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Friday February 07, 2025

The Kurram question

Disturbances that began in 2023 with attack on school have escalated rapidly in recent weeks

By Dr Raashid Wali Janjua
January 21, 2025
A representational image of activists of Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM) holding a protest demonstration against the terrorist attack in Parachinar at Soldier Bazar in Karachi on November 22, 2024. — PPI
A representational image of activists of Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM) holding a protest demonstration against the terrorist attack in Parachinar at Soldier Bazar in Karachi on November 22, 2024. — PPI

Kurram has emerged as a sectarian tinderbox reminiscent of the turbulent years of 2007-08. The disturbances that began in 2023 with an attack on a school have escalated rapidly in recent weeks.

A tribal jirga, which had been convened and which issued a peace decree, has proven ineffective due to violations of the agreement by militant groups. The attacks on convoys protected by police and military forces demonstrate the militants’ ferocity and intransigence, showing that they place little value on the sanctity of a tribal jirga.

Numerous unprecedented events have unfolded within the malevolent story of Kurram. These include the violation of jirga agreements, attacks on military-protected convoys, and the kidnapping of women. These incidents signal a departure from tribal norms and a disrespect for institutions that were once revered by the refractory and truculent tribesmen. But what is the root cause of the current conflict and disorder?

The first known instance of sectarian violence in Kurram dates back to 1938, when Shia-Sunni tensions in Lucknow prompted the Shia community in Kurram to move there. Their convoys were attacked by Sunnis in Hangu, resulting in sectarian violence. The next wave of sectarian unrest occurred in the 1960s, followed by sporadic eruptions in 1970, 1977, 1982, and 1996. The sectarian fault lines in Kurram became more pronounced after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution in 1979.

These existing sectarian divisions, coupled with land disputes, were exploited by rival sectarian proxies as Kurram emerged as a critical base for Afghan mujahideen resistance from 1979 to 1988. The land disputes in the region stem from early settlement claims and the failure of post-Partition governments to resolve them. The British attempted to address the issue in 1901 and again in 1943-44, but the absence of proper land demarcation records prevented any conclusive resolution. Currently, around 90 per cent of the land in Kurram remains disputed, with rival sects making competing claims to various tracts.

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Kurram Agency became a frontline region, a place of refuge for fleeing Al Qaeda and Afghan resistance elements. This led to a protracted and bloody sectarian conflict between 2007 and 2011. The conflict prompted the involvement of the military and Frontier Constabulary to restore peace, resulting in the migration of over 2,000 Sunni households from Upper Kurram and Parachinar Valley to Lower Kurram and settled districts. This migration disrupted the region’s demographic balance: Upper Kurram and Parachinar became dominated by Shia populations, Central Kurram remained Sunni-controlled, and Lower Kurram became a mixed-population area.

Parachinar, with its business and agricultural infrastructure, now lacked a Sunni presence that had previously acted as a buffer against Sunni violence at the entrances and exits of Kurram, areas dominated by Sunnis. The removal of this delicate demographic balance allowed rival sects to engage in violence with few consequences, as there was no longer a Sunni community to retaliate. In October 2008, the Murree Accord between Shia and Sunni factions was reportedly backed by the Haqqani Network. The accord called for the removal of bunkers and the blockade of the Peshawar-Parachinar Road, with the Frontier Constabulary tasked with enforcing the peace.

The involvement of locals in foreign conflicts further complicates Kurram’s sectarian landscape. These militants, who fought in Syria and Iraq, added another layer of violence to an already volatile situation. The current conflict, which has claimed over 90 lives, can be traced back to the disruption of the demographic balance caused by the migration of Sunni tribesmen from Parachinar Valley. Contributing factors include the rise of the TTP following the US withdrawal, externally supported Shia-Sunni proxy warfare, and the governance vacuum in Kurram after Fata’s merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The solution lies in a five-pronged approach. The first step should focus on addressing external factors, specifically targeting the support base of sectarian proxies in neighbouring countries through effective diplomacy. The second step should involve the resettlement of Sunni tribesmen who were forced to migrate from Parachinar Valley. While they may fear returning, their resettlement is essential for re-establishing a balanced demographic in Parachinar Valley, which would help curb sectarian violence.

The third step requires a strong guarantor for peace agreements, whether brokered by the Jirga or other inter-tribal accords. This guarantor could be a prominent elder with tribal support or the military, acting as a credible and neutral arbitrator. The government and military must ensure neutrality and transparency during peace negotiations, allowing every sect’s voice to be heard. When any sect is ignored, it breeds resentment and increases the likelihood of violence. The military and its affiliated paramilitary forces would be particularly well-placed to enforce peace agreements, using their authority to punish violators.

The fourth step involves strengthening security arrangements to maintain peace and safeguard convoys, such as the deployment of law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the establishment of security checkpoints along vulnerable routes. The final step is the resolution of the long-standing land disputes. The KP government must take decisive action to resolve these disputes by digitising land records and establishing clear demarcations based on merit, free from political influence.

Finally, governance plays a crucial role in achieving sustainable peace. Since the merger of Fata with KP, there has been a lack of effective governance in Kurram, with both district administration and police struggling to establish their authority. The judiciary must also play its part in restoring order by ensuring justice through the law or Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms. Any delays in these areas will only exacerbate the complex situation in Kurram.

Kurram’s sectarian violence is deeply rooted in historical grievances, land disputes, and external influences. Resolving the conflict requires coordinated efforts on multiple fronts, from diplomacy and resettlement to effective governance and dispute resolution. Only by addressing these issues comprehensively can Kurram hope to achieve lasting peace.


The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be reached at: rwjanj@hotmail.com