Entitlement to plunder?

Legal eye
Are events like the Asif Zardari’s recent harangue condemning the military for its sins since Pakistan’s inception a consequence of our unfortunate civil-military imbalance or partly its cause? The provocation appears to be a claim made by DG Rangers Karachi before the Sindh apex committee (constituted as part of the National Action Plan to fight terror) that Rs230 billion is looted annually from Karachiites by various mafias patronised by political parties, and that part of this black money is used to fund terror.
Is the claim that Karachi might have a $2.3 billion black economy really startling? Or that Karachi is a haven for terror partly because political parties sponsor and protect militants? Or that proceeds of crime are being used to fund terror as well? This is old news. It was also documented when the Supreme Court took up the Karachi law and order case a few years back. The only thing new might be the expression of resolve by the DG Rangers (backed by the military high command) to rein in Karachi’s black economy as part of the fight against terror.
What is it that Asif Zardari is really saying? One, that let he who is without sin cast the first stone. That many of the generals that have come and gone were as dirty as Sindh’s politicos and if khakis don’t stop slinging mud at Sindh’s political patrons, the Zardari-led PPP might engage the khakis in a grand mud-fest. And two, that the Zardari-led PPP’s politics of reconciliation is hinged on the doctrine of live-and-let-live. Khakis can do as they please in their exclusive domain of influence and let politicos do so in theirs. That khakis are breaching that understanding by meddling with Sindh’s black economy that falls beyond khaki domain.
And three, that in being consigned to Sindh, the Zardari-led PPP has reconciled with the shrinking size of the pie that it feasts over. Now that khakis are interfering with how politicos run Karachi and Sindh (or run it down) they are interfering with the Zardari-led PPP’s means of subsistence. If they don’t stop, Zardari & Co will give up the path of least resistance and opt for mutually assured destruction instead.
The three obvious questions are: Is Zardari right? Is his threat credible? Will the khakis back off in Karachi?
That as a historical matter our powerful military must assume a major chunk of the blame for Pakistan’s present woes can hardly be denied. Whether it is misconceived security policies, molestation of the constitution and usurpation of political power, financial misdeeds when in power or the refusal to be held accountable under the laws of this country, we can demonise khakis just like we can demonise any other institution (ie the bureaucracy, the judiciary) for its errant role in Pakistan’s chequered history.
But is Zardari saying that he is eager and willing to offer himself for accountability so long as dirty generals are also held accountable? It was the Zardari-led PPP that endorsed the military’s assumption of control over internal security. It was he who granted extensions to generals Kayani and Pasha. His government refused to prosecute Musharraf or hold anyone accountable for the OBL debacle. It was under his watch that financial scams involving generals (remember NLC?) came to the fore and he looked away.
Zardari is simply saying that whether it is politicos in power or generals, we are of the same grain and we are all dirty. So let us all dispense with the righteousness and continue to make hay while the sun shines. Zardari is not seeking course correction here. He is claiming his entitlement to continue in his stead and do as he pleases because power elites in the past (with the khaki elite at the top of the power pyramid) have done so. The threat delivered by Zardari is not about principles. It is about interests.
The situation in Karachi today is also not comparable to what transpired in D-chowk in 2014. That was about unconstitutional regime change. This is not. That was the khaki-elite clarifying there could be fatal consequences if a civilian government gets excited enough to try and put a former army chief in the dock. Here the military command seems to have bought into the broken windows theory: if Karachi’s terror havens are to be cleared its crime mafias will have to be busted as they offer sanctuary and support to terrorists.
Is the Zardari threat credible? Mutually assured destruction is rooted in the ability of adversaries to inflict unacceptable harm on one another. Will maligning generals who plundered national wealth in their time (and consequently the military as an institution) be deemed unacceptable damage by the present military leadership? Zardari & Co suffer from major disabilities in this regard. One, ZAB and BB were popular charismatic leaders who could rile up public sentiment and thus take on the establishment. Zardari is not.
Two, once upon a time the PPP was a national party capable of influencing public mood from Khyber to Karachi. The Zardari-led PPP has shrunk to being a Sindhi party with pockets of influence in other provinces. Three, unlike in the debate during 2014’s dharna where those favouring civilian control of the military stood on one side, the present debate is more akin to the one around the NRO. Many will call for across-the-board accountability including that of generals. But it will be hard to make a case for leaving dirty politicos alone.
Four, the cause taken up by Zardari & Co has no appeal for the PML-N and the PTI. The PTI stands to gain most from the PPP’s decline in Sindh and the PML-N has no political stake in Karachi, except that the ability of the MQM or the PPP to shut down Karachi at will hurts the federal government. Further, the PML-N standing with Zardari & Co in a turf-war where the Zardari-led PPP is on the wrong side of the moral argument would strengthen Imran Khan’s narrative that the PPP and PML-N are birds of a feather.
And five, the military under its present high command is more popular than all political parties put together. The general sentiment is that were it not for the military the existential challenge of terror would consume us. While using its hard power in Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Balochistan and Karachi, its soft power and ability to influence the national narrative is greater than ever. This was most evident post-Peshawar when within days our politicos felt obliged to huddle together and inscribe within our constitution the aberration that is military courts.
As much as one wishes to cheer democracy and oppose military intervention in politics, it is hard to stand with Zardari & Co in this desperate attempt to preserve its shrinking turf and nurture its festering sense of entitlement. Our generals have been no angels and have done plenty wrong. But politicos showcasing steadfast resolve to continue to pillage just because generals have also done so does nothing to endear democracy within a country where it has very shallow roots.
In threatening the military, Zardari & Co might have bitten more than it can chew. Trying to take on the military at a time when it is in the middle of a deathly war, has otherwise been making all the right moves and has its popularity graph soaring high can only be explained as an act of desperation of a party that is out of ideas, disconnected from public sentiment and in no mood to introspect, undertake course correction and reorganise.
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu