Peace through war

The writer is a former high commissioner of

Pakistan to India, and is currently president of the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), Islamabad

Pakistan’s genuine efforts aside, peace in Afghanistan remains hopelessly elusive. Another round of full-scale civil war now appears ineluctable to determine who finally prevails and controls Kabul – and then eventually the whole of Afghanistan. Is Afghanistan reverting to 1996?

The mess that has been created over the years is now beyond any single power to fix it. Diplomacy, the art of the possible, seems to have run its course. Arguably, some players are simply not interested in peace. They would rather prefer a chaotic Afghanistan at least for some more years to come. Pakistan must be wary lest it is held responsible yet again for the failures of others.

The chasms dividing the internal and external stakeholders are not difficult to understand. Internally, how can Ashraf Ghani, Abdullah Abdullah et al acquiesce in a settlement that is contrary to the country’s constitution? Increasingly marginalised, holding the next presidential election in September this year appears to be their topmost priority. This will give them more time and space to re-establish their legal and political credentials, putting pressure on the US against an agreement with the Taliban that is to their political disadvantage. Ashraf Ghani and company must also be worried at the prospect of the US troops leaving Afghanistan.

The Afghan national security forces not only lack capacity and conviction to inflict a decisive defeat on the Taliban, they are also facing daily desertions adding to their woes. Moreover, sustaining the ANSF would be a Herculean task, given meagre national resources and the lack of appetite on part of the international community to generate over $4 billion yearly for at least another decade or so.

On the other hand, how can the Taliban endorse the present Afghan constitution which they consider un-Islamic? Should the latter do so, that would negate the very purpose of their movement. The Taliban leadership is unlikely to make fatal compromises that push their cadre away. And then, as we all know, democracy and elections are not where they draw their strength from. They are committed to re-establishing an Islamic Emirate with some modulations to keep the US on their side. The Taliban cannot get a better interlocutor in the US than President Trump who may be averse to Talibanisation but not necessarily the Taliban.

As regards the external stakeholders, the US under President Trump is keen to reach a modus vivendi with the Taliban which among other things also allows the US to remain the key player in Afghanistan both in political and economic terms. It is inconceivable that the US would leave the resource-rich region to the advantage of both China and Russia.

Trump considers the two countries bigger threats to the US than terrorism. Speaking to Fox TV recently, President Trump has clearly stated that even if the US withdraws its combat troops from Afghanistan, it would still maintain a very strong intelligence presence in the country.

As for China and Russia, both want the US to leave Afghanistan – but not in haste. Their trilateral talks with the US are aimed at preventing Afghanistan to become once again a safe haven for ETIM, Chechen militants and global networks like Al-Qaeda and Daesh. Hence they are not opposed to the Taliban so long as the latter abide by their commitment to not allow Afghanistan’s soil be used for violence and terrorism abroad.

A peaceful Afghanistan, not necessarily democratic, is also important in the context of BRI and CPEC. However, China is unlikely to invest at full throttle in the Aynak copper mines until it is convinced that its investments are secure. China has still to tread a long way to catch up with the US and ultimately become the world’s biggest economy. It needs stability; it cannot afford to get embroiled in imbroglios.

India has other issues. Its Afghanistan policy has mostly been driven by the hostile dynamics of Pakistan-India relations. It has invested close to $3 billion in Afghanistan since 9/11, which helped it to make further inroads into Afghanistan to Pakistan’s disadvantage. A chaotic Afghanistan with a pro-India government suits India to continue pursuing its offensive-defensive doctrine inside Pakistan.

India is following a multi-pronged policy to keep Pakistan under pressure on Kashmir and CPEC. It wants the US to stay on in Afghanistan, knowing full well that a Taliban-led government would be averse to its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan. As it is growing economically, India would prefer to develop and use Chabahar for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia rather than through Pakistan. Ergo, it sees no merit in reviving Saarc and, in its policy estimation, favouring Pakistan.

Like Pakistan, Iran also hosts Afghan refugees. Logically speaking, it may prefer the hostile US to leave its neighbourhood. However, it may not be too excited about a US-Taliban reconciliation and would rather like to see the US withdrawing from Afghanistan in defeat and humiliation.

As regards Pakistan, it can neither be oblivious to the game plans of others nor its legitimate interests. Whereas it cannot object to Afghanistan’s growing relations with India. Nevertheless, if these relations unquestionably work against Pakistan then the latter has every right to be concerned and protect its interests.

Islamabad must let the US and others know that Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban is limited. In fact, the Taliban cannot be dictated, especially when they are now controlling a vast swath of Afghanistan. They do not need so-called ‘safe havens’ in Pakistan.

On the other hand, our public statements to the effect that peace in Afghanistan cannot be realised without Pakistan hardly make any sense. When Pakistan itself makes tall claims and is then unable to deliver, it gives others good reasons to bludgeon it.

The US should also clearly understand how deeply Pakistan is concerned about India’s unhelpful activities in Afghanistan. India has penetrated into the NDS and is using it against Pakistan through militant outfits. Moreover, unless all the regional countries share responsibility, and refrain from using the Afghan soil for their respective myopic interests, reconciliation efforts are bound to fail.

As the Doha process is not yet officially dead, and in case there is no agreement by September, it would be imprudent to hold the presidential election in Afghanistan. Once the election is held in September, it will render achieving national reconciliation far more difficult. An elected president would demur to sharing power and playing second fiddle to the Taliban.

Prime Minister Imran Khan is to meet President Trump in the White House on July 22. Let’s hope the prime minister is able to utilise the occasion to the maximum. Good luck, Mr Prime Minister.