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Wednesday April 24, 2024

Policy and protocol

By Shahzad Chaudhry
September 16, 2016

Part - I

General Raheel Sharif spoke of five things in his September 6 speech: the completion of the kinetic operations of Zarb-e-Azb in Fata; the importance of the supporting manoeuvre via the National Action Plan and other elements of good governance to sustain the gains from Operation Zarb-e-Azb; the criticality and hence the resolve to fully implement the CPEC as a national mission; relations with Afghanistan; and relations with India.

In case of the last two, he pitched in with how the army views those relationships. Surprisingly, the speech did not find fancy on the talk-show circuit, probably to keep the importance of it at a low key, though there remained seething anger among many for the nature of comments and the office from where these came. I write to allay some of those reservations.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb first. Raheel Sharif placed it in its complete perspective with establishing its centrality for Pakistan in ridding itself off the bane of terrorism. To the cynic it has always been ‘give up the policies which had in the first place given birth to such groups fanning terror, now come back to haunt the state’ – snakes in the backyard analogy. And they wouldn’t be too wrong, except that they are unwilling to accept that such a change in policy has been in play for quite some time. Losing more than 5,000 lives is far too expensive for any duality to hide behind fancy notions howsoever strategic.

General Sharif stated that ‘to many, Operation Zarb-e-Azb is an operation; to us, Pakistanis, it is a war of survival (baqa ki jang)’. He then listed three facets of it. The kinetic operations in Fata are almost done and over; though we continue to clear pockets around the Afghan border and its difficult reaches – minor revisits to some of these regions will continue as a necessity in the months ahead since sealing the border in entirety is impractical.

There is an accompanying manoeuvre in support of Operation Zarb-e-Azb all across Pakistan by the paramilitaries and the police, with the military in tow where needed. Two parallel operations, IBOs (intelligence-based operations) and combing operations will reinforce the kinetic gains achieved in Fata. A combination of these three facets make for the Zarb-e-Azb emblem and complete what lay in the domain of the military as its primary function.

These are detect, nab and prosecute actions across our towns and cities against terror affiliates, sleeper cells and their sympathisers; these are also meant to eliminate the facilitators for the hard-core terrorists who after finding entry into Pakistan from Afghanistan are logistically supported by them. This is akin to ‘draining the pool’.

To some the pool should have been first drained from where the stench to them was the closest. There will be priorities. In the larger construct though, when the pool drains there will simply be no place for anyone – Haqqanis, the LeT or the JeM, and anything else that catches the fancy of the cynic – to hide or find a sanctuary.

To someone like Modi or Ashraf Ghani, or even the US which parrots both, that may not be convincing. But are we to bend backwards and reverse our priorities to suit the pleasure of the two, or three, worthies? We have started the job and are at the point of completing major components of it. The pieces are falling in their place. In the end, all have to go – those who found favour at some point and those who simply fostered in an enabling environment. If a policy recall recognises the need to make amends, we must also have the confidence that we will have the resolve to dispense what is macabre. Did we miss this larger point in General Raheel’s speech?

Next he spoke of sustaining the gains. This is right out of his strategy book. When you gain, you must then consolidate, which over time by doing a set of actions will then sustain the gains. No rocket science here. If a military man can get it, so can others. In Operation Zarb-e-Azb, what are those sustaining planks? The National Action Plan was a consequence of considerations which will help fight the war better.

Over time we found out it was the most central plank of the entire effort. This is ideological draining of the pool. It is essential to inhibit the supply of the raw material that sustains terror. That included stopping funding to these groups – through all avenues, domestic and foreign, so that the nexus of extremism and militancy is broken – along with a host of other governance matters that relate both to policy and conduct which will, over time help us win this war. The apex committees at the provincial level were meant to periodically review these.

In a nation whose Cabinet Committee on National Security only meets once a year, or even less, why would you think that the political and military synergy so important to fight and win wars would find root elsewhere? The politics of war had taken leave after being outsourced to the military. This for a nation at war. Is the chief so misplaced as to tell the government that without its supporting manoeuvre the gains on the battlefield will only be temporary?

The response, despite the fourteen months lapse since NAP was first conceived, has been woeful. Instead the politicians relish in their shenanigans. Churchill was not special because he was a super politician; in fact he got politically clobbered as soon as the war was done. He was special and has lived in history because he owned the challenge of war and synergised an entire nation’s response to a war that was central to his nation’s survival. Our politics still has time to mend its ways and, taking a leaf from Churchill, ensure that the primer outlined in the principles of political conduct in an existential war are attended to.

We fail at NAP; we fail at this war. This country will never be the way we have wanted it to be. NAP is fundamental to breaking and fighting this nexus of radicalism, extremism, militancy and terrorism. Add to it the essence of good governance and rule of law and then only can society and state reorient themselves to a more sustaining normalcy. NAP, and more, will have to be enacted to reclaim this country from the dark forces that have shadowed its future for long.

To be continued

The writer is a retired air-vice marshal, former ambassador and a security and political analyst.

Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com