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Thursday March 28, 2024

Asking for a neutral Iran

By Saleem Safi
April 09, 2016

Iran is an ideological and religious state, and these dimensions are well reflected in its foreign policy outlook, which protects national interests with focus on religious and sectarian identity.

Iran also holds a sectarian stance on international dealings. That could be seen in the March 14 statement by President Rouhani that Iran is determined to protect the Shia community though intervention in any part of the world.  National pride is also very visible in their policy. After Imam Khomeini’s revolution, Iran wished to take over the leadership of the Muslim world. This was the main reason behind Iran’s strong stance on the issues of Israel and Salman Rushdie. However, it is very clear that whenever there is conflict within these factors, Iran’s policymakers put national interest above all other priorities, and they use sectarian and religious aspects as tools to achieve these national interests.

Iran is willing to have good relations with Pakistan, as a Muslim neighbour. But when national interests call for it, Iran has never hesitated to neglect the religious and sectarian interests of those in Pakistan. This explains why Iran is a strategic and economic partner of India, and why Iran is much closer to non-Muslim Russia than Muslim Turkey. This also explains the (very recent) past stance of Iran against the US, when the Americans were supporting Saudi Arabia against Iran. And now, when the US is distancing itself from Saudi Arabia, Iran is cementing ties with the so-called Great Satan – as any other realist state would do in such circumstances.

The politics of the state of Iran (they ignore religious and sectarian priorities for national interests) can be seen in Afghanistan as well. Iran was a staunch enemy of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda for strategic and sectarian reasons. But now, when national interest requires it, Iran has good relations with a faction of Al-Qaeda and also supports a specific group of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Like any other wise and practical state, Iran puts its national interests on top of the priority list.

But one has to admit that Iran and Saudi Arabia both have sectarian followers around the world – people who are ready to sacrifice their own interests for Iran or Saudi Arabia. Unlike Iran, factors other than national interest – such as personal, sectarian and religious considerations – do affect our foreign policy. If one prime minister of Pakistan belongs to a certain sect, his policies tilt towards Saudi Arabia. If the next premier belongs to another sect, the policies shift towards Iran.

Zardari’s financial interests were tied with the UAE, so during his reign he was ready to do anything that pleased the Emirates. Pervez Musharraf was the friend of a fellow Muslim state, so he welcomed any move to make them happy. The children of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan are in Britain, so their stance towards that country is soft. We are unlucky that our religious leaders put the national interests of either Saudi Arabia or Iran above those of Pakistan. Against this backdrop, it is very easy to understand the roots and mutual impact of Pakistan, India and Iran relations.

For the most part of its history, Pakistan has remained in pro-US camp. Before its revolution, Iran was an even stronger supporter of the US than Pakistan. After the Iranian revolution, Iran-US relations changed into open rivalry. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s dependence on the US increased during the cold-war years. Despite this economic and strategic dependence – due perhaps to the Islamic ideological base of Pakistan or the sectarian representation in the population – Pakistan never allowed the US to use its territory against Iran.

Pakistan pursued the same policy when it came to China. Pakistan acted as a bridge between China and the US and in the same spirit and gesture – before establishment of formal diplomatic channels between Iran and the US – Iran utilised the services of Pakistani embassies in Europe and the US for diplomatic communications with the Americans.

However, all this changed with the emergence of the Afghan Taliban. The Taliban factor turned Iran and Pakistan into economic and strategic rivals in Afghanistan. Iran, along with India and Russia, supported the Northern Alliance, while Pakistan, with the help of the Gulf States, firmly stood with the Taliban. Up to this day, in Afghanistan, all Indian economic and strategic influence is a result of facilitation by Iran.

Another avenue of conflict is Gwadar and Chabahar. Iran wanted that for Central Asia, only Chabahar and Bandar Abbas should be utilised as trade ports. It was postulated that these ports would connect Central Asia with China, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. But it is clear that once Gwadar is developed and becomes operational, no other port could compete against it in terms of relative advantage. It would be the most cost effective, easy and shortest route to connect China and all other regions. So it is natural that the US, UK and some of the Gulf States are not comfortable with the idea of Gwadar and the CPEC. It has direct consequences for India and Iran as well, being devastating for the economic interests of Iran and strategic interests of India.

This situation made it necessary for India and maybe even Iran to interfere in Balochistan and the north-western areas of Pakistan, so as to halt work on Gwadar and the CPEC. They invested billions of dollars in Chabahar, in the same way as China and Pakistan are investing in Gwadar and the CPEC. Kulbhushan Yadav, a serving officer of RAW, was granted the Iranian visa for many years to stay in Chabahar under the Muslim name of Hussain Mubarik.

This economic and strategic alliance has been active for many years; I have hinted towards it in my media appearances, only to face open threats and defamation. But this nexus is not discussed as openly in Pakistan as is the issue of Afghanistan and India.

It is very common to refer to Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad, but no one speaks about the activities of the Indian consulate in Zahidan. For this reason, the arrest of the RAW official is, I believe, a great success for the Pakistani agencies – helping not only to prove RAW involvement in Pakistan, but also enabling Gen Raheel Sharif to discuss the issue with the Iranian president.

We need not push this incident to the extent of making our fellow Islamic country Iran into our rival. The national interests of both our countries demand close diplomatic ties. However, all this must be on an equal and mutual basis.

This is the perfect time to put this case through diplomatic channels. We should seek the guarantee that Iran be open to all opportunities of mutual connection with India – but not at the expense of Pakistan. If Pakistan, with such little resources, was able to sustain US pressure during the cold war, and did not allow its land to be used against Iran, why can Iran not do so in the case of India?

Pakistan acted as a bridge between Iran and the West; and China and the US. If Iran is not able to act in the same fashion with India and Pakistan, then at least it must stay neutral. This is the least that Pakistan deserves.

The writer works for Geo TV. Email: saleem.safi@janggroup.

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