No to proxy wars

Army chief General Raheel Sharif has called for an end to the ongoing proxy wars that are causing greater destabilisation in the region. How far can this approach help stabilise the region and bring the adversarial countries on the same page?

This most important pronouncement by Gen Sharif came at a time when Pakistan’s international and regional isolation had become too obvious, despite the denial mode that was not appealing any more to the international community.

Although Advisor on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz had the guts to deny an overwhelming impression of the failure of Pakistan’s isolationist foreign and over-extended security policies, Director General ISPR General Bajwa was quite straight forward in stating that Pakistan was left alone in its war against terrorism. However, neither the denial by Aziz nor the lament of General Bajwa can help with the much-needed correction of a strategically flawed course.

Ever since Gen Musharraf’s decision to join the war against terrorism, Pakistan started to move on the difficult but contradictory course of the reversal of its decades-old pro-jihad policies adopted by Gen Ziaul Haq and patronised by the free world at the peak of the cold-war times. Strategic depth in Afghanistan remained elusive and the so-called strategic assets or non-state actors created during that period were not only kept but also extended to Indian-administered Kashmir.

In the post-cold war period and with the rise of Islamic terrorism, the outdated security paradigm and the use of proxies to promote strategic objectives in the region became counter-productive and, ironically, turned into a principal security threat.

In the post-9/11 period, a forgotten ‘most allied of allies’ became a non-Nato strategic ally of the US. Gen Musharraf used this exceptional opportunity to play his double-game: helping the US-led Nato war on terror with a focus against Al-Qaeda while preserving strategic assets – Quetta Shura and Haqqani Network – for strategic depth in Afghanistan. Like Gen Zia, Gen Musharraf played intelligent vis-a-vis India to neutralise the eastern front. By halting cross-border militancy, he engaged New Delhi in a path-breaking dialogue on Kashmir; but his regime was derailed before he could seal a pragmatic deal on the ‘core issue’.

By the time Gen Kayani assumed leadership, Pakistan had become a victim of its own device. However, despite terming internal terrorism as an “existential threat” to Pakistan’s security, Gen Kayani hesitated to take on renegade non-state actors, who had taken over vast border regions and were threatening the monopoly of state power. Although a successful military operation was undertaken in Swat and South Waziristan, he avoided wiping them out of their bastion of power, North Waziristan, for fear of a massive blowback.

Gen Raheel Sharif took the terrorists head on in their stronghold by launching Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, and cleaned up other tribal regions. The National Action Plan brought all political forces in the country on the same page and initiated a tedious process of the reversal of the pro-jihad policies.

The military and political leadership resolved to fight to the last terrorist, without preference for any, and vowed not to let Pakistan’s territory be used for terrorism against any other country. Yet, despite the success of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, certain proxies were kept – partly because of the hangover of the past and mainly due to continuing uncertainty in Afghanistan. If Gen Sharif is to be taken on his words being a true soldier, then it opens a great possibility – if India and Afghanistan also reciprocate in letter and spirit.

Proxy wars are not new to this region. Both India and Pakistan have been running proxy wars against one another ever since the bloody partition of the Subcontinent. India did not accept Partition and Pakistan sent tribal militias into Kashmir to complete the ‘unfinished agenda’ of Partition. If Ayub Khan undertook Operation Gibraltar to help Kashmiris secede, India trained Mukti Bahini during the secession of East Pakistan or Bangladesh’s war of independence. In cohorts with India, the Afghan authorities supported the Pakhtunistan movement as they refused to respect the agreements on the Durand Line and Z A Bhutto backed Islamist dissidents of the Afghan monarchy, who later became the leaders of the Afghan Mujahideen against the Saur revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Soon after the emergence of the Kashmiri intifada, General Zia diverted some of the jihadis from the Afghan front to the Kashmir front. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have been providing sanctuaries to the terrorists operating against the other side of the Durand Line. And India is finding the high-profile acts of terrorism a good pretext to sponsor terrorism and secessionist movements in Pakistan.

The proxy wars sponsored or backed by almost all the countries of the region – Afghanistan, Pakistan and India in particular – are fuelling unending destabilisation in the Af-Pak region with wider repercussions for the whole region. Similarly, the conflict over Kashmir is overshadowing the whole ambit of relations between India and Pakistan and allowing both state and non-state actors to damage the other side.

The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan at this juncture is dangerous for both countries and will help the extremists to destabilise both countries. On the other hand, India needs to learn from the US experience of using Islamic radicals against the Soviets (they later turned their guns on their erstwhile patrons). By helping the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch radical nationalists, India is becoming instrumental in not only destabilising the Af-Pak-Central Asia region, but also inviting extremists to fish in India’s troubled communal waters, besides encouraging the unleashing of a huge stock of jihadis across the border.

This is dangerous brinkmanship, which Pakistan and India must avoid for peace and economic benefits of regional cooperation. Pakistan’s utmost security priority must be its own secured borders and not over-stretched unsustainable security agendas. Afghanistan requires peace and reconciliation, rather than making claims on Pakistan territory. Pakhtuns and Pakhtun nationalists find greater assimilation towards south, rather than opting for a bleak future in the northwest – even though they would like to keep Afghanistan as a secondary market like Afghan refugees.

For a greater role in the Asia-Pacific region, India needs to settle issues with all its neighbours as Saarc presents a bigger promise in conjunction with the energy-rich Central Asia that is being held back because of the enmity between India and Pakistan. Without a mutually cooperative relationship with Pakistan, India cannot have a more convenient access to Central Asia and Iran. Similarly, Pakistan cannot benefit from its geo-economic location without overcoming its enmity-hangover with India.

Gen Sharif has realistically arrived at the right conclusion – as he did while taking on the terrorists in North Waziristan. The logical conclusion of Operation Zarb-e-Azb should be a paradigm shift, and Gen Sharif seems to be arriving at that point if he finds willing partners in Kabul and Delhi.

Pakistan should be more confident in taking this initiative, having ensured its nuclear defence against India’s asymmetrical conventional threat and almost over-powering terrorists and isolationist secessionists. Afghanistan has no option but to find ways for peace within, with the cooperation of Pakistan. Both Saarc and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation can provide platforms for bringing an end to all kinds of bloody proxy wars.

The writer is a senior journalist.

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