Increased transparency of nuclear arsenals and fissile materials is an indispensable prerequisite for any meaningful move towards nuclear arms control reductions. By removing the unnecessary secrecy surrounding the global nuclear weapons stockpiles, we can prevent the theft or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons as well as undermine the rationale for continued relevance on them. However, nuclear weapons of all four de-facto nuclear weapons states, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea, remain mired in secrecy. When it comes to North Korea, especially, there is very little authentic information available about the extent of the country’s centrifuge enrichment infrastructure. Few diplomats believe the official story because North Korea has denied in the past even credible information and evidence of its undisclosed nuclear activities. The country was pursuing efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability since the late 1990s but it chose to deny the existence of a highly enriched uranium programme for weapons until May 2010. It remains uncertain if the Yongbyon centrifuge plant is the only uranium enrichment plant operated by Pyongyang. In December 2010, Glyn Davies, US ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), revealed that North Korea was operating than one clandestine uranium enrichment facilities in other parts of the country. But the Obama administration has yet to provide any empirical evidence to back up this claim other than arguments based on circumstantial evidence. The absence of crucial empirical information on enrichment-related activities can be explained by the fact that it is always much easier to hide uranium enrichment facilities from aerial surveillance than it is to hide plutonium facilities. In addition, it is hard to find out, without adequate ground-based human intelligence, if a country is operating only a small-scale centrifuge enrichment programme or a large-scale uranium enrichment plant. According to a recent study, North Korea has 4-8 weapons from highly enriched uranium but these estimates are not based on any empirical evidence. The estimates of the exact amount of enriched uranium and how much of that enriched uranium is really weapon-grade uranium (WGU) are also dominated by uncertainties. With such large gaps in the information, a central challenge for nuclear experts is to understand North Korea’s changing nuclear posture and its future goals. North Korea’s nuclear establishment has been working on nuclear weaponisation for more than three decades and, according to American intelligence officials, may have received critical assistance from other countries. This information has been corroborated by multiple sources. Even former president Gen (r) Pervez Musharraf admitted in his book ‘In the Lind of Fire’ that Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan “transferred nearly two dozen P-1 and P-2 centrifuges to North Korea. He also provided North Korea with a flow meter, some special oils for centrifuges, and coaching on centrifuge technology, including visits top-secret centrifuge plants.” Similarly, there is evidence of North Korea hiring Chinese companies for procurement of certain dual-use items. These revelations support the view that North Korea could even build a plutonium-based miniaturised nuclear warhead for its Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and the Taepodong-2 missile. North Korea is pursuing successive nuclear weapons designs because of a relatively limited stock of plutonium. However, with the passage of time, North Korea’s nuclear establishment has been able to reduce the amount of plutonium it needed for each weapon. The country is using plutonium for its miniaturised devices because weapons based on enriched uranium have a large diameter, which makes it difficult for them to be mounted on a Nodong (MRBM) missile. Adopting an aggressive military posture, North Korea is the only nuclear state that has openly threatened the use of nuclear weapons for coercion even during times of peace. On the other hand, the international community led by the United States cannot resort to the use of force due to fears of escalation. The North Korean government, due to its internal weaknesses, feels cornered by the inside and from potential external adversaries. By denying exact information about its nuclear designs to adversary, the regime wants to limit the leverage the outside powers can exert. Many North Korean officials argue that the Kim regime would also be more likely to use weapons against South Korean and Japanese cities because the country expects early use of nuclear weapons by the United States in case of conflict. The argument sounds totally illogical because the US has no reason to launch a nuclear attack on North Korea unless it becomes clear that the latter is launching its nuclear weapons against Japan and South Korea. If a nuclear attack does take place, the consequences will be unimaginable. It has been estimated that if North Korea uses a 10 kilotons (10,000 tons of TNT) nuclear weapon against Seoul, it would promptly kill more than 150,000 people. And even if the North Korean nuclear weapon had a 1-kiloton yield, the casualties would still be in thousands, depending on the exact target point location. In this situation, it is very difficult to predict the future of North Korea’s nuclear programme because of uncertainties involved in assessing the growth of the programme. However, there are three possible scenarios that could determine the future of North Korea’s nuclear programme. First, in a continuation of current trajectory, Pyongyang would have 20 to 30 weapons by 2020. This assessment assumes that North Korea would continue to build small weapons. Second, due to further technological advances, North Korea’s nuclear establishment could build a formidable nuclear force and mount miniaturised weapons on short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Further, the Kim regime might even think about developing advanced single-stage thermonuclear weapons. Very few nuclear experts have considered the third possible scenario where the Kim regime collapses due to internal political pressures. In such a scenario, different political factions will try to take control of nuclear weapons. If they succeed, these factions will not show any hesitation in using nuclear weapons against other factions in their struggle for political survival. This scenario is deadly because the collapse of the Kim regime will deprive all military and political elites of their privileged positions. The ensuing disorder will leave them with no option but to join criminal organisations and the black market for their economic survival. Making the situation further complicated for the global community, they may even choose to use those weapons against external powers like Japan and South Korea, or sell nuclear devices to terrorist organisations. Email: rizwanasghar5@unm.edu
