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Tuesday March 19, 2024

What’s cooking in the KSA?

By Dr Naazir Mahmood
June 24, 2017

On June 21, the Saudi king changed his mind. He announced that the crown prince – 57-year-old Prince Mohammad bin Nayef – is no longer in the line for royal succession in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Instead, the king’s son – 31-year old Prince Mohammad bin Salman – was appointed the new crown prince. The former crown prince was not only deprived of his possible kingship, but he was also removed from his position as interior minister.

The king’s son has been elevated to the position of deputy prime minister, in addition to his existing portfolio as the defence minister. Apparently, this decision was taken in consultation with the council that is responsible for matters of succession. The council was created in 2006, prior to which it was the sole responsibility of the king to appoint his successor. The present king has been in power just for two-and-a-half years. In this short period, it has been difficult to determine what the kingdom is up to.

The former king, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, a step-brother of the present king had died in January 2015, leaving a kingdom that had remained without any major domestic liberalisation for generations. Three months after assuming power, King Salman made his first change of the crown prince when Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz – another one of his step-brothers – was replaced by his nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef. The new king’s son was made the deputy crown prince. This triggered speculations about his possible elevation. The now-removed crown prince had been leading Saudi counter-terrorism efforts. In that capacity, he was known to have initiated major operations against Al-Qaeda.

The new crown prince has been active, not only in the Saudi intervention in Yemen but also in making plans for a post-oil economy for the KSA. An important development on the international front during the past couple of years has been the increasing tension with Iran. Both the KSA and Iran have been locking horns in Syria and Yemen and the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has been vocal against the KSA.

For Iran, the agreements worth $3.5b between the US and the KSA have become a major issue. The new crown prince is reported to have played an important role in negotiating that agreement, in feting Trump in Riyadh, and in securing promises from the US for the sale of arms worth over $1.5b – which is one of the largest arms deals in world history. The US president and foreign secretary have declared that the deal was aimed at containing Iran.

This extraordinary Saudi tilt towards the US has left its traditional allies in a lurch. For example, the politico-religious parties in Pakistan – such as the JI and the JUI, which were allies of the Saudis and the Americans in the Afghan wars during the 1980s and 1990s – have turned their ire against the US since 2001. Be it a pro-Taliban narrative or a free-Aafia campaign, such parties have been strongly critical of the US.                    Even our governments have been visibly upset about the killing of terrorists such as Mehsud and Mansour.

The narrative of the religious right in Pakistan has been overwhelmingly anti-American since 2001. Most religious outfits – both Shia and Sunni –have projected the US as a primarily anti-Muslim power that is bent upon destroying the Islamic Ummat (the Ummah of the Zia lexicon). The Nato intervention led by the US in Afghanistan targeted the Taliban and Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden, who was a hero to the JI, JUI, and countless other jihadi entities. So where does the KSA lead us now?

The KSA has been as ambiguous in its policies as us – keeping a soft corner for those who have been declared terrorists by not only the Western powers but also by major international organisations, and then announcing an unequivocal support to the war on terror. Even Trump was furiously against the KSA in his pre-election campaign. But now he has reconsidered his initial stance by declaring the KSA as the primary ally of the US in fighting terrorism. The Saudi leadership is likely to receive complete American support with the new crown prince.

Internally, the KSA is likely to see some liberalisation as the new crown prince has been encouraging cultural activities and theatrical performances. Even women may get the right to drive and travel without the permission of the closest male relative. The centres of power in Pakistan, the KSA and the US appear to be more interested in retaining and strengthening their control over their own people and within their spheres internationally.

So again, what is the KSA up to? Well, they appear to be doing what Pakistan and the US are likely to continue doing – projecting themselves as the champions in the war against terror and indulging in military buildup.    In this game of thrones, the local political and religious allies will inevitably remain confused.

 

The writer holds a PhD from the
University of Birmingham, UK and works in Islamabad.

Email: Mnazir1964@yahoo.co.uk