Avoiding the unthinkable

"Since the advent of the Nuclear Age, everything has changed save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” –Albert Einstein
More than thirteen years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, how concerned the world should be over threats of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons remains a subject of intense debate in US foreign policy circles. A number of security experts in Washing DC have once again started to express concerns about the spike in apprehensions that a nuclear attack on US soil may be forthcoming- sooner rather than later. With the dramatic rise of the Islamic State over the last couple of years, many assert that nuclear terrorism is inevitable – not a matter of ‘if’ but ‘when’.
The threat of nuclear terrorism can take many forms. Terrorist organisations may try to attack nuclear facilities or attempt to steal a nuclear device or fissile material with help from inside sources. They may attack nuclear power plants to steal radioactive material which can cause thousands of deaths. Another reason why a transnational terrorist group like Isis would be interested in stealing nuclear weapons is that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the reclusive leader of the militant Islamic State, an Islamic caliphate and the possession of nuclear weapons would provide him legitimacy.
However, there are several opposing schools of thought, and a spectrum of views, regarding the likelihood of a terrorist attack involving nuclear weapons. While policymakers and experts agree that nuclear terrorism is a clear and present danger for all countries, they differ over: (i) the probability of nuclear terrorism; and (ii) the capability and the intent of terrorist organisations to build a crude nuclear device, deliver it to its target and detonate it. Sceptics believe that there are many obstacles to the acquisition of a nuclear capability by terrorist groups.
On the other hand, conventionalists think that the probability that terrorists will be able to successfully execute a nuclear attack in cities like New York, London or Mumbai is increasing. In their view, the inability of the international community to take immediate steps to secure every gram of fissile material will have disastrous consequences. The followers of this school of thought focus more on terrorist intent and consequences than the capability of terrorist groups to acquire or employ a nuclear device.
But there is near-universal agreement among experts and policymakers that even a single incident of nuclear terrorism could forever change the world as we know it. Once terrorists became successful in stealing a nuclear weapon, they would be in a position to detonate it as soon as it reaches their intended target.
And if the Islamic State becomes able to steal only significant quantities of fissile material, a number bomb could be built in less than a year. Hundreds of metric tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium are used annually at nearly 350 different sites in more than 60 countries. This widespread use of fissile material constitutes serious proliferation risks.
The fundamental challenge for the international community is to deny terrorist organisations the means to steal fissile material needed to build a crude nuclear weapon – an improvised nuclear device (IND). Efforts must be focused more on securing and completely eliminating the vast quantities of HEU globally because it is well within the technical reach of terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda to manufacture a ‘gun-type’ IND, if they acquire just a few kilograms of weapons grade or near weapons grade HEU.
According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, as of January 2013, the global stockpile of HEU is estimated to be about 1.390 tonnes, of which more than 50 tonnes is material situated in civilian research reactors. Some of the material is very poorly secured, making it an ideal target for terrorists.
Experts are of the view that uranium enriched just above 60 percent can also be used to produce a small-scale detonation. The gun-type atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, for example, used 80 percent enriched uranium. Although the US and Russia possess much of this material, there are over 25 other countries that also possess significant quantities of weapons-usable material.
Against this backdrop, the most logical step to combat nuclear terrorism is the total phase-out of civilian commerce in HEU. It is a well-known fact that HEU is not needed for the generation of civilian nuclear power and is only used as fuel for some research reactors and critical assemblies. And in most of these research reactors, low-enriched uranium can be substituted for HEU. According to a recent report from the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 62 HEU fuelled research reactors have been converted to use LEU fuel and 17 reactors have been shut down in 36 countries over the past three decades.
The international community has taken a number of steps to further the objective of combating nuclear terrorism by reducing global stocks of HEU. However, despite many significant achievements, the US and other major powers have remained unable to develop a universal consensus on HEU elimination. The global community must work together to develop HEU transparency guidelines like those that exist for plutonium used in civilian facilities.
Finally, countries must review stockpile requirements for HEU fuel used in naval reactors that power submarines and aircraft carriers. This issue has significant implications for the prospects of HEU elimination because HEU use in naval reactors has been kept out of the ‘elimination debate’. Despite a number of formidable technical and political challenges to HEU removal, the fact is that the less HEU exists in civilian research reactors, the less opportunity there is for terrorists to steal the material.
Compared to other non-proliferation initiatives seeking to place limits on fuel cycle technology development, HEU elimination is non-discriminatory in nature because it applies to both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. This added virtue offers a common ground for fostering broad cooperation in reducing a very real threat to international security.
Email: rizwanasghar5@unm.edu