Negative peace: what next?

After the brief but climactic war and its resolution on May 10, which ended in a clear Pakistani victory, India now sits in anger, licking its wounds and plotting its next move.

The Indian media has already taken a bellicose stance, baying for blood in the aftermath of a shocking failure to meet their war expectations. After 72 hours that shook the Subcontinent, the political, diplomatic and military landscapes reflect a state of negative peace.

Negative peace refers to the absence of active warfare without addressing the fundamental causes underlying a conflict. In India, the post-war environment is rife with jingoism and the very hauteur that fueled the confrontation in the first place. Much to India’s discomfort, the Indo-Pak conflict has been re-hyphenated in a manner that deeply irks the proud sensibilities of a self-styled regional power. The Kashmir dispute has once again been internationalised as a bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan, undermining India’s carefully cultivated image of normalcy in the illegally occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has emerged with its international standing enhanced. It has been seen as a responsible nuclear state that acted in self-defence and refrained from escalating the conflict. Despite India’s relentless accusatory rhetoric, it has failed to present a shred of credible evidence linking Pakistan to the Pahalgam terrorist incident.

Pakistan, in fact, offered to allow an investigation by any neutral international body. Even the former governor of Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, Satya Pal Malik, revealed India’s negligence and complicity in the Pulwama attack on its CRPF personnel. Similar claims are now being echoed by individuals like Mushtaq Sofi of the 29 Rashtriya Rifles, who was dismissed and incarcerated for suggesting internal collusion.

While President Trump played a constructive role as an anti-war statesman, there are cautionary voices, such as that of scholar Christine Fair. In an interview, she pointed out that Indo-US relations have become so deeply institutionalised and bureaucratised that, despite Trump’s personal inclination to mediate and defuse tensions, the entrenched bureaucracy, influenced by India’s perceived role as a regional gendarme for the US, continues to lean in India’s favour.

Within India itself, there is bipartisan resentment over any re-hyphenation of Indo-US relations. Indian politicians and diplomats, including Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, bristle at the mere suggestion of foreign-mediated rapprochement with Pakistan.

Pakistan conducted itself with honour and restraint in the face of a far larger and more militarily powerful adversary. But the danger is far from over. A positive peace has not returned; India has shown no willingness to reconsider its stance on the underlying issues at the heart of the conflict. Prime Minister Modi’s post-ceasefire speech did not attempt to disguise India’s hostility. He unequivocally stated that any future dialogue with Pakistan would be limited to discussions on terrorism and the status of Azad Kashmir – with no room for third-party mediation. His tone seemed more an exercise in political damage control, aimed at managing the fallout from what was, by all accounts, a humiliating outcome for India.

India has suffered a strategic and psychological setback – one it is unlikely to forget or forgive. The vague political objectives given to the Indian military could not be transformed into tangible or winnable outcomes. Despite the RSS-driven nationalist fervour that energised the campaign, India’s armed forces failed to deliver on the ground. Faced with a sharp, calibrated, and proportionate response from Pakistan, the Indian civil and military leadership has been left cornered, forced to contemplate their next move.

One telling indication of India’s future course came from Ajai Sahni, executive director of the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal. He argued that the most effective response to Pakistan would be to pursue an aggressive covert war.

As if on cue, the Indian deep state appears to have escalated its proxy warfare. A recent spike in terrorist attacks in Balochistan suggests this approach is already underway. India’s post-ceasefire policy is also evident in its combative rhetoric and its media's shrill, inflammatory tone. The surge in attacks attributed to the TTP and BLA shows India’s aggressive posture. However, proxy warfare alone cannot fully reinforce Modi’s incendiary rhetoric, especially as it pertains to anti-Muslim narratives in the politically sensitive states of Bihar and West Bengal.

A more profound danger lies in the toxic political polarisation stoked by the BJP, which has fundamentally altered the social fabric of India, particularly in the Hindi-speaking heartland. Citizens have been imbued with a misplaced sense of Indian supremacism and inflated notions of global stature. This narrative has been eagerly embraced by a population eager for validation. To redirect this mass mindset, the Modi administration would have to expend political capital – something it appears unwilling to do in its current state of nationalist overreach and megalomania.

Given these dynamics, another confrontation cannot be ruled out. The BJP government, intent on recovering its lost political capital, may well seek another showdown. Therefore, Pakistan must remain vigilant and ramp up its military preparedness and diplomatic engagement. Strategic collaboration with China is vital in order to address weaknesses in our defence posture, particularly in air defences (such as: upgrading the HQ-9 system), AEW capabilities, BVR weaponry, anti-drone technologies, the resilience of mechanised ground forces, and enhancing the navy’s offensive and defensive reach.

If it comes, the next war is likely to involve limited ground incursions via India’s Integrated Battle Groups and Theatre Line reserves, in line with its Proactive Defence Doctrine. Pakistan must equip its armoured and mechanised battle formations with robust electronic countermeasures capable of neutralising drones and top-attack precision weapons. Air defence systems must be significantly bolstered, especially around the capital and sensitive installations.

Pakistan must prepare to fight an effective legal and diplomatic battle on the water front, particularly regarding the Indus Waters Treaty. Creating an IWT Response Hub within the Ministry of Water Resources is imperative. This body should bring together the finest legal, engineering, and hydrological minds to defend Pakistan’s rights as a lower riparian state. Our red lines must be clearly defined, articulated, and internationally recognised to leave no room for water-based coercion or blackmail.

Finally, in light of this fragile and potentially explosive state of negative peace, Pakistan must keep its powder dry. Complacency is not an option.

The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be reached at: rwjanj@hotmail.com