Washington’s dilemma

Should we shun them? Should we continue engaging them? Should we go harder or softer on them? Should we rely more on the carrot or on the stick? Should we cut or increase bilateral assistance to them. Should the conditions for capital inflows be made more stringent?

Such are the questions agitating the minds of American policymakers and intelligentsia as Washington seeks to redefine its relations with Islamabad – a major non-Nato ally as well as a strategic partner. Over the years, Washington has made no bones about its distrust of Islamabad, especially the latter’s counterterrorism credentials. At the same time, a few deem it to be a wiser course of action for the US to leave Pakistan entirely to its own.

In Americans’ eye, at its worst, Islamabad is an errant boy in the comity of nations whom they can turn their back on only at their own peril. At its best, Pakistan, the sixth largest nation in the world, the second largest state in South Asia and the only Muslim country which is a nuclear power, is too important a country to be ignored, let alone abandoned.

This dilemma was laid bare at a recent hearing of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee on Pak-US relations held in Washington. Disillusionment with Pakistan was expressed in so many words for the ‘lack of cooperation’ in putting down the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The pros and cons of going tougher on Islamabad through measures such as declaring it a state sponsor of terrorism, slapping it with sanctions yet again and cutting off all economic and security related assistance were discussed.

At the same time, the policymakers were warned that pushing Pakistan to the wall might backfire, thus impairing rather than serving US interests in the region. It was also pointed out that putting curbs on Islamabad or toning up aid conditionality had turned out to be of little avail in the past. Probably the best course of action would be to continue the current engagement with Pakistan: giving it economic assistance and asking it to do more.

That Washington faces a policy dilemma on its ties with Islamabad is hardly surprisingly. Pak-US relations are driven by both mutual dependence and distrust. For over a decade-and-a-half, the US has looked upon Pakistan as an indispensible player to achieve one of its foremost national security policy objectives: “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates” (read Taliban) as outlined in the first National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Obama administration.

Pakistan offered the most economical conduit for transit of cargo to International Security Assistance Force (Isaf), which was overwhelmingly drawn from the US, in Afghanistan. In return, Pakistan has been given $19 billion assistance – $11 billion humanitarian and economic and $9 billion security related – since 9/11.

On its part, Islamabad has relied on capital inflows from Washington to keep the wheels of its economy moving and to fight the militancy. American money and expertise have come handy in pushing up development efforts in cash-starved Pakistan, particularly in grappling with the energy crisis.

This mutual dependence has not been without its flip side. When a politically instable and economically vulnerable country like Pakistan is so important for securing key policy objectives of a military and economic superpower like the US, the logical result is increased engagement between the two. This engagement can take various forms including playing on economic and security assistance, the incessant pressure to do more, intervention in domestic affairs and – if required – violation of national sovereignty.

In 2007, the US Congress passed counterterrorism legislation, which incorporated recommendations of an inquiry into the 9/11 attacks. The new law promised increased US assistance to Pakistan provided the country demonstrated the commitment to fight religious extremism. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (the Kerry-Lugar-Berman law) passed in 2009 provided for annual economic assistance of $1.5 billion to Pakistan with the same conditionality.

The US has been suspicious of Pakistan’s counterterrorism role, accusing it of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare. The fact that Osama bin Laden had been in hiding in Pakistan for years before he was killed (May 2011) by US marines only lent credence to such suspicion. With the regime in Kabul struggling to hold its own against the renewed Taliban onslaught in recent months, Pakistan is being branded as the bad guy who (allegedly) continues to provide shelter to Afghan militants. The killing via a drone strike (in May 2016) of Taliban supremo Mullah Akhtar Mansour on Pakistani soil further tarnished Pakistan’s image.

Many a mover and shaker in Washington believes that Pakistan does not deserve US assistance, particularly security related assistance. Recently Congress shot down a proposal from the executive to allow Pakistan to purchase a few F16 aircraft using American money.

Then there is the nuclear issue. When Pakistan went nuclear in 1998, the US slapped sanctions on the country. From then onward, Washington saw Islamabad exclusively through the prism of non-proliferation. However, the sanctions didn’t deter Pakistan from going ahead with its nuclear programme. Then the fateful events of 9/11 came about and Pakistan became an American ally overnight. The sanctions were lifted and the non-proliferation issue was placed on the back burner.

The US is still engaged in Afghanistan. However, the focal point of global terrorism has shifted to the Middle East. The non-proliferation issue is back. Washington has never approved of Islamabad’s nuclear programme and would like to see it rolled back or capped. Islamabad, on the other hand, has so far resisted all attempts at making it dance to American tunes.

Even when the bilateral relations were at their high water mark, the Americans remained oblivious of Pakistan’s major demands, which included: (a) civilian nuclear cooperation similar to that between India and the US; (b) American mediation to help resolve the Kashmir problem; and (c) enhanced market access to Pakistan`s exports.

Regarding the transfer of civil nuclear technology to Pakistan, Washington is of the view that an agreement to that effect would confer legitimacy on Islamabad as a nuclear power. True, Washington has a similar agreement with New Delhi, another de facto nuclear power. But then the Americans suspect that Pakistan does not have a clean record in nuclear non-proliferation.

Contrary to the US’s expectation that by using carrot (aid) and stick (conditionality), it can macro-manage Pakistan, the country has not proved to be a pushover. On both the key issues – the war on terror and the nuclear programme – Pakistan has struck out on its own. Failure to appreciate that Islamabad will be guided by its perceived national interest has been the fundamental weakness of Washington’s policy. Whether the policy will change, and in which direction, under the upcoming administration is anybody’s guess.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com