Beyond the Iranian nuclear deal

So the terms of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme have been agreed to and now these terms and conditions will be put in writing and signed by the participants of the negotiations: Iran, the EU, China, the US and Russia.
Apart from the specifics of the agreement itself – and it is precise in terms of curbing Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, if any existed, for the next 15 years (time bound as Iran had wanted) – the agreement has far-reaching consequences beyond the nuclear issue area.
But first just a few words to point out that, contrary to western perceptions fuelled by the US’ trauma on Iran following the success of the Islamic revolution, Iran had not shown any commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons capability.
Unlike North Korea, Iran had never mentioned its intention of exiting from the Non Proliferation Treaty, which it could do under Article X of the NPT. It is a matter of public record that Iran was almost ready to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Safeguards Protocol that had been added to the NPT when the US disrupted the Iran-EU dialogue on the nuclear issue more than a decade ago.
For Iran it was always about its right to develop its civilian nuclear fuel cycle, as allowed for under Articles IV and V of the NPT, which to date remain unoperationalised by the parties. These articles are a right bestowed upon NPT members, not a privilege to be earned as the EU had begun enunciating in the wake of the Iran nuclear issue. But in the end, the Iranians played their cards well especially the western fear of a nuclear Iran and the agreement is a win-win for all.
The agreement on the nuclear issue, after 12 long years, has repercussions that go far beyond into the arena of global politics. The sanctions and unfreezing of assets will be operationalised once the IAEA has confirmed Iran’s compliance with the technical terms of the agreement.
Iran’s frozen assets in the west, especially the US, will then be unfrozen and Iran will regain control over these legal assets. Of course, there will be hurdles amongst competing claims to these, perhaps going to courts in the US, but by and large the US government will have to play its part and allow Iran access to what is legally theirs.
Once nuclear-related sanctions on Iran are lifted, Iran will also see flows of FDI coming into the country and will gain full access to markets abroad, especially the vital EU market. Further, Iranian tourism will receive a major boost – especially its ski resorts and historic sites.
The major consequence of the nuclear agreement will be the mainstreaming of Iran in global politics. The country is already a major player in its region as a result of the US undermining strong, though dictatorial, Arab states like Iraq and Syria. Egypt, which was coming into its own under a democratic setup with the Muslim Brotherhood winning a free and fair election there, saw a US-backed military intervention undercutting Egypt’s regional role.
With Iran’s support for forces like Hamas and Hezbollah, and the vacuum created by the chaos in the Arab states of the Middle East, Iran has gained tremendous political space. However, it was denied recognition of the same by the US and its allies.
Now Iran can gain that recognition and become a player brought into the loop for international action for restoration of peace in this region. The Daish factor will also pull in the US and the EU towards Iran. The Gulf Arab states have neither power nor access to the anti-Daish forces in the region.
Already Iraq is pushing against Daish with the assistance of Iran. Iran is also present in Syria alongside the embattled Assad regime, which the US is now seeking to talk to after having wreaked havoc in that country earlier by willy-nilly supporting all opponents of the Assad regime – not realising the consequences of the Isis threat till it was too late.
The nuclear deal also comes at precisely the right time for Iran – as the Yemen crisis comes to the fore. By becoming part of the mainstream, Iran will gain recognition as a regional power and will be part of any multilateral negotiations especially if conducted through the UN framework. The Saudi regime has lost political ground in the wake of the nuclear deal despite Obama’s statement to the contrary. The Iran factor cannot be used by the Gulf regimes to gain support for the dictatorial measures they use to repress those aspiring for a political voice as in Bahrain. Interestingly, the UAE has been a major source of Iranian investments and now that financial relationship can be overtly reflected.
For Israel, the agreement is a major setback as it signals a new US approach to foreign policy in the Middle East and West Asia. The message is clear to Israel: for the first time Israeli histrionics have not impacted US policy goals in this region. Whether Congress will support the Obama administration remains to be seen, but with the EU, China and Russia putting their signatures on the nuclear agreement, Congressional opposition can only have a limited impact and will only isolate the US on this issue.
Netanyahu has already condemned the deal publicly but there is a question that now arises: can Israel exploit the opposition of several Arab states to the deal? A number of Arab states already have ties with Israel including some Gulf States.
It is not that Iran was not playing a major role in the region – from Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to Afghanistan. However, this role will now gain legitimacy and a more overt form.
At the end of the day, Iran remained party to the NPT throughout the nuclear standoff reflecting its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and now it has gained political and economic global mainstreaming as well.
The writer is the information secretary of the PTI. The views expressed are the writer’s own.