It got its greatest impetus with the boycott of the referendum held in what was then NWFP by the Red Shirt movement of Bacha Khan, who was opposed to the accession of his native province to Pakistan. Though the boycott of the referendum resulted in the isolation of the Pakhtun nationalists, they kept the pan-Afghan aspirations alive till the integration of Pakhtuns from north to south eroded the very basis of Pakhtun exclusivist tendencies. Their pan-Afghan nationalist notions continued, though, since a Loya Jirga rejected the Durand Line in 1949 and refused to recognise the dominion of Pakistan as the legitimate successor of this part of the British India.
Amid continuing controversy over the idea of Pakhtunistan, most Pakhtun nationalists continued to adhere to a process of assimilation. And the integration of Pakhtuns from Peshawar and Quetta towards Karachi helped them overcome the urge for exclusivity or separatism. Consequently, Pakhtun nationalism continued to coalesce for a greater share across Pakistan.
Four decades of militancy and continuing warfare across the border as well as the influx of over three million Afghan refugees created a double market and dual-nationality for more mobile Afghans and the Pakhtun business classes. This finds dualist expression in Pakhtun nationalists’ self-proclamations about their identity being Pakistani-Afghan – which also serves their pan-Af-Pak trading interests.
When the rise of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban posed a greater threat to the estranged Pakhtun nationalists, they subsequently found an ally in the Pakistan Army. Similarly, under threat from the Afghan Taliban, successive Pakhtun-led governments in Kabul – dominated by non-Pakhtuns – one the one hand looked towards Pakistan for help, while on the other sought reinforcement from elsewhere, India in particular, to counter what they see as the Afghan Taliban being propped up by Pakistan as its proxy or a tool for strategic depth.
Coincidentally, Pakistan found it convenient not to annoy the Afghan Taliban while fighting domestic terrorism. Pakistan also used the cleavage of reconciliation among Afghan parties to its advantage, thereby reinforcing suspicion among the parties in power in Kabul. The over interference of India in Kabul’s affairs further fuelled animosity between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which then fuelled proxy wars between India and Pakistan.
While President Obama’s drawdown policy weakened the fragile Afghan state, it encouraged the Afghan Taliban to expand their space. That, consequently, widened the wedge between Kabul and Islamabad. In the meanwhile, as a consequence of Operation Zarb-e-Azb many terrorists had to escape; and they found sanctuary in the adjoining lawless provinces of Afghanistan.
This allowed both sides the convenience to build pressure against one another – leading towards a virtual breakdown of diplomatic relations. The fact is that terrorists are benefiting from these inter-state conflicts. The situation in fact requires greater coordination and joint operations against those who separately threaten both the states. Despite this realisation, both states have failed to evolve a joint mechanism to stabilise the region.
As in the past, the Afghan war theatre is now attracting not only Daesh but also various regional and world powers. Escaping from Iraq and Syria, Daesh is finding a lucrative theatre in those areas in the Af-Pak region. Dissidents of various terrorist groups, anti-Shia groups and Salafis are finding a pan-Islamist attraction towards Daesh – over the nationalist-Islamic notions of Afghan Taliban.
The emergence of Daesh is in fact creating the necessity to engage the Afghan Taliban. Increasingly, a concurrence of view is emerging among various regional and world powers about engaging the Afghan Taliban. While Russia, China and Pakistan are pushing the line to engage the Afghan Taliban, the new secretary of defence and national security adviser in the Trump administration are inclined to reinforce Afghan security forces and are also weighing the possibilities of both neutralising and engaging the Afghan Taliban to counter the emergence of Daesh.
The situation demands the initiation of multi-track diplomacy engaging all interested parties. There is a greater need to revive the trilateral dialogue between Afghanistan, the US and Pakistan and evolve a joint mechanism to monitor and regulate the border. What is most important to agree on is how we deal with the Afghan Taliban. If they are to be engaged in the reconciliation process, then the approach would be to persuade them to accept a ceasefire and come to the negotiation table. And if reconciliation is not possible, then they will have to be forced to exit.
In both cases, Afghanistan and the US must ensure that they will not let Pakistani outlaws or any other country use Afghan territory against Pakistan. In this context, both the US and China must facilitate a dialogue between India and Pakistan not only on bilateral issues but also on Afghanistan.
It’s better that the US, EU, Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia States and India engage each other on multiple tracks or through Afghan-centred processes, such as the Bonn Agreement and the Heart of Asia Conference. Bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral and multi-lateral engagements can help sort out the mess in Afghanistan. Above all, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India and China must engage with each other to pursue a cohesive strategy to bring peace in Afghanistan.
A Pak-Afghan joint mechanism should ensure that the two countries keep each other’s interests and work together to manage the Af-Pak border and respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The quadrilateral forum should be revived to bridge differences over the Durand Line, border management and the Afghan Taliban.
With the successful conclusion of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and launch of Operation Raddul Fasaad across the country, Pakistan can afford to take new measures that can help remove the apprehensions of both our eastern and western neighbours. There has to be reciprocity and Afghanistan and India will have to agree to bring an end to proxy wars. Their destiny is inter-dependent – Afghanistan and Pakistan’s in particular. New opportunities are opening up for regional and inter-regional connectivity and energy and trade corridors. The choice is between two options: bleeding each other or benefiting from one another.
The writer is a senior journalist.
Email: imtiaz.safma@gmail.com
Twitter: @ImtiazAlamSAFMA
