Trump’s tweet and chequered history of Pak-US ties

In the immediate post-9/11 period, most scholars and analysts in Pakistan uncritically accepted diplomatic statements on their face value and rushed to concur with official pronouncements that the deadly attacks in the US ushered in a new era of Pakistan-US strategic relations which have been on the wane over the past decade. Not only the history of Pakistan-US relations, but also the logic of their new partnership and the requirements of US war on terror worldwide should have cautioned them against such naive optimism.

We have a chequered history of Pakistan-US relations. The historical record shows that the duration of close asymmetrical relations has been shorter than the duration of correct relations between the two countries. In spite of such past record which should have mellowed the widespread naive optimism in the country, most scholars, analysts and state functionaries had made us believe that the post-9/11 Pakistan-US relationship would be an exception to the past pattern. The recent precipitous decline in Pakistan-US relationship has rendered them orphans.

In the immediate post-9/11 period, it was admittedly hard to chart out the definitive direction of Pakistan-US relations.

The very start of the new Pakistan-US cooperative relationship was less than auspicious. After the 9/11 attacks, the US set out to muster international support for its avowed sustained war on anti-American terrorism the world over. Pakistan promptly announced its readiness to cooperate with the US in a number of areas. The decision of cooperation was first characterised as a lesser evil, although it was later couched in religious terms and sanctified with citations from Islamic texts and history.

In fact, the Pakistan leadership claimed to have made this decision in response to two clear-cut, stark choices which the US bluntly presented to it — either cooperate to punish anti-American terrorists and their sponsors or consider itself among American enemies. It was claimed that hidden but not-so-hidden in the second choice was the threat — be prepared to share in the fate of such enemies who reportedly faced the risk of being taken back into the ‘stone age’. Of course, Pakistan had no such desire and lost little time in picking the first choice.

The way the cooperation was sought and extended created an impression of the inauspicious start of the new partnership between the two countries with Pakistan in a subservient position.

Pakistan leadership since then has been under tremendous psychological and political pressure to dispel the impression of subservience and capitulation to the US and cleanse itself of the lesser evil, too. No wonder the Pakistan-US cooperation in war on terror remained a highly guarded secret in Pakistan over the years.

The recent events, including the $33 billion Tweet of Trump and the suspension of US military aid, added insult to injury, presenting Pakistan as a mercenary and deceitful partner in the war on terror.

In view of the past and prevailing conditions, it is sensible for Pakistan to seek to off-load some of the past baggage and find new bases for its relations with the US.

The state functionaries and most strategic analysts in the immediate post-9/11 era hardly paid attention to a wrong precedent which was being set in the immediate post-9/11 period. The ease with which the US was able to coerce Pakistan into a partnership in war on terror set a wrong precedent in Pakistan-US relations. Such ease could have potentially exaggerated (and it did) the effectiveness of US coercive approach toward Pakistan.

In other words, it convinced the US leadership that Pakistan was an easy target, tempting it to repeat the performance in its future demands on and dealing with that country.

Soon after Pakistan unconditionally became the frontline state in the American war on terror, the evidence of growing differences between the two partners started mounting. Their positions started clashing on a number of important questions, including the status of Kashmiri groups and the post-Taliban political setup in Afghanistan.

In fact, the nature and requirements of the war on terror worldwide cast serious doubt about the smooth future of the new Pakistan-US relationship. Pakistan must have readied itself for many disappointments on these issues. Notwithstanding laborious diplomatic explanations and rationalizations, its painful policy turn-about on the post-Taliban political dispensation was a case in point. It must also have readied itself to accept its diminishing importance to the American war on terrorism the world over. Of course, Pakistan was and is still the most critical state for the American war on terror originating from the Afghan soil. However, as the Americans took their anti-terror war to other parts of the world, Pakistan lost its important status of a frontline state in the American anti-terror war. It became marginally relevant to the expanding American anti-terror war the world over. It is needless to say that the relevance of Pakistan for the American war on terror in one country was hardly sufficient condition for building an enduring strategic relationship between the two countries. Therein lie the dilemma for Pakistan.

On the one hand, the continued American war on the Taliban or/and the American need for cooperation of Pakistan to impose American solutions on the knotty Afghan problems ensured the flow of much-needed generous international and American support for it for some time. On the other, it was clear that if this war continued unabated, the opposition of some segments of the Pakistani population to the war was likely to intensify; such a situation was likely to produce unpleasant consequences, including operations against the local Taliban.

In addition, the continued American war against the Taliban was bound to frustrate the US policymakers, leading them to blame Pakistan for their failure to inflict an utter defeat on the Afghan Taliban. This is precisely what happened — a situation which our strategic planners and thinkers could not foresee. They seemed to have operated under the assumption that the US would not doubt the sincerity of their purpose and action and would readily accept the level of cooperation which they were providing it for its anti-terror war.

In view of the current situation, it will be again unwise to seek to revive the so-called strategic partnership with US on one point. That is, the American war on terror. The need is to supplement this point with expanded bases of Pakistan-US relationship which may not be strategic but friendly and frank in character. These bases must include both issues of high and low politics.

Dr Muhammad Islam

The writer is dean/director at Islamabad campus of Iqra University.

Email: mislam89@hotmail.com